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Saladin is the Kurdish warrior
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The ISIMÕs five-year formative period is drawing to a close. The institute is
nearly functioning at full capacity of academic staff and fellows. Last year
an evaluation report was drawn up by Peter Geschiere (Leiden Universi-
ty/University of Amsterdam), Barbara Metcalf (University of California at
Davis), and Merle Rickleffs (University of Melbourne) (see www.isim.nl).
The reflection upon the ISIMÕs recent past and ensuing changes were
the more crucial because ISIMÕs first and current Academic Director,
Muhammad Khalid Masud, will be retiring in September 2003. His
unique expertise that combines a profound and lived knowledge of Is-
lamic law and society with a keen interest in the humanities and social
sciences has shaped the ISIM research agenda over the last four years.
Much to the benefit of the ISIM he succeeded in attracting the coopera-
tion of leading scholars in the broad field of the study of Muslim soci-
eties and cultures. Some of these colleagues pay homage to Khalid
Masud in this issue of the ISIM Newsletter (Eickelman, pp. 14Ð15; Mes-
sick, pp. 16Ð17, and Moosa 30Ð1). When I told him of these special fea-
tures Khalid Masud commented jokingly that it is, indeed, preferable to
see oneÕs obituaries when still alive! Among the most modest and unas-
suming international scholars, Khalid MasudÕs legacy is already evident
and the appreciation of his scholarship and intellectual acuity is not lim-
ited to Western academia. Last April he was awarded the Iqbal Award in
Pakistan for his book IqbalÕs Reconstruction of Ijtihad. 
With his retirement the ISIM loses not only a great
scholar, but also a true Muslim intellectual who
shows great concern for social, political, and
moral dynamics within Muslim societies and com-
munities, including those in Europe. Much of his
work is also aimed at stimulating an open and
critical discourse among Muslims and connecting
intellectual debates with developments at the grassroots level. In par-
ticular his observation that today too much sacredness is attached to
the past (see his interview with Tayob, pp. 18Ð19) demonstrates this
concern. It accentuates his use of the past Ð not to reconstruct it but to
historicize the great Islamic tradition and its openness to change. In
this spirit are Khalid MasudÕs writings on the fourteenth-century schol-
ar al-Shatibi, which are among his most influential scholarly output. 
MasudÕs scholarship being unique, the ISIM was of course obliged to
open itself to a different profile for a successor. In its search, the ISIM
relied on the joint commitment of the ISIM Chairs. Contrary to the first
years, when Khalid Masud and Martin van Bruinessen were the only
ISIM Chairs, with the appointments of Annelies Moors in 2001 and Ab-
dulkader Tayob in 2002 the ISIM has gained the critical mass needed to
enhance its research capacity. 
Asef Bayat, the ISIM Academic Director and ISIM Chair at Leiden Univer-
sity from September 2003 onwards (see p. 5), has followed a somewhat
different, if not reverse, trajectory of academic interests to that of Khalid
Masud: Bayat started his research on the working classes, later moving to
issues concerning faith. Nonetheless, both share the lived experience of
dramatic change in their home countries and prolonged exile.
One of the changes that followed from the evaluation of the ISIM was
the dissolution of its twin advisory committees: the International Advi-
sory Committee and the Academic Committee. Instead, a new and sin-
gle Advisory Committee is presently in formation. In particular the
input of the Academic Committee has been vital in the success of the
ISIM in establishing itself internationally within a short span of time,
also because several of its members have been actively engaged in
ISIM activities and are among the contributors to the ISIM Newsletter,
this issue being no exception.
After eleven issues published in tabloid style, the ISIM
Newsletter Ð as well as the ISIM Website Ð has been re-
vamped. Some of the functions of the Newsletter have been
transferred to the website, such as the international agenda
of conferences and workshops, as the Internet offers a more
up to date and interactive instrument. The website has more
than this to offer (see p. 11). The aim is to create a greater in-
teraction between the Newsletter and the website. Back is-
sues of the ISIM Newsletter are available on the site
(www.isim.nl) and they will also be published on cd-rom. As
in the past, we invite your comments and suggestions.
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n  If Frits Staal had read my entire article instead of relying
on his bad suspicion, he might have understood that a care-
ful distinction between Islam and violence is indeed made in
my work, none of which is intended in the sense as indicated
by Staal. In the article, I was simply affirming that these
three tales of converts Ð to quote from the article Ð ÔÉdeeply
affected the American imagery and brought about a re-
awakening, or even the discovery of an interest in the Islam
of converts, which until recently with few exceptions was
mainly considered to be a phenomenon limited to the black
Muslims movement of Elijah Muhammad and nowadays of
Louis Farrakhan (of whom John Allen had been a follower),
and consequently almost thought of as an ÒethnicÓ oddityÕ.
Of course, Staal is free to find what h e likes to find, however
astounding his findings may be.
S T E F A N O A L LIE V I
D IC K D O U WE S
N E W  F E L L O W S
The ISIM welcomes the following new fellows:
Ph.D. Fellows
Ð Chuzaifah, M.A.: 
ÔIndonesian Migrant Domestic Workers in the G u l f :
Transnational Relations, the Dynamics of Religion,
a n d t h e Construction of I d e n t i t i e s Õ
Ð Miriam Gazza, M.A.:
ÔRa Music in Holland:
A Question of Identity, Islam, and GenderÕ
Post-doctoral Fellows
Ð Dr Marloes Janson:
ÔAppropriating Islam: Finoos (Islamic Bards) as Brokers
between Global Islam and Local Culture in The Gambia
(West Africa)Õ
Ð Dr Frank Peter: 
ÔReligious Authorities in French Islam:
A Case Study of ÒImamsÓ in the Union of I s l a m i c
Organizations in France (UOIF)Õ
Visiting Fellow
Ð Dr Saba Mahmood
University of Chicago
Dear Editor,
n When the ISIM Newsletter 11 opens its first page with a
colossal howler, there must be something deeply wrong with
the author, the editorial office, or both. Stefano Allievi, in the
bold-faced introduction to his leading article on ÔConverts
and the Making of European IslamÕ, which is also the first
paragraph of the Newsletter, calls attention to three people:
Jonny Walker, Ôlabelled ÒJonny the TalibanÓÕ; Jos Padilla,
Ôloaded with explosivesÕ; and John Allen Williams, Ôthe serial
killerÕ. So far so good. The readerÕs attention is awakened. And
then comes the final sentence of that little paragraph: ÔThese
three tales have nothing in common, apart from the fact that
all three protagonists are converts to Islam.Õ
The reader wonders: Nothing else in common? What about
a pathological obsession with violence? Do the author and
ISIM wish to strengthen and further spread the idea that Islam
and violence are the same? Or does it go without saying?
F R I T S S T A A L
Frits Staal, University of California at Berkeley
h t t p : / / p h i l o s o p h y . b e r k e l e y . e d u / s t a a l /
L E T T E R  T O  T H E  E D I T O R
I S I M
Asef Bayat grew up in Iran in a rural
Azeri-Turkish migrant community lo-
cated in the central province. For the
sake of schooling his family moved to
Tehran in the 1960s where he attended
an Islamic school followed by a gov-
ernment high school and then college,
earning a bachelorÕs degree in political
science. As a rural immigrant living in
an urban environment and cognizant
of the burgeoning political dissent in
Iran, he developed a keen interest in
social and political issues from an early
age. He was involved in student poli-
tics from the early 1970s and partici-
pated in the Iranian Revolution, in the
course of which he left Iran for England
to pursue graduate studies at the Uni-
versity of Kent. He obtained his Ph.D.
degree in sociology and politics in the
Interdisciplinary Studies Programme in
1984. The following year he was a post-
doctoral fellow at the Center for Mid-
dle Eastern Studies at the University of
California, Berkeley. His desire to re-
turn to the Middle East, learn Arabic,
and experience life in a country other
than Iran took him to Egypt, to the
American University in Cairo, where he
has been teaching since 1986. In that
period he also served as visiting pro-
fessor at the University of California
(Berkeley), Columbia University, and
the University of Oxford. 
With Iran, England, the United States,
and Egypt as vantage points, and with
linguistic competency in Persian, Azeri
Turkish, and Arabic, Asef Bayat has
been uniquely positioned to engage in
empirical comparative research on
contemporary Muslim societies that
draw on and make a contribution to
contemporary social theory. For his Ph.D. he studied popular mobiliza-
tion during IranÕs Islamic revolution and was the first and only student
to conduct field research in factories and neighbourhoods during the
turbulent revolutionary years. This study, Workers and Revolution in
I r a n, was published in London in 1987. Attempting to locate the Iranian
experience in the broader, largely non-Muslim, developing world, he
later conducted a comparative study by examining similar experiences
in a number of such areas. The result was a volume entitled Work, Poli-
tics and Power (London and New York, 1991). 
A witness to the profound social and political changes unleashed in
both Iran (under the Islamic state) and Egypt (through its powerful Is-
lamist movement), BayatÕs work took a new direction. He documents
broader social transformations in Iran in the book S t r e e t Politics: Poor
PeopleÕs Movements in Iran (New York, 1998), which draws partially on
his own life experience and examines the particular politics of the
urban poor, the m u s t a z ' a f i n, from the 1970s through the post-revolu-
tionary years until 1992. Theoretically, the book breaks new ground in
social movement theory by offering a fresh conceptual framework
(Ôquiet encroachment of the ordinaryÕ) to understand poor peoplesÕ
movements in the global South. 
As he has become more familiar with so-
ciety and politics of Egypt and acquaint-
ed with other parts of the Middle East,
BayatÕs research has taken on a more
comparative regional dynamic. In his lat-
est, forthcoming, book Post-Islamism:
Socio-religious Movements and Political
Change in the Middle East Bayat traces
socio-religious movements in the Mus-
lim Middle East with a particular focus
on Iran and Egypt in the past thirty
years. This historical-sociological study
examines the transformation of political
Islam into both a Ôpost-Islamist polityÕ (a
project and movement that adheres to
an inclusive religiosity) and a Ôpost-Is-
lamist pietyÕ (a fragmented trend of indi-
vidualized piousness). Here, Bayat pays
particular attention to the major agents
of change Ð social movements of the in -
tellectuals, the youth, students, women,
and the poor Ð who attempt to articu-
late new visions of society and politics
under the regimes of power that owe
their legitimacy to identifying with Is-
lamic orthodoxy. At the same time, a
comparison of Iran and Egypt allows for
an examination of the logic behind both
the vitality and stagnation in religious
thought in distinctly Muslim communi-
ties, and helps explore how socio-reli-
gious movements are able to animate,
or impede, democratic transformation
in the contemporary Muslim world and
how they may influence the dynamics of
transnational Islamist movements. 
Meanwhile, Bayat continues to pur-
sue his ongoing interests in diverse so-
cial issues pertinent to the Middle East
including urbanization, social develop-
ment, and the youth. He plans to ex-
pand his inquiry into the cultural poli-
tics of Muslim youth from the perspective of social movements and so-
cial change in the Muslim societies. Bayat is emphatic that scholarly in-
quiry includes rigorous attention to both the production of empirical
knowledge and theoretical elaborations. Bayat hopes that this double
engagement will serve to de-marginalize and ÔnormalizeÕ the study of
Muslim societies. His extensive involvement in international research
networks and cooperation with scholars within and beyond the Middle
East Ð in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia, Latin America, Europe, and
North America Ð represent an attempt to engage questions of impor-
tance to Muslim societies with those of the non-Muslim world.
As ISIM Academic Director, Bayat will continue with and extend the
ISIMÕs commitment to interdisciplinary and comparative research, as
well as international and national outreach, by building on his vast in-
ternational experience and his conviction of the need to integrate the
comparative advantages of both the social sciences and humanities.
His chair at LeidenÕs Department of Languages and Civilizations of the
Islamic Middle East is particularly relevant to his commitment to such
interdisciplinary engagement. 
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Asef Bayat joins the ISIM as Academic Director
and the ISIM Chair at Leiden University from
the American University in Cairo, Egypt,
where he worked as professor of sociology
and Middle East Studies. He brings to the ISIM
and Leiden his vast experience in the study of
contemporary Muslim societies from socio-
historical and political perspectives, with
social movements and social change as his
central focus. BayatÕs own life trajectories,
educational background, professional
experience, research interests, and
international connections complement
t h e scholarly areas, approach, and objectives
t h a t t h e ISIM pursues.
Asef Bayat
New ISIM Academic Director
M A R T IN  V A N  B R UIN E S S E N
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Eleven papers were presented at the
workshop ÕThe Production of Islamic
Knowledge in Western EuropeÕ, most of
which were based on new and ongoing
research. The topics discussed may be
roughly classed as follows: mosque and
ethno-religious association, religious
counsel and fatwa, and Muslim intellec-
t u a l s .
The mosque and ethno-
religious association 
AmirauxÕs paper focused on the mos-
que in the Rue dÕAlger in Paris, which
under the leadership of the remarkable
Larbi Kechat has become a major centre of intellectual debate and of en-
counter between Muslims and non-Muslims, in a didactic setting. The
mosque also engages in social counselling and contributes to practical as
well as discursive knowledge of Islamic norms. Amer spoke on the Min-
hajul Q u r ' a n movement in the Netherlands and Denmark, a distinct sub-
group within the Barelvi
movement that is gaining
much influence among the
younger Muslims of Pakistani
background and that appears
to appeal to non-Pakistani
Muslims, especially the youth,
as well. Along with the shift
from Urdu or Panjabi to Euro-
pean languages, the youth
movement is developing dis-
courses and practices  that
are significantly different from
those of the first generation
and that take explicit account
of the European context.
Thielmann described how in
a small town in Germany with
a heterogeneous but pre-
dominantly Turkish Muslim
population and a number of
competing mosques, the in-
creasing importance of Ger-
man as a common language
facilitated a shift from Ônation-
alÕ (c.q. Turkish) identity to
ideological preference as the
dominant factor in mosque
a f f i l i a t i o n .
Religious counsel
and fatwa
If a distinct European Islam
is developing, fatwas for
Muslims in Europe are an ob -
vious source for the study of
this process, the questions
(istifta) being perhaps even more signifi-
cant than the authoritative answers. The
concept of fiqh al-aqalliyyat , the theory
of religious obligations for Muslims in a
minority situation (cf. M. Khalid MasudÕs
article in ISIM Newsletter 11), has rapidly
gained popularity over the past few
years. The institution most directly asso-
ciated with it, the European Council for
Fatwa and Research (CaeiroÕs paper, see
also p. 26Ð7) appears to be establishing
itself as a leading, although by no means
uncontested, authority. An increasing
number of websites offer online fatwa
services for Muslims in Europe. Mariani
presented his analysis of such sites and his encounter with one of the
ulama behind them, the UK-based radical Omar Bakri. The discussions
further touched upon the more spontaneous television and telephone
fatwas and the interesting case of social counselling at a Paris mosque,
where social and psychological support comes with advice on proper
Muslim comportment Ð a sort of fatwa-giving without reference to fiqh. 
Muslim intellectuals
Whereas the ulama Ð from the mosque imam to such internationally
prominent scholars as Yusuf Qaradawi Ð may claim privileged access to
religious knowledge, Muslim intellectuals, who usually depart from
disciplines other than fiqh, have also made important contributions to
Islamic discourses. Two papers discussed relatively neglected groups
of such Muslim intellectuals: the mostly converted perennialist Sufis of
the Maryami tradition, whose esotericism has also some appeal to
highly educated, born Muslims in Europe (Sedgwick), and the French
intellectuals of Muslim background such as Mohammad Arkoun, who
are more visible in the secular French public sphere than in Muslim
media (Mas). The latter may be rejected as spokespersons for Islam by
many committed Muslims, but their influence on secular-minded Mus-
lims should not be under-estimated.
I S I M/ W o r k s h o p
ÕThe Production of Islamic Knowledge in
Western EuropeÕ, one of the twelve parallel
workshops at the Fourth Mediterranean Social
and Political Research Meeting of the Robert
Schuman Centre, European University
InstituteÕs Mediterranean Program (Florence,
19Ð23 March 2003), was devoted to the theme
of ISIMÕs research project under the same
name (see www.isim.nl). The workshop,
directed by Martin van Bruinessen and
Stefano Allievi, brought together a group of
mostly young scholars presently engaged in
research on various aspects of religious
knowledge and authority.
The Production of
Islamic Knowledge 
in Western Europe
Ð Martin van Bruinessen ( I S I M ): ÔMaking and Unmaking
Muslim Religious Authority in Western EuropeÕ
Ð Stefano Allievi (University of Padua: Italy): ÔI s l a m i c
Voices, European Ears. Exploring the Gap between the
Production of Islamic Knowledge and its PerceptionÕ
Ð Jrn Thielmann (University of Mainz: Germany):
ÔChallenged Positions, Shifting Authorities: Muslim
Communities in a Small Town in Southwest GermanyÕ
Ð Valrie Amiraux (CNRS: Amiens, France): ÔC o m p e t e n c e
and Authority in the Muslim Community and Beyond:
A Case Study in ParisÕ
Ð Mohammed Amer ( I S I M ) : ÔEmerging European Islam:
The Case of the Minhajul Qur'an in the NetherlandsÕ
Ð Alexandre Caeiro (EHESS: Paris): ÔThe European Council
for Fatwa and ResearchÕ
Ð Ermete Mariani (Universit Lumire Lyon: France):
ÔFatwa on-line: Proposition pour une mthode de lectureÕ
Ð Mark Sedgwick (American University of Cairo: Egypt):
ÔThe Renaissance Returns to Europe by Way of Tehran:
Traditionalism and the Localization of IslamÕ
Ð Ruth Mas (University of Toronto): ÔProducing ÒIslamÓ in
French: The Discourse of Muslim Intellectuals in the French
P r e s s Õ
Ð Nadia Fadil (Catholic University of Leuven: Belgium):
ÔEuropean Islam: An Individualized Religiosity? About
Islamic Religiosity and its Relationship to Islamic
K n o w l e d g e Õ
Ð Johan Geets and Christiane Timmerman ( U n i v e r s i t y
of Antwerp: Belgium): ÔThe Significance of Islamic
Knowledge for Highly Educated Muslims in BelgiumÕ
The papers will be posted at the European University InstituteÕs
website: www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Mediterranean/mspr2003
A scene from the workshop.
P A P E R S  P R E S E N T E D
Martin van Bruinessen
is the ISIM Chair at
Utrecht University.
I S I M/ L e c t u r e
case of covered dress, key concepts are
not so much rights and sacrifices, but
rather religious obligations and fash-
ion, external appearance and inner
states of being, and notions of individ-
ual and collective responsibility Ð all is-
sues that are addressed in public de-
bates and that women refer to when
discussing their dressing styles. Yet,
whereas in public debate dichotomies
such as traditional versus modern, cul-
turally authentic versus westernized, and subordinated versus emanci-
pated are commonly employed, womenÕs narratives point to the prob-
lems involved in employing such contrast schemes. Many accommo-
date to the styles of dress appropriate in their social circles, while oth-
ers go against the mainstream, by either uncovering or covering more
strictly. Notions of traditionality or cultural authenticity are quickly
subverted when the long-term influences from Istanbul, Europe, or
Saudi Arabia, as well as the importance of fashion, are taken into ac-
c o u n t .
Migrant domestic labour
A third field of research centres on the cultural politics of migrant do-
mestic labour. During the last decades paid domestic labour, often per-
formed by migrant women, has become a growth sector on a global
scale. Forms of migrant domestic work can productively be investigat-
ed in its relations to ÔMuslim cultural politicsÕ. Religious networks and
institutions are instrumental in recruitment; overt forms of Ôpolitical re-
ligionÕ are very present in public debates; and more covert cultural and
religious notions are submerged in normative ideas about the family,
labour, and domesticity. If much work on transnational migration has
dealt with the engagements of male migrants in transnational politi-
cal-religious movements, a focus on migrant domestic workers high-
lights how women take part in, and are objects of, debates about reli-
gious-cultural identities, and how they are involved in the embodied
expressions of religion that are embedded in the micro-politics of do-
mestic relations.
In short, ÔMuslim cultural politicsÕ deals with not only textual, but also
embodied and material practices. It includes not only intellectuals and
political leaders involved in public debates, but also subaltern women
as agents. Addressing such topics as acquiring gold through the
dower, covered dress and fashion, and migrant domestic labour
demonstrates to what extent the lines between the public and the pri-
vate are blurred. The subtitle of the inaugural lecture, ÔWhatÕs Islam Got
To Do With ItÕ alludes to the unease some may feel about linking such
mundane topics with Islam. Those who do not consider these topics
worthy of inquiry may well work with a modernist concept of religion.
This programme, in contrast, starts from the perspectives of those re-
lating cultural politics in one way or another to Islam. This is not an ar-
gument for returning to an Orientalist perspective that sees Islam a pri-
o r i as an all-encompassing system that determines peopleÕs lives, but
for including an actorÕs point of view and for a thorough contextualiza-
tion of cultural practices and their politics.
A N N E L IE S  M O OR S
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ÕMuslim cultural politicsÕ is shorthand
for the politics of culture that Muslims
engage in and consider in some sense
as related to Islam or Muslim culture.
This programme investigates emerg-
ing forms of culture production and
performances with a focus on how par-
ticular notions, practices, and partici-
pants become authoritative while oth-
ers are increasingly marginalized. Fam-
ily dynamics and gender have turned
out to be particularly productive as a prism to work through, both be-
cause the family and gender have strong symbolic salience and be-
cause starting from the family and gender further broadens the no-
tions of Ôthe politicalÕ. It shifts the attention from politics at the level of
the state to the daily-lived micro-politics of family relations and the
ways in which the family is symbolically and materially employed in
politics. 
Central to the various research projects included in this programme
is an investigation of the links between public debates and everyday
life. Such a turn to the everyday is an argument for inclusiveness, con-
necting the public to the private in terms of how these spheres are
constitutive of each other, overlap, and intertwine. Rather than seeing
daily practices of ordinary people as engaged in flexible and fluid per-
formances and creative productions versus participants in public de-
bates as employing essentialist notions of Islam, the programme inves-
tigates the various and possibly competing notions of Islam and Mus-
lim culture employed in public debates as well as in everyday life. Cur-
rently, projects are dealing with three fields of investigation: family law
debates and the everyday, the body politics of representation, and the
cultural politics of migrant domestic labour.
Family law and gold jewellery
If conventional accounts of Muslim family law have often concen-
trated on an analysis of texts, this programme focuses on public de-
bates about family law and investigates peopleÕs engagements with
legal institutions. Public debates in the 1990s often entailed the in-
volvement of a greater variety of participants and publics, including
not only religious authorities and state officials, but also womenÕs or-
ganizations, the Islamists, and human rights NGOs. 
Turning to other forms of engagement with the legal system,
womenÕs strategies with respect to the dower have been studied. A
substantial part of the dower Ð the sum of money the groom has to pay
the bride and that is to remain her own property Ð is usually spent on
gold jewellery. Different categories of women do not only hold differ-
ent points of view about the dower, but also engage in different prac-
tices with respect to buying and wearing gold jewellery. If, in public de-
bates about family law reform, secularists and Islamists hold opposing
points of view with respect to the dower and gold jewellery, lines of
demarcation do not follow those of party politics but rather tie in with
those of class, status, and lifestyle.
Covered dress and fashion
Not only wearing gold but also wearing particular styles of dress can
be seen as part and parcel of Muslim cultural politics Ð in this case, the
body politics of representation. Whereas both gold and clothing func-
tion as a way of making a statement in the public sphere, they occupy
different positions in the field of cultural politics. In the case of gold
jewellery women employ a quintessentially Islamic institution, the
dower, and are backed by both the legal system and public opinion if
they claim their rights; gold jewellery is not only a medium to construct
a certain identity, but also a major source of economic security. In the
Annelies Moors holds the ISIM Chair at the
University of Amsterdam for the social science
study of contemporary Muslim societies.
O n 13 March 2003, she delivered her inaugural
lecture entitled ÔÒMuslim Cultural PoliticsÓ:
WhatÕs Islam Got To Do With It?Õ In this lecture
she presented the research programme
ÔMuslim Cultural PoliticsÕ, which she has
initiated at the ISIM, and briefly summarized
the results of some ongoing research projects.
Inaugural Lecture
Muslim Cultural Politics
Annelies Moors is ISIM
Chair at the University
of Amsterdam.
The inaugural lecture will be published by the University of Amsterdam.
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emphasized the importance of an intra-
Muslim dialogue, of religious indepen-
dence, and of building an authoritative
voice by educating people with both re-
ligious and contextual knowledge. No
single person can embody these two as-
pects, and therefore religious bodies in-
cluding experts in both fields, such as
the European Council for Fatwa and Re-
search, should be established. Abdulka-
der Tayob pointed to the historicity of
Islam and the diversity of Muslim practice. He stressed that everyone has
the right to say what kind of Muslims he or she is.
Your constitution is not mine
In the third meeting, all speakers agreed that the idea of the consti-
tutional state and the principle of the separation of church and state
are multivocal concepts. Marc Hertogh, for example, argued that dis-
cussions about the constitutional state are often normative discus-
sions, in which one group defines the constitutional state for another
group, whereas they should be open discussions concerning peopleÕs
ideas about the constitutional state. The constitutional state is, accord-
ing to this line of thought, a contested concept. Integration policy
should therefore concentrate on managing diversity through dia-
logue, instead of assuming uniformity. The dominant discourses in
many Western European countries present Muslims as being opposed
to the principle of the separation of church and state, Sadik Harchaoui
argued. MuslimsÕ struggle for basic civil rights is thus unjustly identi-
fied with rejection of this principle. Harchaoui emphasized that Mus-
lims should try not to solve their problems outside the law of the state,
but to incorporate protection against injustice in the existing laws: the
state belongs to everyone, and not only to non-Muslims. 
Rib of the man
ÕIf only people could show half the solidarity with Muslim women
that they have shown with Ayaan Hirsi AliÕ, Fenna Ulichki sighed in the
fourth meeting of the series, ÔThe Rib of the ManÕ. Ayaan Hirsi Ali is the
Dutch Liberal Party politician who stood up against the oppression of
Muslim women by stating that Islam is a hindrance to emancipation.
This and other statements about the supposed backwardness of Islam,
the perversity of the Prophet, the incidence of forced marriages and
marriage with a partner from the country of origin, and domestic vio-
lence all confirmed the views of many people in the Netherlands, but
Muslims severely criticized her standpoints. Seyma Halici argued that
wearing a headscarf and an ankle-length coat does not exclude eman-
cipation and integration in Dutch society. 
Concluding meeting
In the concluding meeting, Roger van Boxtel, Minister of Urban Policy
and Integration of Ethnic Minorities from 1998 to 2002, emphasized the
importance of transparency of policy, of dialogue, of institutional sup-
port through a national representative body of Muslims, of able Muslim
spokespersons in the media, and of Dutch language proficiency. Inte-
gration policy has focused mainly on socio-economic inequalities, but
cultural differences between Muslims and the autochthonous popula-
tion have been neglected. Haci Karacaer said that dialogue is also self-
criticism. In his view, Muslims cover up the truth if they differentiate be-
tween what Islam is and what Muslims do. Muslims should take peo-
pleÕs behaviour as their starting point. Abdulkader Tayob argued that
Muslims should welcome controversies, because uncomfortable stand-
points can contain solutions to the communityÕs problems: Ôyou can ob-
tain understanding only through misunderstandingÕ, to use his words.
I S I M/Lectures and Debates
Ð ÔWould the Muslim Intellectual Please Stand Up!Õ (20 June 2002)
Speakers: Nathal Dessing (ISIM), Haci Karacaer (director, Milli G  r sü, the N e t h e r l a n d s ) ,
Saoud Khadje (Dar al-Ilm, Institute for Islam Studies), and Fouad Laroui (researcher and
writer). Moderator: Ab Cherribi (entrepreneur). 
Ð ÔA Lonely Planet Guide for MuslimsÕ (19 September 2002)
Speakers: Tariq Ramadan (College of Geneva and Fribourg University, Switzerland)
a n d Abdulkader Tayob (ISIM Chair, University of Nijmegen). 
Moderator: Peter van der Veer (ISIM co-director).
Ð ÔYour Constitution is Not Mine!Õ (10 October 2002)
Speakers: Famile Arslan (lawyer), Sadik Harchaoui (public prosecutor), and Marc Hertogh
(associate professor of socio-legal studies, University of Tilburg). 
Moderator: Steve Austen (permanent fellow of Felix Meritis, cultural entrepreneur,
publicist, and consultant). 
Ð ÔThe Rib of the ManÕ (7 November 2002)
Speakers: Gijs von der Fuhr (Amsterdam Centre for Foreigners), Seyma Halici (womenÕs
group, Milli G  r sü), and Fenna Ulichki (Moroccan WomenÕs Association in the
Netherlands). 
Moderator: Steve Austen (see above). 
Ð Concluding Meeting (27 January 2003) 
Speakers: Roger van Boxtel (Minister of Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities,
the Netherlands, from 1998 to 2002), Famile Arslan (lawyer), Haci Karacaer (director, Milli
G  r sü, the Netherlands), Abdulkader Tayob (ISIM Chair, University of Nijmegen), and
Fenna Ulichki (Moroccan WomenÕs Association in the Netherlands). 
Moderator: Steve Austen (see above).
The first meeting in the series of lectures
and debates ÔIslam, Authority, and Lead-
ershipÕ, entitled ÔWould the Muslim Intel-
lectual Please Stand Up!Õ, discussed the
presence or perhaps absence of Dutch
Muslim intellectuals in the wider public
debate on issues such as health, educa-
tion, and the environment. Nathal Dess-
ing, the first speaker, argued that where-
as Muslim voices can be heard in the
Dutch national debate on multicultural
society, these voices represent only specific sections of the ÔMuslimÕ com-
munity in the Netherlands. Particularly those who take a secularist, inte-
grationist, and individualistic viewpoint, such as the lawyer Afshin Ellian
and the writer Hafid Bouazza, take part in the debate and are well re-
ceived in the Dutch media. However, for a more balanced picture of Islam
and Muslims in the Netherlands, a broader variety of people should be-
come involved in the public debate, from Islamist to atheist, from imam
to secularist. Haci Karacaer and Saoud Khadje agreed, but added that
after the 11 September 2001 attacks and ensuing controversies concern-
ing some Muslims in the Dutch press, Muslims have become cautious in
expressing their opinion in public and prefer to engage in discussions
within the Muslim community. Fouad Laroui argued against the tenden-
cy of labelling someone a ÔMuslimÕ on the basis of his or her name, where-
as the person concerned might take a wholly secularist position.
Lonely planet guide
Tariq Ramadan and Abdulkader Tayob addressed the following ques-
tions in the second meeting, ÔA Lonely Planet Guide for MuslimsÕ: What
are authoritative sources for religious knowledge and how should they
be used? What or whom should Muslims in Europe consult to learn more
about Islam? Should they approach an imam or interpret the sources
themselves? Tariq Ramadan argued that Muslims in Europe do not know
how to handle authority: they lack experience in managing diversity. He
The ISIM and Felix Meritis (European Centre for
Arts and Sciences, Amsterdam) organized
a series of lectures and debates on ÔIslam,
Authority, and LeadershipÕ in 2002 and 2003.
The series, consisting of five meetings, dealt
with the presence of Muslim intellectuals in
t h e media, views on how to live a Muslim life in
Europe, the principle of separation of church
and state, the position of Muslim women in
t h e Netherlands, and Dutch integration policy.
Islam, Authority,
a n d L e a d e r s h i p
Nathal M. Dessing
conducts research on
Islam in Europe and is
ISIM education
c o o r d i n a t o r .
P R O G R A M M E
I S I M/ W o r k s h o p
The point of departure for the conveners
of the workshop ÔAnthropology of Islam-
ic LawÕ was the debate in the field of Is-
lamic law, which centres on the relations
between legal discourses produced by
Muslim scholars and peopleÕs daily lives.
Some earlier scholars propagated the
point of view that legal texts had a
major, if not determining, impact on the
lives of the people, whereas others ar-
gued that legal texts have been compar-
atively irrelevant. Simultaneously, attention has also been drawn to the
other side of the equation, that is the ways in which local practices have in-
fluenced legal discourse. Often these questions have been presented in
terms of dichotomies such as universal versus local, text versus action, and
theory versus practice. This workshop intended to shift the focus from di-
chotomies to relations. The aim was to point to the intricacies of these re-
lations and to develop a more subtle approach by situating the discourses
and practices of all participants in the field of Islamic law. 
In doing so, the workshop envisaged building on the renewed interest
in Islamic law witnessed during the last decades among anthropologists
and historians. Whereas also during the colonial period those involved in
the study of Islamic law had used ethnographic fieldwork in order to gain
insight into actual legal practices, these anthropologists and historians
have placed the relations between legal discourse and social processes at
the centre of debate. They have done so by employing a greater variety of
sources (such as court cases, fatwas, narratives) and methodologies (ob-
servation, oral history, discourse analysis) and by bringing other questions
and new perspectives to the fore (such as those on gender). Their work has
also influenced those working on Islamic law from other disciplinary back-
grounds. 
The conference opened with the inaugural lecture by Annelies Moors at
the University of Amsterdam, in which she showed how an anthropologi-
cal approach to Islamic law that includes the ways in which people deal
with legal institutions in their everyday lives is part of her general research
programme on Muslim cultural politics (see p. 7). 
The papers in the workshop explored four general issues. The first issue
pertained to the method of studying the normativity of Islamic law. For
Baudouin Dupret, an anthropological approach to Islamic law should be
praxiological; Islamic law is found in the practices of Muslims. The re-
searcher should avoid bringing any pre-conceived ideas about what Is-
lamic law should be. The study of normative legal texts and historical tra-
ditions is only justified if the actors themselves explicitly refer to them as
such. Dupret advocated an actor-oriented approach rooted in ethno-
methodology. Several other participants contested this view. John Bowen
presented a different approach to the issue of normativity in Islamic law.
His focus was on diversity in the intellectual debates, which he character-
ized as pluralism from several perspectives. The recent debates about Is-
lamic norms among immigrants in France show that we can only under-
stand the plurality of views by taking into account the differences in back-
grounds, of local contexts, and in traditions. 
A second theme was the focus on legal practice of the courts. The pa-
pers by Dupret, Stiles, Dahlgren, Kapteijns, and Rosen represented the
varying ethnographic styles in studying the working of the courts. Next to
an action-oriented approach focusing on actors and speech acts, atten-
tion was paid to a more conceptual approach, linking the courts to culture
in general. Erin Stiles compared the working of two judges in Zanzibar,
showing the existence of differing personal approaches at one time and
place. Dahlgren and Kapteijns both studied the workings of colonial
courts in South Yemen, arriving at very differing interpretations. 
A third theme was legal writing. Houari Touati analysed the coming into
being of the use of writing in legal proceedings and the creation of legal
proof in early Islam. Brinkley Messick dis-
cussed the keeping of archives and legal
papers in contemporary Yemen as an
ethnographic phenomenon. Lon Bus-
kens examined the collecting and trad-
ing of legal documents in present-day
Morocco and the ways these materials
become available in decontextualized
collections in the West. Ruud Peters re-
viewed another aspect of legal writing:
the codification of Islamic legal norms.
A fourth theme was the ethnography of the legal debate. Both Judy Tucker
and Martha Mundy showed how new conceptualizations of legal norms
arose out of social conflicts in the 18t h and 19t h centuries in Egypt and
greater Syria. Masud and Bowen both analysed contemporary discussions
about Islamic law in Pakistan and France. In Pakistan, a critique of Islamic
law in popular poetry recitals, particularly about the sense of obligation,
rights of women, and music, attracted the masses and the urban lite alike. 
In the final discussion, most participants were hesitant about defining
an anthropological approach to Islamic law. For some, ethnography
meant nothing more than putting Islamic law in its context. For others,
this focus in research was too narrow to include all the important aspects
of legal activity. In their view, the people they were studying were much
more engaged in conflict resolution and winning conflicts than the appli -
cation of Islamic norms. Some participants stressed that legal practice
should not be narrowed down to the activities of judges and muftis, since
other actors and activities also deal with Islamic law. Several participants
felt that more attention should be devoted to the role of the processes of
state formation and colonial policies in the transformation of contempo-
rary Muslim legal systems.
The conveners are considering the publication of a selection of the pa-
pers from the present workshop. They also hope that the debate initiated
in this workshop will continue at the forthcoming conference ÔÒWhat hap-
pened?Ó Telling Stories about Law in Muslim SocietiesÕ in October 2003 in
Cairo, organized together with CEDEJ and IFAO.
In collaboration with Utrecht University,
Leiden University, and the University of
Amsterdam, the ISIM organized a workshop
on the anthropology of Islamic law in Leiden
from 14 to 15 March 2003. Convened by Lon
Buskens, Khalid Masud, and Annelies Moors,
the workshop brought together a group of
scholars working on Islamic law and practice
in different parts of the world, in the fields of
anthropology, history, and legal scholarship.
A n t h r o p o l o g y
o f Islamic Law
M U H A M M A D
K H A LID  MA S UD
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Ð John R. Bowen (Washington University, St. Louis): ÔShari'a without Fiqh: The Anthropology
of Law without Law? Reflections from FranceÕ
Ð Lon Buskens (Leiden University/Utrecht University): ÔDocuments without People.
Attempts at a Codicological Ethnography of Legal Fragments from MoroccoÕ
Ð Susanne Dahlgren (University of Helsinki): ÔCourt of Practice, Social Context, and Justice
to Women: A Case from AdenÕ
Ð Baudouin Dupret (CNRS/CEDEJ, Cairo): ÔAccounting for the Causes of Action: A Praxio-
logical Grammar of Causal Concepts in the Egyptian Criminal Law Treatment of Moral IssuesÕ
Ð Lidwien Kapteijns (Wellesley College): ÔThe Government Qadis of Aden: Ethnography
in the Aden ArchivesÕ
Ð Muhammad Khalid Masud (Leiden University/ISIM): ÔPopular Criticism of Islamic Law
in Panjabi Folk Literature: Abida Parween Recital of Bullhe ShahÕ (video presentation)
Ð Brinkley Messick (Columbia University, New York): ÔReading Shari'a TextsÕ
Ð Martha Mundy (London School of Economics): ÔIslamic Law and the Order of StateÕ
Ð Ruud Peters (University of Amsterdam): ÔPublic Justice, Private Justice, and Legal Pluralism:
The Westernization of Criminal Law in the Middle EastÕ
Ð Lawrence Rosen (Princeton University): ÔOn the Meaning of Ownership: The Problematic
of Property in Moroccan CultureÕ
Ð Erin Stiles (Columbia University, New York): ÔKadhis and Courts: Zanzibaris Islamic Judges
between State and CommunityÕ 
Ð Houari Touati (EHHS, Paris): ÔDroit musulman et criture: histoire dÕune tensionÕ
Ð Judith E. Tucker (Georgetown University, Washington D.C.): ÔTracking the WomanÕs
Divorce: Khul' in Historical ContextÕ
P A R T I C I P A N T S
Muhammad Khalid
Masud is academic
director of the ISIM
until September 2003.
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The workshop ÔGender and Conversion
to IslamÕ was opened by Abdulkader
Tayob (ISIM Chair at the University of
Nijmegen) and Willy Jansen (director
of the Centre for WomenÕs Studies,
University of Nijmegen). The convenor
of the workshop, Karin van Nieuwkerk
(ISIM) gave an introduction to the
theme of the workshop. Yvonne Had-
dad (Georgetown University) was the
first guest speaker. She gave a fascinat-
ing outline of the diverse groups active
on the Internet and their specific dis-
courses on Islam that are influencing the conversion narratives of fe-
male converts. She also offered a historical background to the dis-
courses behind d a ' w a activities and analysed the present construc-
tions of gender that are produced in the conversion narratives.
Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons (University of Florida) used her own ex-
periences to contextualize conversion to Islam in America amongst
African Americans. She particularly focused on the Nation of Islam (NOI).
She traced the attraction of the NOI to black-nationalist sensibilities on
the part of the converts, which are a product of their exclusion from main-
stream American life. She analysed the gender discourse in the NOI and
the subordination of women in the organization. Whereas the traditional
strength of black women has been overruled, the Scandinavian case, pre-
sented by Anne Sofie Roald (University of Malm), showed the develop-
ment of a transcultural Islam in which equal gender opportunity is in-
cluded. She analysed the developments from the late 1990s onwards as
the last stage in the development of a Scandinavian Islam and observed a
growing acceptance of cultural diversity in the Muslim community on
both a global and local scale. She analysed the creolization of practice
and discourse. New converts first tend to defend traditional gender sys-
tems. However, as they go through various stages in the conversion
process, there is a tendency to incorporate Scandinavian ideals of gender
relations in the Islamic framework. These
new Muslims nonetheless diverge from
the majority society in embracing con-
cepts of equity rather than equality.
The comparison of online and off-
line conversion narratives presented
by Karin van Nieuwkerk (ISIM) was
aimed at understanding the different
discourses that could help to under-
stand why Islam can be attractive for
women in the West. Besides the bio-
graphical narratives, the ethnic, reli-
gious, and gender discourses of new
Muslims were analysed. Not only the content but also the different
contexts in which the narratives were produced Ð that is, fieldwork in
the Netherlands versus self-written testimonies on the Internet Ð were
compared. Margot Badran (Georgetown University and ISIM) contin-
ued with comparative life stories of a small number of female converts
from the Netherlands, England, and South Africa. She particularly fo-
cused on the Islamic-feminist discourse produced by female converts.
Islamic feminism is defined as feminist discourse and practice articulat-
ed within an Islamic paradigm and is thus different from notions of
gender equity. Islamic feminism derives its understanding from the
Qur'an and seeks rights and justice for both men and women. In Bad-
ranÕs research it became clear that converts are particularly important
in articulating Islamic feminist discourses.
Haifaa Jawad (University of Birmingham) brought forward the Sufi
paradigm. Sufism has been and continues to be an important agent for
conversion to Islam. She outlined how the SufisÕ emphasis on feminine
values pertaining to the family and the feminine element in spiritual
life has been crucial in attracting Western women to Islam. Stefano Al-
lievi (University of Padua) discussed the shifting significance of the
h a r a m/h a l a l frontier. He particularly focused on the h i j a b, an issue that
is symbolically important both outside the community of converts and
inside the associative milieus. He also suggested to de-Islamize the ap-
proach of conversion to Islam. The so-called ÔIslamicÕ discourses per-
taining to gender that are attractive to converts are very close to famil-
iar European gender discourses of former generations.
Nicole Bourque (University of Glasgow) added an important dimen-
sion to the study of conversion by focusing on discourses and practices
of Scottish female converts to Islam. Converting to Islam involves the
recreation and renegotiation of religious, national, and gender identi-
ty. Yet, the creation of a new Muslim identity also entails the embodi-
ment of this new identity and taking up new bodily practices. After dis-
cussing the creating and sustaining of a new identity, the last speaker,
Marcia Hermansen (Loyola University, Chicago), addressed the trans-
mission of female Muslim identity in the West. She focused on mothers
who converted between 1967 and 1980 and analysed how they raised
their daughters as Muslims.
Whereas the case studies revealed the differing patterns and dis-
courses in various countries in Europe and the United States, the focus
on gender also allowed for many connections to emerge. 
I S I M/ W o r k s h o p
There is a growing interest in the role of
converts to Islam in Europe and the United
States. However, whereas most converts to
Islam appear to be women, this fact has been
relatively neglected. The ISIM workshop on
ÔGender and Conversion to IslamÕ, held from
16 to 17 May 2003 in Nijmegen, the N e t h e r-
lands, was aimed to readdress this i m b a l a n c e
by focusing on gender and conversion to
Islam in the West. Nine scholars from various
countries and different disciplines were
invited to compare their research material.
Gender and
C o n v e r s i o n to Islam
Ð Yvonne Haddad:
ÔThe Quest for Peace in Submission: White Women ConvertsÕ Journey to IslamÕ
Ð Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons:
ÔAfrican-American Islam as an Expression of Religious Faith and Black Nationalist Dreams
and HopesÕ 
Ð Anne Sofie Roald:
ÔTowards a Scandinavian Islam? A Study on Scandinavian ConvertsÕ
Ð Karin van Nieuwkerk:
ÔGender and Conversion to Islam: A Comparison of On-line and Off-line Conversion
NarrativesÕ 
Ð Margot Badran:
ÔConversion and Feminism. Comparative Life Stories: South Africa, the United Kingdom,
and the NetherlandsÕ
Ð Haifaa Jawad:
ÔFemale Conversion to Islam: the Sufi ParadigmÕ
Ð Stefano Allievi:
ÔThe Shifting Significance of the H a r a m / H a l a l Frontier: Narratives (on Hijab and Other
Issues) of Male and Female Converts ComparedÕ
Ð Nicole Bourque:
ÔHow Deborah became Aisha: The Conversion Process and the Creation of Female Muslim
Identity in ScotlandÕ
Ð Marcia Hermansen:
ÔKeeping the Faith: Convert Muslim Mothers and the Transmission of Female Muslim
Identity in the WestÕ
P A P E R S  P R E S E N T E D
Karin van Nieuwkerk is
a post-doctoral fellow
at the ISIM.
The papers presented and discussed at the workshop will be prepared for publication.
I S I M/ W e b s i t e
Ð ISIM Projects: This new section currently provides further details for
the ISIM Rights at Home project with reports of all the past Sounding
Board Meetings.
Ð Publications: All issues of the ISIM Newsletter and the ISIM Papers
Series are now available online in .pdf format. Using the online forms
users can subscribe to the ISIM Newsletter mailing list and/or order
back issues of the ISIM Newsletter as well as hard copies of the ISIM
Papers Series.
Ð FAQ: The FAQ section is designed to provide straightforward an-
swers to the most commonly asked questions regarding the ISIM.
FAQ contains lists of questions and answers, with links to related
sections, about the ISIM and is divided into the following three sub-
sections: general, fellowships, and publications.
We welcome the feedback of our readers. For any questions, comments, or suggestions
about the ISIM website please contact the webteam (isimupdate@isim.nl).
N O è L  LA M B E R T
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The 26th of March 2003 saw the launch of the redesigned ISIM website.
In addition to a fresh visual style, simplified navigation system, dated
and printer-friendly pages, many new and expanded features are avail-
able. The new sections have been created with a view to the ongoing
evolution of the ISIM itself and to increase the siteÕs usefulness as a re-
search resource for all. The primary function of the site is still to provide
up-to-date core information about the ISIM and its upcoming events, in
an easily accessible format. The major new additions and expanded sec-
tions include:
Ð The Noticeboard: This is an entirely new section with comprehensive
listings of non-ISIM events related to the study of Islam and Muslim So-
cieties, divided into three sections: academic, art, and other. Users are
encouraged to submit and publicise their own events via the online
form (subject to approval). We expect that the Noticeboard may ex-
pand in the future to include information on grants, fellowships, and
vacancies in the field of the study of Islam and Muslim societies.
Ð Research and Fellowships: At-a-glance descriptions and online appli-
cation forms for ISIM Fellowships can be accessed within this section.
Here users can also find individual pages for current ISIM fellows out-
lining their backgrounds and current research topics. Limited informa-
tion is also available for ISIM alumni.
Ð ISIM Archive: All major ISIM events in the past are catalogued here
with links to programmes, reports, and other related documents as
a v a i l a b l e .
Ð Links: The links section has been updated and re-divided into the fol-
lowing sub-sections for easier browsing: resources, academic links,
Muslim links, and country links. This section now provides an index o f
online resources such as documents, libraries, institutes, organiza-
tions, guides, etc., for Islamic Studies and related fields. The former sec-
tion Ð Islamic Studies links Ð has now been absorbed into this general
links section. There is also an online form for users to directly submit
their own links for inclusion in the links section (subject to approval).
ISIM Website
R e l a u n c h e d
N E W ON W W W . I S I M . N L
¥ The Noticeboard
¥ Online fellowship application forms
¥ Downloadable newsletter issues & paper series 
¥ Expanded archive
¥ Information on ISIM fellows
¥ Dated pages
I S I M  E V E N T SI S I M  F E L L O W S H I P S
The ISIM invites applications and research proposals for
its various programmes. Applications from candidates in
the social sciences, humanities, and religious studies will
be considered. Applicants should be competent in
academic English.
The ISIM fellowships and their respective application
deadlines are as follows:
Ð Ph.D. fellowships
(1 September 2003 and 1 March 2004)
Ð Post-doctoral fellowships
(1 September 2003 and 1 March 2004)
Ð Visiting fellowships
(1 September 2003 and 1 March 2004)
Ð Sabbatical fellowships
(1 September 2003 and 1 March 2004)
For more information on the various fellowships
and for application forms,
please consult www.isim.nl.
Rights at Home Capacity Building
W o r k s h o p
Organizers: ISIM and Forum for Civil Society
Date: 21 July 2003 Ð 4 August 2003
Venue: Y e m e n
Rights at Home Capacity Building
W o r k s h o p
Organizers: ISIM and Sahiba Sisters Foundation
Date: 7Ð19 August 2003
Venue: T a n z a n i a
Conference: Sufism and the Modern
Urban Middle Class 
Organizers: Martin van Bruinessen (ISIM), Dadi
Darmadi, Julia Howell, in cooperation with
IIAS and Melbourne University
Date: 4Ð6 September 2003
Venue: Jakarta, Indonesia
Workshop: Textuality, Intertextuality:
Interactive Cultural Practices in Judaism
and Islam (in the series: Jewish and
Islamic Hermeneutics as C u l t u r a l
C r i t i q u e )
Organizers: ISIM and Wissenschaftskolleg zu
BerlinÕs Working Group Modernity and Islam
Date: 23Ð26 October 2003
Venue: Leiden University
Workshop: ÔWhat Happened?Õ Telling
Stories about Law in Muslim Societies
Organizers: Annelies Moors (ISIM) in conjunc-
tion with CEDEJ, IFAO, and Utrecht University
Date: October 2003
Venue: Cairo, Egypt
For more information
on these and other ISIM Events
please consult the ISIM website
or contact the ISIM Secretariat:
Tel: +31 71 527 7905
Fax: +31 71 527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
w w w . i s i m . n l
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The third Sounding Board Meeting of
the ISIMÕs Rights at Home Project was
explicitly meant as a Southeast Asian
regional consultative meeting. Forty
participants from Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thai-
land attended, including the Malaysian
hosts Chandra Muzaffar, president of
JUST, Farish Noor, member of JUST,
and Zainah Anwar, executive director
of SIS. The ÔRights at HomeÕ project
team, with its primary consultant Ab-
dullahi an-N a ' i m (Emory University, At-
lanta) and programme coordinator
Laila al-Zwaini (ISIM), was joined by
Muhammad Khalid Masud (ISIM Academic Director) and Martin van
Bruinessen (ISIM Chair at Utrecht University). Cassandra Balchin (Pak-
istan) and Ebrahim Moosa (USA), members of the Rights at Home Advi-
sory Board, were also present. Following the concept of the first two
Sounding Board Meetings in Yemen and Tanzania, the Malaysia meet-
ing brought together representatives from different regions, genders,
and professional backgrounds, such as human rights activists, scholars,
ulama, social welfare officers, teachers, lawyers, and childrenÕs rights
advocates, to discuss themes related to Rights at Home from different
perspectives, and to jointly explore strategies and activities to pro-
mote the positions of Muslim women and children.
In the first sessions, presentations by partici-
pants from the Southeast Asian region aimed at
giving a general impression of the situation of
womenÕs and childrenÕs rights in their respective
countries. Those presentations were enlivened
more than once by anecdotes of personal experi-
ences with gender and power relations in the fam-
ily, at school, at work, and in public areas like the
s h a r i ' a courts. The discussions that followed did
not only elaborate on the factors in culture, reli-
gion, and upbringing that curtail womenÕs and
childrenÕs rights in the different Islamic settings.
Rather, structures that actually promote
them were equally explored. For in-
stance, the organizations that were rep-
resented in Kuala Lumpur were consid-
ered to be good examples of such pro-
moting structures. This idea was illus-
trated by their prudent but enduring at-
tempts to make use of theological, ju-
risprudential, sociological, and political
resources to deepen the understanding
of human rights in general and to
strengthen those of Islamic women and
children in particular. 
Especially this kind of exploration
brought to light some specifics of the
region: first, the relatively high level of capacity in advocacy and net-
working of participants and their organizations, in comparison to
many agents of social change in Yemen and Tanzania; second, the ex-
perience gained over the years made the Southeast Asian counterparts
increasingly aware of the rapidly changing contexts in which they op-
erate. Until some years ago, they were used to working within societies
and legal environments that were highly secularized. Accordingly,
human rights issues were addressed from a secular perspective too.
Now, with the progressing re-Islamization of their states, their formal
structures, and legislations, they have to deal increasingly with Islamist
currents. The advocacy resources that are needed to pursue their goals
within the present Islamic discourse differ from those that were useful
in the past. The agents of social change in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand urgently look for information
about how human rights issues can be effectively dealt with from an Is-
lamic point of view. 
Finally, the participants of the Sounding Board Meeting in Malaysia
commonly identified a regional action plan in which the provision of
adjusted advocacy resources receives particular attention. A regional
executive committee, called the Rights at Home Committee for South-
east Asia, comprising volunteers from Malaysia (Sisters in Islam), In-
donesia (Ulil Abshar-Abdaila), the Philippines (Yasmin Busran-Lao), Sin-
gapore (Mariam Ali), and Thailand (Airin Sa'idi), was formed to spear-
head the implementation of this action plan. 
One of the actions in the plan that will be taken into the next phase
is the development of a website for an Islamic discourse on human
rights. The aim of this Rights at Home website is to make easily accessi-
ble selected information from a wide range of sources Ð from articles,
training manuals, guides, theory, methodology, position papers,
books, and case law to a forum focusing on human rights within a pro-
gressive Islamic framework Ð with particular attention to the rights of
women and children. In this way the website will not only provide
powerful advocacy resources for community-based organizations,
NGOs, grassroots activists, and individuals, but will constitute in itself a
way to intensify their networking, lobbying, and mutual aid activities.
Another activity proposed is taking human rights messages right to
the homes of Islamic families. Popular media, like television dramas,
comics, novels, political literature, and syndicated newspaper columns
can be utilized to this end. The host organization in Malaysia, Sisters in
Islam, for example, has experience in this field: it published easy-to-
read, low budget booklets in question-and-answer format, illustrated
with cartoons.
The ISIM project ÔRights at Home:
A n Approach to the Internalization of Human
Rights in Family Relations in Islamic
CommunitiesÕ convened its third Sounding
Board Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
from 15 to 17 January 2003. This meeting was
organized in close collaboration with its
Malaysian counterparts: the International
Movement for a Just World (JUST) and
S i s t e r s in Islam (SIS), an NGO committed to
promoting the rights of women in the
framework of Islam. Earlier sounding boards
were convened in Yemen and Tanzania
( S e e ISIM Newsletter 10, pg. 4, and 11, pg. 4).
Sharifa Zuriah Aljeffri, member of Sisters in Islam,
coordinated the organization of the Sounding
Board Meeting in Malaysia. More information
about the NGO Sisters in Islam can be found on
their website (www.sistersinislam.org.my). 
Maritte van Beek is administrative coordinator
of the Rights at Home Project. More information
about the project and the current composition of
its project team can be found on the projects
section of the ISIM website.
Rights at Home
Southeast Asia
C o n s u l t a t i v e M e e t i n g
Cassandra Balchin, Norani Othman, Zainah Anwar, and Farish Noor 
at the Sounding Board Meeting.
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On 23 May 2003, the ISIM organized a
Ôfarewell seminarÕ for its academic direc-
tor Muhammad Khalid Masud on the
topic of fiqh al-aqalliyat , Islamic law for
Muslim minorities. Lon Buskens, chair-
ing the seminar, showed how this theme
fitted neatly into MasudÕs research inter-
ests: as an expert in the field of Islamic
law, Masud has always been particularly
interested in the contemporary inter-
pretation and implementation of Mus-
lim legal traditions. Muslim minorities in
the West deal with daily questions on is-
sues such as dietary laws, mixed mar-
riages, divorce, political participation,
banking transactions, or the use of cred-
it cards, for which religious legitimiza-
tion, a normative order, is sought. This happens not only in European
countries where Muslims form a minority as a result of migration, but also
in Bosnia, where Muslims constitute an indigenous population, as Ahmed
Alibasic showed. 
Religious authorities within and outside of Europe and international
fatwa bodies (comprised of both European and non-European scholars),
for example the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR)
presided by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, deal with the formal adaptation of shar'ia
as a fiqh for minorities in the West. Here, Masud detected a paradoxical
situation, because Muslim jurists cannot think of fiqh without an Islamic
state, while in Europe fiqh is inherently without a state. As Dilwar Hussein
said, fiqh can be an essential part in the daily life of practising Muslims liv-
ing in the West, but laws of the nation-states differentiate between what
is religious and what is legal. Studying fiqh al-aqalliyat then becomes rel-
evant not only from an empirical perspective Ð people deal with ques-
tions which come up in local and national political and social settings, to
which fatwas are given Ð but also as an academic discipline in the gener-
al study of law. Mahmood Saifi, who looked at fiqh al-aqalliyat on a more
theoretical level, called it Ôa new area of jurisprudenceÕ. Ihsan Yilmaz dis-
cerned a neo-ijtihad.
T e r m i n o l o g y
The conference started with an expos by Masud on the meaning of
fiqh al-aqalliyat and soon it appeared that the participants shared a dose
of scepticism regarding the terminology. One reason is, as Sjoerd van
Koningsveld explained, that many books on fiqh al-aqalliyat are written
by Muslim scholars living in the Muslim world, who themselves widely
differ in their fatwas. They tend to refer to Muslims in the West Ôas if they
are an exception, but it does not touch their sacrosanct ideas of Islamic
state and societyÕ. Thus, he said, we are dealing with a normative, not a
descriptive term. Much of this literature should be seen as apologetic and
aimed at demonstrating that Muslim migrants have the tools to remain
committed to their faith. Another reason stressed by several participants
Ð most articulated by Nasr Abu Zayd Ð is that although it is called fiqh of
minorities, many of the topics are heavily discussed in the Muslim world
as well. This brings us to the question of the audience. Participants in the
seminar not only looked at the level of the ÔproductionÕ of fiqh by scholars,
but also at the level of the ÔconsumptionÕ, as Alexandre Caeiro argued. He
stressed that a distinction should be made between Ôpublic fatwasÕ, like
from the ECFR, and Ôprivate fatwasÕ. These ÔprivateÕ (or local) fatwas allow
for more interaction between the mufti and the mustafti (who asks for a
fatwa), while a fatwa from the ECFR has to reach a wide and diverse audi-
ence. Moreover, these fatwas are often the result of long negotiations in
order to satisfy the varied views represented in councils. 
A u t h o r i t y
The question of authority on a local level appeared to be a difficult
matter to evaluate. Van Koningsveld suggested to study fiqh al-aqalliy-
a t in three stages: first, an identification of the relevant materials and
analysis of their content; second, a comparative analysis of models of
different scholars and their publications and ideas; and third, a social
and cultural analysis. Lena Larsen disagreed with the proposed se-
quence, stressing that one should first look at how the needs for reli-
gious legitimization emerge, and then trace how f i q h is developed by
scholars. However, all participants agreed that one should look not
only at the macro-, supranational level, but also at the normativity on
the local level. Frank Peter, for example, addressed the question of the
links between individuals and religious authorities. Matthias Rohe took
the constitutional rights of the German legal state as point of depar-
ture in which certain questions come up and ask for a normative reli-
gious answer. 
Maleiha Malik, who acted as
respondent of the sessions,
concluded that the study of
fiqh al-aqalliyat should not be
a mere adjunct in Europe
when dealing with problems
that accompany migration,
but should be a serious acad-
emic discipline because legal
theory has to think of the
break-off of the nation-state.
She pointed to a main analo-
gy in the European context:
the development of Euro-
pean Union law. Khalid Ma-
sud seems to have succeed-
ed in his call for greater atten-
tion to this new emerging
field. One of the objectives of
the ISIM is the start of a net-
work of scholars working on
the subject. 
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In recent years, fiqh al-aqalliyat, or Islamic law
for Muslim minorities, has incited a great deal
of interest among Muslim scholars. The growth
of fiqh al-aqalliyat as a topic of debate is
a recognition of the relevance of Islamic law for
a considerable number of Muslims living in
non-Muslim countries, in particular in the West.
It has revealed the complexities that Muslims
face in reconstructing such laws in the context
of migration and post-migration. Traditional
Islamic law lacks provisions for Muslims living
permanently in non-Muslim countries.
F i q ha l-a q a l l i y a t is an attempt to fill this gap
and to reconstruct an Islamic legal theory to
deal with questions of Islamic law for Muslims
living under non-Islamic legal systems.
Islamic Law and
Muslim Minorities 
Ð Ahmet Alibasic (Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo)
Ð Nasr Abu Zayd (Leiden University/Humanistic University,
U t r e c h t )
Ð Mohammad Amer ( I S I M )
Ð Abdullahi an-Na'im (Emory University, Atlanta)
Ð Welmoet Boender ( I S I M )
Ð Martin van Bruinessen (ISIM/Utrecht University)
Ð Lon Buskens (Utrecht University/Leiden University)
Ð Alexandre Caeiro (EHESS, Paris)
Ð Nathal Dessing ( I S I M )
Ð Dick Douwes (ISIM, seminar convenor)
Ð Dilwar Hussain (Islamic Foundation, Leicester)
Ð Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Leiden University)
Ð Lena Larsen (Oslo University)
Ð Maleiha Malik (KingÕs College, University of London)
Ð Muhammad Khalid Masud (ISIM/Leiden University)
Ð Frank Peter (Freie Universitt Berlin)
Ð Ruud Peters (University of Amsterdam)
Ð Susan Rutten (Universiteit Maastricht)
Ð Mathias Rohe (Erlangen University)
Ð Mahmoud Saify (Leiden University)
Ð Abdulkader Tayob (ISIM/University of Nijmegen)
Ð Tim Winter (Cambridge University)
Ð Ihsan Yilmaz (SOAS, University of London)
Ð Laila al-Zwaini ( I S I M )
P A R T I C I P A N T S
Welmoet Boender
i s a Ph.D. candidate
a t the ISIM.
Participants at the ISIM Roundtable
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Since childhood, Muhammad Khalid
Masud has inhabited multiple social
and intellectual worlds. Born in 1939 in
Ambala, in the Indian Punjab (now
called Hariana), his family emigrated in
1947 to Jhang, in the Pakistani Punjab.
In a literal sense, the designation
m u h a j i r encompassed Punjabi-speak-
ing emigrants such as MasudÕs family,
although today the term refers primar-
ily to Urdu-speaking refugees who fled
to Pakistan after IndiaÕs independence.
MasudÕs early schooling comprised
both Islamic and more or less secular
state studies. A complementary major influence was his home environ-
ment. His father lacked formal schooling, but studied medicine as an
adult at Bhopindra Tibbiya College Patiala, Indian Punjab, from where he
graduated with a degree of Hadhiq al-Hukama with a clinical and surgi-
cal specialization. He was considered a h a k i m and t a b i b for his mastery of
Arab-Greek medicine. Although not madrasa-educated, his father stud-
ied religious books on his own in Urdu and personally knew many of
IndiaÕs prominent u l a m a. Thus Masud, from his early childhood, became
familiar with the milieus of traditional learning. He also memorized parts
of the Q u r'a na n d studied Persian and Arabic on his own.
The other major intellectual formation was state-run primary and sec-
ondary schooling. Masud studied for part of a year with Ghulam Husayn,
the local mufti in Jhang Sadar, but stopped because the mufti was only
irregularly available for lessons. Concurrently he taught at the Islamiya
high school in Jhang Sadar from 1957 to 1962, later taking his B.A. de-
gree as a private candidate (one who sits for the degree examination
without college affiliation or formal classroom experience) from Punjab
University, Lahore. MasudÕs 1962 M.A. thesis from the same university,
ÔThe Attitude of Panjab University Students toward ReligionÕ, won a gold
medal and also suggested his early interest in social science methods for
understanding the contexts of religious ideas and experience.
The learning environment at McGill UniversityÕs Institute for Islamic
Studies provided an almost unique bridging environment between
Western- and Islamic-style scholarly traditions. With early support from
the Rockefeller Foundation, the InstituteÕs graduate student body was
almost equally divided between students from Muslim-majority coun-
tries, especially India and Pakistan, and Ôthe WestÕ. Masud thrived in
this environment.
Contextualizing al-Shatibi 
MasudÕs 1973 thesis on Abu Ishaq al-ShatibiÕs idea of the common
good (a l - m a s l a h a) first appeared as a 1977 book that, once significant-
ly revised and published with a new title in 1995, showed the influence
of heavy immersion in Western-style social thought over the interven-
ing years.1 In his lifetime, al-Shatibi (d. 1388) grappled with significant
issues of political, economic, and social change in his native Andalusia.
After an eclipse in influence that lasted for hundreds of years, ShatibiÕs
work returned to prominence in the late nineteenth century when Is-
lamic reformers such as Rashid Rida (1865Ð1935) and Muhammad
' A b d u h (1849Ð1905) made it a major reference point for their own
thinking. Shatibi, argues Masud, Ôdevelops the concept of m a s l a h a a s
the basis of rationality and extendibility of Islamic law to changing cir-
cumstances, but also presents it as a fundamental principle for the uni-
versality and certainty of Islamic lawÕ.2 ShatibiÕs most important text
was the M u w a f a q a, neglected by many jurists because readers needed
a background knowledge of the political, economic, and social circum-
stances of the times in which Shatibi lived in order to understand his
argument. Without such knowledge, not a normal part of convention-
al jurisprudence, ShatibiÕs views on
m a s l a h a appear Ôcontradictory, vague
or abstract, and hence difficult to fol-
l o w Õ .3
In MasudÕs view, Shatibi goes further
than many modernist jurists in seeing
Islamic law as adaptable in theory as
well as practice, with m a s l a h a as an in-
dependent principle of jurisprudence
rather than merely a justification for
expediency. Of ShatibiÕs 40 known
legal opinions, 34 deal with cases of
Ôsocial changeÕ Ð MasudÕs reserved way
of referring to the increasingly chaotic
political and social conditions of ShatibiÕs native Andalusia in the four-
teenth century. In MasudÕs view, these concerns prevail equally in the
contemporary Muslim majority world. In the M u w a f a q a t, Shatibi en-
dorses flexibility and the use of human reason as elements integral to
developing and interpreting Islamic law, the goal of which is to realize
the human good, and Masud emphasizes the necessity of placing
these opinions in their political and economic contexts in order to
make sense of them.4
From Shatibi to Shahrur
I have worked closely with Khalid Masud since the early 1980s in
planning conferences and editorial projects, but I did not get a con-
crete understanding of MasudÕs method of interpreting and analysing
texts until March 1996 in Islamabad. Our primary activity was conduct-
ing interviews with publishers and distributors, and supervising a sur-
vey of bookstores in Islamabad. Our goal was to explore how print
media was being used to disseminate new religious ideas and move-
ments and to sustain older ones. In off-hours we read Muhammad
ShahrurÕs second book, Contemporary Islamic Studies on State and Soci-
e t y,5 which applied arguments made in his earlier best-selling a l - K i t a b
w a - l -Q u r ' a n: Qira'a Mu'asira (The Book and the Q u r'a n: A Contemporary
Reading) to issues of political and social authority.6
We both saw Shahrur as a maverick who offered major interpretive
challenges to the world of established religious scholars, and Masud
drew strong parallels between Shatibi and Shahrur. Both writers insist-
ed that the interpretation of jurisprudence and tradition in Islam was a
continuous process requiring close attention to the contexts in which
interpretations were made. Shahrur argued that any act of interpreta-
tion involves the author, the text, and the reader or listener. He bluntly
argues that in the case of the Q u r ' a n, God is the author so that no one,
even at the time of its first revelation, could claim to understand it in its
entirety without also claiming to be a partner to God in knowledge.
Therefore the reader or listener is obliged to use his or her intellect and
knowledge of context to interpret the text. Yet when it comes to the
Q u r ' a n and to the interpretation of religious tradition, Shahrur argues
that many people fall back on religious authority alone.7
Rather than thinking of the sayings and actions of the ProphetÕs com-
panions and the deliberations of the first jurists as the ÔfoundationsÕ of
Islam, Shahrur argues that Muslims should regard them as the prod-
ucts of human action, subject to error and to interpretation, abandon
the authority-oriented view of religious knowledge as fixed and im-
mutable, and replace it with a collective, critical approach in which
there is a freedom to argue, interpret, and adapt within the worldview
(w a ' i) and knowledge of a particular time and place.8 Mutual consulta-
tion (s h u r a) is integral to proper interpretation, and it is always linked
to historical practice: ÔForbidding s h u r a is like forbidding prayer.Õ9
Masud sees strong parallels between Shahrur and Shatibi, who ar-
gues Ð although without ShahrurÕs characteristic directness Ð that laws,
F e a t u r e s
Over the last years Dale Eickelman has been in
close contact with Muhammad Khalid Masud
while at the ISIM. Often, while travelling the
globe and changing flights at AmsterdamÕs
international airport, the two would meet over
lunch or breakfast. Eickelman paid frequent
visits to the ISIM office, also in his capacity as
member of the ISIM Academic Committee, and
participated in several of its workshops.
T h e friendship between the two scholars dates
back to the 1980s. On the occasion of MasudÕs
retirement, the anthropologist reflects on his
career and their mutual interests.
Khalid MasudÕs
Multiple Worlds
including the s h a r i ' a, become embedded only through social habits
and customs (' a d a) .1 0 I would argue that the importance of under-
standing the social context of Islamic jurisprudence and tradition is
also a major theme running through MasudÕs own work. Masud never
argues as bluntly as Shahrur that Islamic jurisprudence (f i q h) is paral-
ysed to the extent that it ignores these changing frameworks. Nor does
he directly link the authoritative habits of f i q h to political authoritari-
anism, as does Shahrur. Nonetheless, these central and consistent
threads also run through MasudÕs thought.
In reading Shahrur in Islamabad, Masud intercalated comments on
his style Ð that of a secularly educated civil engineer rather than a tra-
ditionally educated Islamic scholar. Each chapter of Dirasat Islamiya,
like ShahrurÕs other books, begins with an engineerÕs draft of the
points to be covered, and then meticulously elaborates them.1 1
ShahrurÕs approach also lends itself well to lectures in modern secular
universities and audiences. My sense is that Masud was especially sen-
sitive to ShahrurÕs style because he faced similar challenges in his own
career. MasudÕs 1995 book on Shatibi, like its 1977 predecessor, makes
no explicit reference to Western-style social science. But the 1995 ar-
gument relating ShatibiÕs judicial opinions to their social and political
contexts is considerably stronger than in the earlier volume, and
MasudÕs later work, including that achieved during his appointment as
ISIM Academic Director, explicitly incorporates such approaches. 
MasudÕs scholarship in Leiden
MasudÕs analytic signature is a combination of authoritative immer-
sion in key Islamic ideas and texts and the judicial use of the concepts
in the social sciences. His three decades at the Islamic Research Insti-
tute, Islamabad, instilled recognition of the diverse audiences for Is-
lamic studies in Muslim-majority countries Ð and the political risks in-
herent in direct expression. This is a negative element of his sensitivity
to audience. The positive element has been a consistent one to make
texts accessible to audiences from both Islamic studies and the social
sciences everywhere. 
MasudÕs characteristic scholarly approach seeks carefully to define
terms rather than assume that audiences both in the Muslim-majori-
ty world and in the West share the same background scholarly un-
derstandings. Consider, for example, the long opening essay to his
edited volume on the Tablighi movement, Travellers in Faith ( 2 0 0 0 ) .1 2
It begins with an extended discussion of terms and concepts, includ-
ing ÔtransnationalismÕ. Masud first shows how the concept has been
used in social sciences, referring to historical phenomena that pre-
ceded the rise of nationalism in the West and generally downplaying
the importance of religious movements. Turning specifically to the
Muslim world, he indicates how Muslim transnationalism does not
necessarily threaten the state or nationalist movements. Likewise,
key terms such as ÔrenewalÕ (t a j d i d), ÔcommunicationÕ (t a b l i g h, from
which derives the name of the move-
ment), and ÔcallÕ (d a ' w a) are carefully
spelled out. 
MasudÕs chosen vehicle of expression
in Leiden has been short essays on top-
ical themes, many related to the broad
scope of his responsibilities in organiz-
ing and encouraging collective re-
search projects and conferences over a
wide spectrum of Islamic studies. Thus
ÔHadith and ViolenceÕ begins with a de-
notative definition of ÔviolenceÕ derived
from WebsterÕs New Collegiate Dictio-
n a r y, followed by an analysis of the
term in a variety of cultural semantic
fields. He then turns to a similar analysis
of jihad and fitna (rebellion or civil
w a r ) .1 3 Whether the subject is naming
the ÔotherÕ in European and Muslim lan-
guages, Sufi views
of the hajj and
Islamic rituals, or
minorities in Is-
lamic history, Ma-
sudÕs approach is
consistently a care-
ful examination of terms, both in English and in
Muslim-majority languages, in order to examine
the subject. The anchor is always specific historical
texts rather than inferences about the nature of
Muslim religious consciousness or Muslim soci-
e t i e s .1 4 Thus, after reviewing the ambiguities of
defining ÔminoritiesÕ in international law and na-
tion-states, Masud, basing himself on a 1956
analysis and selection of texts by Muhammad
Hamidullah, examines four Muslim documents:
the seventh-century pact of Medina, defining the
rights and obligations of Muslims and Jews; the
pact of Najran, defining the status of Christians;
Caliph ' U m a r Õ s pact of Jerusalem (638); and the
pact of Granada signed in 1491 between the last
Muslim ruler of Granada and the kings of Aragon
and Castille. MasudÕs addition to HamidullahÕs ear-
lier work is to make the significance of these four
pacts accessible through close reading to a gener-
al audience concerned with the sociology of mi-
norities. A more ambitious essay on pluralism in Is-
lamic moral traditions Ð Masud uses the plural Ð
provides a framework for understanding the gen-
res through which Islamic ethical traditions have
been conveyed and the Ð perhaps surprising for
some Ð spectrum of past and present thought on
issues such as social control, citizenship, issues of
life and death, and human sexuality.1 5
In scholarship as in developing ISIMÕs teaching
agenda, MasudÕs consistent goal has been to find
ways of opening Islamic scholarship to new ways
of knowing, combining the strengths of the Is-
lamic sciences with contemporary scholarship
that uses other methods and techniques. The
Netherlands in the last two decades has been a
particularly apt locale for MasudÕs interest in Mus-
lims in Europe and the development of a Euro-
pean Islam,1 6 and his contributions over the next
few years will add significantly to our understand-
ing of these vital topics.
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Muhammad Khalid MasudÕs training in
his chosen field, Islamic Studies, began
with higher studies at Punjab University,
in Lahore, and was completed with a
Ph.D. from McGill University, in Montre-
al. In addition to his own active research
and publication activities, and various
other instructional positions in Pakistan
and Nigeria, he has served in two key in-
stitutional posts that have had an enor-
mous impact on Islamic Studies. The first
of these was his membership in the in-
novative Committee on the Comparative Study of Muslim Societies (So-
cial Science Research Council, New York), the second his inaugural direc-
torship at ISIM. 
Muhammad Khalid MasudÕs best-known work remains his meticulous
and foundational study of the legal philosophy of Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d.
1388). A Maliki by interpretive school and a resident of Granada, Shatibi
sought to analyse the shari'a with respect to what he termed its maqasid,
its doctrinal aims or objectives. To this end Shatibi elaborated upon the
concept of maslaha, literally, legal ÔgoodÕ or ÔbenefitÕ, and in the process
he developed a medieval notion of legal dynamism that centuries later
would prove central to modern Muslim discussions about the transfor-
mation of Islamic law. MasudÕs work on Shatibi commenced with his 1973
dissertation at McGill under Professor Charles Adams, the basis for his
well-known 1977 book, which was revised and enlarged in his 1995 pub-
lication, ShatibiÕs Philosophy of Islamic Law (Islamic Research Institute, Is-
lamabad). From the beginning of his career he contributed significantly
to the revision of the major conventional Western assumption about Is-
lamic law, namely, that it was immutable. 
This work on a key medieval representative in the field of usul al-fiqh, or
the theory of shari'a jurisprudence, was interestingly complemented by
MasudÕs study of the interpretive thought of an important modern figure,
Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938). Initiated in 1977 with a research project as-
signed to him by the Islamic Research Institute, the project culminated, in
1995, in IqbalÕs Reconstruction of Ijtihad (Lahore: Iqbal Academy; Islam-
abad: Islamic Research Institute). MasudÕs book focuses on IqbalÕs lecture
on ÔThe Principle of Movement in IslamÕ, and in particular on IqbalÕs
Ôprocess of reasoningÕ. This, it is explained, was Ônot based on Greek logic
of syllogism but was rather derived from a combination of the Qur'anic
mode of exposition and the dialectics of Tasawwuf [mysticism].Õ ÔThat
method of reasoningÕ, he continues, Ôis essentially emotive and intuitive
rather than purely rationalÕ (p. 6). Accordingly, ÔIqbalÕs study is a part of
the continuing tradition of Muslim intellectualsÕ concern over the actual
problems of Muslim societyÕ, while ijtihad (which Iqbal innovatively com-
bined with ijma', or consensus) represented for him Ôa dynamic principle
of Islam and its civilizationÕ (p. 209). Like Shatibi in his period, Iqbal was a
model Muslim intellectual whose Ôapproach enabled him to impart a new
life to the basic components of the Islamic cultureÕ (p. 5). 
In his book on Iqbal, Masud characterizes his own method as historical,
semantic, and contextual (p. 9), and he cites a line from Iqbal as his bookÕs
epigram: ÔOur duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought,
and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it.Õ At the end of
his study of Iqbal, Masud brings the discussion up to the late twentieth
century as he speaks pointedly about the contemporary Muslim predica-
ment in Pakistan. The problem he sees centres on the aggrandizement of
the ulama, Islamic intellectuals, which leads to a Ôseparation between reli-
gion and people, between ulama and ummah.Õ He continues to say that
Ô[f]or the future of the Muslim ummah, particularly for PakistanÕs society, it
is imperative that such dangerous trends which lead toward establishing
a church in Islam must be discouragedÕ (p. 210).
Fatwas and muftis
I first came to know Muhammad Khalid Masud in connection with
the study of muftis and fatwas. Eventually, we co-edited, with David
Powers, Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas ( H a r v a r d ,
1996). His interest in fatwas, however, dated back to his first work as a
graduate student, his 1969 M.A. thesis
at McGill, which was on nineteenth-
century Indian fatwas of the Deoband
school. Later, he analysed the fatwas of
Shatibi. Fatwas are non-binding opin-
ions issued by jurists in response to
questions, and Masud astutely sensed
their great significance for the under-
standing of dynamism in Islamic law
and civilization. When he joined the
SSRC Committee on the Comparative
Study of Muslim Societies, he was in a
position to propose and direct the first international conference on
this interpretive institution, which was held in Granada in 1990. 
A few years earlier, in 1984, Masud published a ground-breaking arti-
cle on the theoretical culture of the mufti and fatwa-giving, ÔAdab al-
Mufti: The Muslim Understanding of Values, Characteristics and Role of
a MuftiÕ (in B.D. Metcalf, ed., Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of
Adab in South Asian Islam, Berkeley, pp. 124Ð50). 
His stated ÔobjectiveÕ in this article was Ôto develop an analytical
framework for studying the conceptual system of personal and moral
authority among Muslims in South AsiaÕ (p. 124). The somewhat better
known adab al-qadi treatises and the adab al-mufti works Masud intro-
duced us to in this article are specialized meta-literatures about the
aims and orientations of the two key Muslim legal interpreters, the
s h a r i ' a court judge and the mufti. In the patterned ideal reticence of a
man of knowledge, a mufti Ôshould speak only when asked, and should
give an opinion only in matters that have actually taken placeÕ. He also
Ôhas a right to refuse a fatwa in matters that he considers futile, imagi-
nary or irrelevantÕ (p. 137). In addressing issues of authority and rank
among historical muftis Masud also touches on the interesting phe-
nomenon of apprenticeship (p. 134). 
In our 1996 edited volume, in which each of the essays centres on
particular fatwas, he contributed ÔApostasy and Judicial Separation in
British IndiaÕ (pp. 193Ð203). This study was my introduction to Mawlana
Ashraf ' A l i Thanawi (1863Ð1943), the prominent and prolific South
Asian Muslim scholar and mufti, whose fatwas are collected in an eigh-
teen-volume work. MasudÕs overall aim in his choice of two of
ThanawiÕs fatwas, one from 1913 and a revised one on the same topic
from 1931, was, once again, to Ôobserve the process of legal change in
Islamic lawÕ (p. 195). The topic was apostasy and its implications for ju-
dicial divorce, and the key contextual change in the intervening period
was the advent of intensive Christian missionary activity. Apostasy had
not been a major issue earlier, but in the absence of other legal reme-
dies, women suddenly began to use the stratagem of conversion to ob-
tain automatic annulments and thus free themselves from difficult
marriages. ÔAnglo-Muhammadan and Hanafi laws prevailing in India
considered the question of motive immaterialÕ (p.199), but in his re-
vised fatwa Thanawi took motive into consideration, reversing himself
to hold that apostasy could not be used as a device to obtain a legal
separation. At the same time, however, Thanawi proposed adopting a
more liberal Maliki school approach to judicial forms of divorce. This he
did Ôin a manner that posited a semblance of continuity with the past
and that maintained the framework of Islamic lawÕ (p. 203).
Migration and renewal
With an innovative article from 1990, Masud initiated yet another
strand of inquiry, this time on Muslim travel: ÔThe Obligation to Mi-
grate: The Doctrine of Hijra in Islamic LawÕ (in D.F. Eickelman and J. Pis-
catori, eds., Muslim Travellers, London, pp. 29Ð49). Although his work
on travel began within his familiar paradigms of history and Islamic
legal doctrine, it would grow in a dramatic new direction, one that ad-
dressed a modern global movement and that transcended the legal
frame of reference. The product of this new research was a volume
edited by Masud in 2000, Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi J a-
m a ' a t as a Transnational Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: Brill). Like
the work on muftis and fatwas, this project emerged from an initiative
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display of such information in charts and tables. Examples of his classifi-
catory impulse are found throughout his writings: in the Shatibi book (p.
102), where a table Ôshows, in detail, ShatibiÕs attitude towards the accep-
tance of social changes in his fatawaÕ; in his ÔAdab al-MuftiÕ article (p. 150),
where an appendix sets forth the Ôscope of fatawa compared with Hadith
and FiqhÕ; in his chapter in the 1996 fatwa volume (p. 198), where Ôthe
range of subjects coveredÕ by ThanawiÕs fatwas is shown in numbers and
percentages; and in the Tablighi book (p. xxviii), where a chart categorizes
ten da'wa movements according to such features as country, registration
of activities, Sufi connections, educational institutions, and militancy.
As the first ISIM Academic Director Muhammad Khalid MasudÕs con-
tributions to the promotion of research on Islamic law have been nu-
merous, recently including a conference on the qadi and the s h a r i ' a
court and a workshop on the anthropology of Islamic law. In his inau-
gural lecture, Muslim JuristsÕ Quest for the Normative Basis of S h a r i ' a
(ISIM, 2000), Masud identified Ôthree major developments in the ongo-
ing debate on s h a r i ' aÕ including Ôthe role of the ulamaÕ, Ôthe issue of
equalityÕ, with an emphasis on gender, and Ôhuman rightsÕ. We may ex-
pect that in his future research he will make further distinctive contri-
bution to such ÔdevelopmentsÕ in Islamic law. My own hope is that he
will analyse the difficult problem of ÔcustomÕ in relation to the law, that
he will hold to the promise of the last line of his Shatibi book (p. 255)
where he refers to Ôour next study on ShatibiÕs concept of ' a d aÕ .
of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Study of Muslim Societies.
MasudÕs contribution to this volume goes far beyond his editorÕs ÔPref-
aceÕ and his lengthy ÔIntroductionÕ and includes both Chapter One, on
ÔThe Growth and Development of the Tablighi J a m a ' a t in IndiaÕ (pp.
3Ð43), and Chapter Four, on ÔIdeology and LegitimacyÕ (pp. 79Ð118). In
a series of case studies from the peripheries of this international move-
ment, contributors to this excellent volume examine Tabligh activities
in several countries in Europe, and also in Morocco, South Africa, and
Canada. Together with contributions by Metcalf and Talib, Masud
analyses the advent and the conceptual world of the Tablighis in their
South Asian metropole. 
Mawlana Thanawi, MasudÕs mufti of choice, also figures in the story
of the rise of the Tablighi movement as some of his ideas were appro-
priated by its founders. Yet Thanawi saw t a b l i g h and d a ' w a, the activi-
ties of ÔcommunicationÕ and ÔcallingÕ to the faith, as pertaining to the
ulama alone, while the Tablighis saw them as the activities of common
believers acting collectively, especially in travelling groups. Masud ar-
gues that Ôthe Tablighi J a m a ' a t Õ s stress on faith renewal and Muslim
transnationalism reflects specifically South Asian concernsÕ. This he un-
derstands in terms of the fact that ÔSouth AsiaÕs intellectual encounter
with the West began earlier than in the Arab world. It sensitized South
Asian Muslims, more than others, to the threats to the faith, not only
from Hinduism but also from modernityÕ (p. Lvi). 
If one of his principal analytic concerns as an editor of the 1996 fatwa
volume was to understand important features of the Ôprocess of reason-
ingÕ employed by muftis, another characteristic, but less heralded contri -
bution appears in that bookÕs ÔAppendixÕ (pp. 323Ð30). Prepared by
Masud, this is described as Ôa list of fatwas translated and analyzed in this
book, classified according to the pattern and order of al-Fatawa al-Is-
lamiyya (al-Azhar, 1982)Õ. One consistent expression of MasudÕs social sci-
entific interests is an enthusiasm for classification and for the instructive
F e a t u r e s
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AK: YouÕve been working on many
different topics, in many different
areas. How would you describe your
work as a whole?
MKM: Law has always been with me.
I started working at the Islamic Re-
search Institute in Pakistan, which was
involved with the legal question. Islamic law, moreover, is a source for
all types of questions, whether you are talking about society or human
rights or culture. 
AK: A theme that I pick up in your writing is the notion of change.
How have you dealt with this notion, and more particularly within the
context of modernity or modernization? 
MKM: When I embarked upon my M.A. in Islamic studies, the ques-
tions that we were dealing with, the discussions that we had, always
presumed a question of change. I have come to understand change, I
think, gradually. In the beginning my own attitude was to be critical.
For instance, questions about whether you should learn English or you
should go to college, were my life questions which I had to debate
when I was young. My father was not keen on my going to college; he
wanted me to go to either to Nadwa or to Deoband. When I was at uni-
versity, I would come home and sometimes mention certain issues. For
instance, one question that bothered me at that time was that accord-
ing to the al-Hidayah, the testimony of non-Muslims may not be ac-
cepted. And the authority for that view came from the Q u r ' a n i c v e r s e
that God is not going to grant authority to non-Muslims over Muslims.
The context in the Q u r ' a n was the war of Badr, and I thought that that
was not proper evidence. So I mentioned this and my father was so
angry that I was critical of al-Hidayah. 
AK: Was your father schooled in Islamic law himself?
MKM: No, he had no formal education in Islam. He was a qualified
t a b i b (traditional medic), but he never went to a madrasa. During the
freedom struggle, he spent months and years in jail with scholars like
Mufti Kifayatulla. So staying with them, he knew all these discussions
and religious debates.
AK: Do you think there is some special quality of change in modernity?
MKM: Until the 1960s modernity for me meant basically a western-
ized way of life. And, as a religious student, westernization was con-
nected with the imperial tradition. So freedom meant also freedom
from this modernity. Later, I thought of modernity as the challenges
that Muslim society was facing. Modernity as I understand it now, as an
enlightenment project, did not dawn on me at that time.
AK: What do you think has been the major engine of change? Where
does the change come from in the way that it affects Muslims?
MKM: Looking back, my idea was that change was coming from the
colonial period, and from Western institutions in power. Only later did
I realize that it was a more dynamic process, and that change was com-
ing from within society, within economic practices. As I thought it
through, I began to feel that modernity and change were inevitable. 
AK: YouÕve mentioned modernity as a form of enlightenment, could
you elaborate on this.
MKM: Perhaps I should first categorize myself among the Muslim
modernists. Most Muslim modernists, at least in South Asia, were sup-
porting reform and development, more in terms of what the West had
brought. And I think that all of these ideas can still be justified. But liv-
ing in the West, I started thinking that modernity was construed as a
project which started with the Enlightenment and that it is basically a
Western phenomenon. I think, howev-
er, that modernity has come to all cul-
tures, and it has come with a different
focus, and different emphases. Not
necessarily every culture will go into
modernity with the same kind of prob-
lems and prospects that the West has
experienced. I believe that the eighteenth century was as crucial in
Muslim world, especially in the South Asia, as it was in the West. But in
the eighteenth century, enlightenment or modernity in South Asia was
local and it was coming from within the tradition; it involved a great
deal of self-criticism. I donÕt know what shape it would have taken, but
unfortunately colonialism gave it a different character. Getting rid of
colonialism, and gaining freedom, meant for a large number of people
opposition to all that colonialism had brought. Because of that earlier
indigenous modernity, however, many supported the progressive
modern values as well. Freedom, democracy, determination of local
governments, reason Ð all these things also have Islamic roots. I donÕt
know if Shah Wali AllahÕs critical thinking would have led to anything
unique, but it was certainly moving away from tradition, towards self-
criticism of tradition, and looking for new thought. So thatÕs how the
Enlightenment in the West and the Enlightenment in the East Ð or in
the Muslim world Ð were not basically different, but the goals and the
categories that have been associated with the Western projects are
now taken for granted. 
AK: Can you perhaps tell us something about people who have had
a formative influence on your thinking? 
MKM: There were so many people that I read and who influenced
me. I think in the beginning it was Mawlana Abu al-Kalam Azad that I
read with much fascination for a long time. Earlier at home, my father
and I were very keen on Abu al-Kalam. IqbalÕs thinking too, not so
much his poetry, but his lectures have also meant a great deal to me.
He was my star. Ahmed Amin (author of Fajr al-Islam and D u h a a l -
I s l a m) fascinated me, and led me to read others. 
AK: YouÕve lectured in many different countries. Pakistan, Nigeria,
North America, and the Netherlands seem to have benefited most from
your work. What have been your experiences? 
MKM: Nigeria was surprising: I found the students very keen and
very responsive when compared with Pakistan. They took much inter-
est; they read everything in the reading list; they asked questions; they
went to the library. And the most surprising was that when I was teach-
ing Islamic law, the students who were Christians were more receptive,
more brilliant, and asked questions that really interested me. In the
United States and the Netherlands, there was a different atmosphere.
There they are interested not so much in the general subjects, but in
their own research work and there own interests. So their interest can
be considered very focused compared to what I found in Nigerian stu-
dents. 
AK: But if you were teaching a course on Islamic law, how would they
be more focused? 
MKM: Well in the Netherlands, for instance, it was disappointing for
me that when teaching in Islamic law two or three students would be
interested in the subject itself. Others would be more keen about their
marks, what type of exam to expect, and this kind of thing. In Pakistan,
too, my experience with students was not stimulating. For instance, I
remember in one of my classes, when I was explaining how the pre-Is-
lamic societies in India and Pakistan were relevant for studying Islam,
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or how the artefacts or art and painting and all these things are helpful,
one student stood up and asked me: ÔIslam has forbidden all these
things, why are you teaching all this?Õ I came across this kind of reac-
tion in Pakistan very often. 
AK: You started with the Islamic Research Institute, so you were deal-
ing with questions of application. In the Netherlands, did the applied
dimension of Islamic law still interest you? 
MKM: In a sense, yes. Applied law is still interesting in the Muslim
world, but the application of Islamic law becomes interesting in the
Western world as well. Muslim communities here may not be in great
number, but there is an increasing number who believe in Islamic law
in their lives. In the beginning, it was thought that ways could be found
to temporarily evade Islamic law. But now an increasing number are
asking really how to apply these laws, and are finding that some of the
laws are not applicable. They are not simply looking for expedient
ways, but in a way they are asking broader and deeper questions about
how to apply these laws. And in a way this is also a question that is
coming up in the Muslim world. 
AK: What do you see as the responsibility of Muslim intellectuals like
yourself in the light of recent developments in the resurgence of Islam.
MKM: If the renaissance or self-criticism that had started in the eigh-
teenth century would have continued, it would have been simpler. But
the problem now is that, first of all, there is too much sacredness attached
to the past. Again and again, Muslims are forced into taking emotional
positions. Because of the encounter with colonialism, many Muslim
thinkers thought that the first priority was political strength, political con-
trol, political power, and military strength. Later, from the 1950s to the
1960s, some thought that political strength was not the only thing. We
should have information, freedom, technical knowledge and scientific
knowledge. And then again, from the 1990s to the present, the West is
showing its strength, and the tide is swinging against the early trend. I
think that Muslim intellectuals have to take a very critical stand that mili-
tary or political strength is not the ideal. 
But the second challenge is this: for a
long time, during the medieval period,
there was a type of built-in hatred
against common people Ð awamm ka-
l - a n a m. This is a fictitious dichotomy
between the lite and the masses. In
the modern period, a greater role is
being recognized for common men
and women, so the intellectuals should
recognize it also. You cannot just sit in
your armchair and think about solving
things. You should be discussing these
things with the people. 
AK: Could you perhaps elaborate on
this point in the field of Islamic law?
MKM: Although we say that it is a di-
vine law, Islamic law is based on
whether it is accepted by the people or
not. And acceptability must be built,
which means that there should be a
communicative process. Scholars can-
not just say that this is the law of God
that must be applied and obeyed. In
the development of Islamic law, this
idea was already there. Just to give you
an example, in early Islam opinion was
very much against social stratification
within marriage contracts. And yet in practical terms marriages could
not be stable when cultural and social differences were not taken into
consideration. So the jurists came to realize that marriages were better
founded on a degree of equality in social status, and that the guardians
of the parents have a right to refuse their charges to marry people of
incompatible social standing. Jurists had realized that for practical rea-
sons, social stratification was difficult to ignore. 
In short, if there is a legal question in Islamic law, we simply cannot
approach it like a mathematical question and get an answer from the
Qur'an and s u n n a. In fact, what I observe is that whenever there is a
question there are already solutions. Often there are one, two, three,
four solutions that the society has thrown out, and muftis solve the
problem by saying which one of these is closer to Islamic teachings. So
again it is the common people, society, who are experiencing Islamic
law, and experiencing these questions, and who are offering solutions
from which to choose. 
AK: Has your work taken a turn in recent years, from legal theory to
the social construction of s h a r ' i a?
MKM: When I started talking about the m a q a s i d of s h a r i ' a or the
goals of s h a r i ' a, there was a very limited response and acceptance.
Some people were even opposed to it, because it appeared like some-
thing against the Q u r ' a n and s u n n a. But gradually the idea has been
taken up in various forms. The idea of the m a q a s i d of the s h a r i ' a is now
commonly accepted. Even in f a t a w a
one cannot just answer questions by
analogical reasoning; one has to look
at the philosophy of law and the
m a q a s i d. But, I feel that there is a need
to develop a concept of history of Is-
lamic law. Nowadays, Islamic law is still
being disembodied, hovering through-
out the past. I think a better under-
standing of the history of Islamic law
shows that it is something that has
been developing and changing over
time and should continue to develop. 
AK: Do you have any comments on
recent developments in Europe? 
MKM: The second and third genera-
tions of Muslims living here are now lo-
calizing Islam. It may not be substantive
enough as yet, but I think it has clearly
begun. I noticed a trend in the f a t a w a Ð
the fiqh al-aqalliyyat Ð which started by
saying that you cannot treat Muslims
living in these countries as diasporic
communities. Islamic law here has dif-
ferent interpretations than in the Mus-
lim world. What I think is lacking thus far
is the full implication of citizenship. This
is realized neither by the host countries
nor by the Muslims themselves. For Muslims this would mean a different
interpretation of Islam, more dynamic, more active, and one that could
contribute to the local civilization, local culture, and make Muslims ac-
tive participants in European societies. Muslims living here are not to be
cut off from the Muslim world but they should in some ways be van-
guards of the new world. I think that type of thinking is in the making.
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Current Issues
self during its occupation of Kuwait. In
other words, there is a lack of research
on how Iraq administered and defend-
ed its ÔNineteenth ProvinceÕ. Under-
standing such internal Iraqi political
dynamics during the Iran-Iraq War or
the 1991 Gulf War would have been
critical to understanding how the
Iraqis would have defended the coun-
try in what is really the Third Gulf War.
One could argue that research on IraqÕs
internal dynamics during these two
wars could not be conducted due to
Iraqi government restrictions. Howev-
er, since 1999, an often under-utilized
electronic archive of four million cap-
tured Iraqi state documents from the Iran-Iraq War, as well as 300,000
documents from the 1991 war, has been publicly available. 
It is questionable that even the few works on Iraq were properly con-
sulted and analysed by the powers that conducted Operation Iraqi
Freedom. These doubts were confirmed when a UK intelligence dossier
on IraqÕs intelligence agencies, presented to Colin Powell in February
2003, was found to be plagiarized from a historical, academic article I
had written on IraqÕs intelligence agencies. After this affair, one must
ask how familiar the US and UK governments really were with Iraq be-
fore they launched this war. 
Assessing the war
The neglected study of the internal dynamics of IraqÕs domestic poli-
tics and security apparatus led to many failed forecasts when US and
UK forces went to war against those institutions of the Iraqi state. The
American and British media as well as the policy-making Ôthink tanksÕ
provided many failed assessments of how the war would be fought.
Generally, these institutions predicted the S h i ' i population in the south
would revolt against their Sunni, Tikriti masters, leaving the toughest
battle to the ÔdecapitationÕ of the regime in Baghdad. On the contrary,
the S h i ' i t e s did not revolt, the most pitched battles were in the south,
and Baghdad fell relatively easily. It was predicted that SaddamÕs lite
Special Republican Guard and security organizations would fight to
the very end to defend the capital; however, the para-military organi-
zations such as Fidayin Saddam, which did not have formal military
training, posed the most serious challenge to coalition forces. Finally,
SaddamÕs feared weapons of mass destruction were not deployed
against military forces as they approached Baghdad.
The Iraqis were mistakenly classified into two camps: pro-Saddam
and anti-Saddam factions, and thus once the pro-Saddam factions
were vanquished, the anti-Saddam tendencies in Iraq would rally be-
hind the US. The US forecasts failed to account for the role of Iraqi na-
tionalism and the Iraqi citizensÕ loyalty in defending the nation op-
posed to the regime. For example, reports on 25 March 2003 from
British military forces stationed around Basra, stated that civilians had
revolted against Iraqi government forces. In fact, no revolts occurred in
Basra; nor did they occur in most of the S h i ' i towns of the south. When
the leader of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
Ayatullah al-Hakim, was asked about why no S h i ' a revolt materialized,
he said that Ô[t]here are a number of reasons why there has not been an
uprising, most important of which is that Iraqis perceive the United
In the US and UK policy analysis circles,
Ôovernight expertsÕ dominated the air-
waves and the discourse on Iraq, which
would later influence those govern-
ment bodies that conducted the war.
As a confession, I was also featured
prominently in the US and UK media,
and believed that my assessments were
of more value since I had devoted my
academic career to studying Iraq. Yet,
even I made many of these failed as-
sessments, due to the fact that I left my
native country when I was a child and
since most of my views on Iraq where
influenced by the Iraqi exile communi-
ty. Nevertheless, the dearth of public
knowledge on Iraq led to many false predictions of how the war would
evolve and how the Iraqis would react to the American and British pres-
ence once Saddam was removed. 
Assessing IraqÕs past 
These failed forecasts could partially be attributed to American and
British academic circles, where the study of Iraq has been neglected,
with only a handful of scholars that can be genuinely characterized as
experts. The literature on Iraq suffers from a lack of research conduct-
ed within the country itself. Simple logistical reasons have led to this
deficiency, as archival work and fieldwork in Iraq was nearly impossi-
ble. While the literature lacks an internal analysis of how the Iraqi state
and society function and operate, several authors have published
works on IraqÕs internal politics. Prominent among them is Kanan
MakiyaÕs work, which gives a detailed background to the emergence
and foundation of the Iraqi security apparatus and Baath Party. While
his book The Republic of Fear is considered the textbook on IraqÕs inter-
nal politics, Makiya wrote the book while in exile. In the US and UK,
Peter Sluglett and Charles Tripp are among the few scholars who have
recently written on Iraq, while other known scholars include the Israeli
academics, Amazia Baram and Ofra Bengio. All have conducted their
research on Iraq from outside of its borders. In fact, the last substantial
work based on research in Iraq only covered the period up to the 1958
Revolution in Iraq; the late Hanna BatatuÕs work is based upon the se-
cret records of the Iraqi monarchy, which were made public after the
1958 Revolution. Nevertheless, the few academic experts were not fea-
tured prominently in the media: perhaps out of their own volition; per-
haps they were never contacted. In fact, in the US and UK media circles,
former military generals dominated the media outlets, demonstrating
the media obsession with how Iraq was being destroyed. Little atten-
tion, however, was given to how it would be rebuilt. 
Much of the literature on Iraq has focused on its eight-year war with
Iran or the 1991 Gulf War, primarily devoted to the military aspects of
the wars, with no works dealing with the internal Iraqi politics during
the conflict. While the literature primarily dealt with the international
diplomacy surrounding the invasion and subsequent military conduct
of the 1991 Gulf War, there is a general lack of information on the
events that took place inside of Kuwait from 2 August 1990 to 16 Janu-
ary 1991. While numerous works have been written on the subject, in-
cluding military analyses, eyewitness accounts, and journalistic pieces,
not one has utilized primary documents produced by the Iraqi state it-
As Operation Iraqi Freedom has come to
a close, the US has declared victory in
achieving its objectives. Given the rapid pace
of this campaign, most analysis focused on
t h e course of events, with little academic and
often inaccurate assessment of the war and
i t s aftermath in Iraq. Such assessments are
crucial when addressing the question of
whether Iraq will survive as a viable state,
a s well as what form it will take. Faulty
forecasts about IraqÕs future, combined with
failing to understand its internal political
dynamics could have disastrous effects on
both the Iraqi people and the American and
UK forces stationed there. 
The Unexpected
Aftermath of O p e r a t i o n
Ô I r a q i F r e e d o m Õ
Current Issues
States as an occupying rather than a liberating force. The second rea-
son has to do with peopleÕs strong sense of nationalism, the painful
memories of the war of 1991, and the fear that anyone who rises up
against the regime will be crushed.Õ After the Second Gulf War, in
March 1991 an uprising began in Basra and literally spread overnight
throughout the south of Iraq. However, the US failed to support this
uprising and IraqÕs Republican Guard brutally crushed it, leaving many
S h i ' i t e s feeling abandoned by the US, and such feelings among the
S h i ' a were not taken into account. 
Assessing IraqÕs future
Prior to the invasion of Iraq, many inaccurate assumptions were made
such as that Iraqi soldiers would not fight at all, American forces would
be greeted as liberators, and Iraqi exiles would be enthusiastically re-
ceived. Once the war had finished, assessments failed to take into ac-
count the almost immediate animosity directed towards the US once
Saddam was removed, and what the Iraqis envisioned for their future
state. Currently there are numerous, often contradictory, visions for a
post-Saddam Iraq, ranging from a US-supported, neo-Baathist Iraq in
the guise of a democracy, to a decentralized, federalist Iraq proposed by
the exile opposition and Kurdish groups. On the other end of the spec-
trum, many Iraqis are calling for an Islamic state/theocracy, with dis-
agreement over whether it should be formed on the Iranian model. 
As IraqÕs S h i ' i t e s mobilize to play a dominant role in Iraq, amply
demonstrated by their holy processions in the last week of April, US ad-
ministration officials admit they underestimated their organizational
strength and were unprepared to prevent the rise of an anti-American,
Islamic theocracy in the country. A Washington Post article stated: ÔAs
the administration plotted to overthrow HusseinÕs government, U.S. of-
ficials said this week, it failed to fully appreciate the force of Shiite aspi-
rations and is now concerned that those sentiments could coalesce into
a fundamentalist government. Others were more focused on the over-
riding goal of defeating Hussein and paid little attention to the dynam-
ics of religion and politics in the region.Õ The US administration fears
that the Iraqi S h i ' a would come under the sway of Iranian influence.
Were some of these US officials to buy a copy of Yitzhak NakashÕs book,
they would realize that the Shi'itesÕ strong sense of Iraqi nationalism
and a resistance to the Iranian concept of a single supreme S h i ' i t er u l e r
(velayet-e faqih) would keep the Islamic RepublicÕs influence in check. 
The failure to understand Iranian foreign policy, especially in the US,
could lead to disastrous consequences for the future of Iraq. Those in
the US administration that argue Iran should be denied an influence in
Iraq, ignore the centuries-old historical ties between the Iranian S h i ' i t e s
and those in Iraq and fail to comprehend the religious significance of
the holy sites in Iraq for all S h i ' i Muslims. US forces in Iraq cannot change
this historical legacy. Additionally, the idea of exporting the Iranian rev-
olution has long expired in IranÕs foreign policy, but rather the Iranians
are more weary of yet another American satellite state on the other side
of its borders. 
While the US focuses on alleged Iranian attempts to influence the
S h i ' a towns of Najaf and Karbala, there are mounting tensions develop-
ing in the predominantly S h i ' i district of Baghdad known as Saddam
City, which has now be renamed Sadr City, in honour of the clerical fam-
ily that has played a pivotal role for this community. For the most part,
US forces have not been deployed here, and the district has been run by
armed factions who support the Sadr faction in the growing contention
over who will dominate IraqÕs S h i ' ic o m m u n i t y .
As the American forces are focused on IranÕs attempt to influence
southern Iraq, they have neglected to maintain a strong presence in the
north. Perhaps they have not fully appreciated the historic conflict be-
tween the Kurds, Iraqi Turkomans, and Arabs in towns such as Kirkuk
and Mosul, and will not see the signs of the potentially dangerous eth-
nic conflict that is taking shape in this region. The forces of the Kurdish
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan moved into the
northern Iraqi cities of Mosul and the oil-rich Kirkuk, despite Turkish
warnings not to do so, arguing this would be the basis for the creation
of an independent Kurdish state. Turkish troops have not been de-
ployed in northern Iraq as many analysts predicted, and yet the Kurds
have not indicated that they will withdraw completely from these cities. 
The failure to understand IraqÕs history and politics lead to many mis-
calculations of how Operation Iraqi Freedom would evolve, and how
the Iraqi people would react to US presence. Additional miscalculations
could have disastrous results. The US should heed the lesson of the
Great Iraqi Revolt of 1920, which united the disparate communities of
the S h i ' i t e s, Sunnis, and Kurds in the newly created mandate of Iraq in a
common animosity towards the British forces in Iraq. All the ingredients
are present for a second Great Iraqi Revolt. The Iraqi nation was created
from the ravages of the First World War, launched a nationwide revolt in
the 1920s, suffered through the Second World War, underwent revolu-
tions in 1958, 1963 and 1968, dealt with an almost continuous Kurdish
rebellion and a mass uprising in March of 1991, and had three disas-
trous wars with foreign powers. Neither Iraq nor the Americans sta-
tioned there need a second Great Revolution.
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The recent military victory by the US
and British forces in Iraq and its imme-
diate aftermath of political chaos and
uncertainty in that ÔliberatedÕ nation
brings an added urgency to addressing
the problems of post-conflict gover-
nance in these multi-ethnic societies in
the region. Explanations for these re-
peated political failures after military
triumphs are both numerous and high-
ly contentious. Suggestions for possi-
ble strategies to break out of the ongo-
ing military-political impasse, while
not as numerous, have been equally
dyspeptic and strongly partisan not
only among Afghan leaders and mem-
bers of the ethnic and regional communities, but also among a grow-
ing cadre of international ÔexpertsÕ, as well as an occasional interested
American politician. Remarkable, however, in these discourses (espe-
cially among Afghans) are two things: an overwhelming convergence
of opinions about the objectives for a desirable political outcome in
Afghanistan, and conflicting views on how and by what political means
to accomplish them. The disagreements on the means and political
strategies for realizing the national goals are becoming increasingly
sharp, especially among those in Kabul and the powerful regional ac-
tors. These divergent centre-periphery political perspectives are in-
formed by significantly different perceptions of national and local in-
terests among the contenders. 
Mismatched strategies
The Afghan state, like many other post-colonial states, was constitut-
ed on the basis of the old dynastic person-centred model of sovereign-
ty in which the ruler exercised absolute power. The rulers, whether
under the monarchy, DaoudÕs royal republic, the Khalq-Parcham Marx-
ists, or the Mujahideen and Taliban regimes, and currently Chairman
Karzai, have all attempted to rule over the country and its inhabitants as
subjects rather than citizens. They have done so by relying on the use of
force and maintaining/building a strong national army and police, com-
plimented by their power to appoint and dismiss all government offi-
cials at will. Such a concentration of power has led to practices of which
the outcomes have been nothing but tragic. Some of the more note-
worthy of these legacies (earlier addressed in ISIM Newsletter 6, pp.
20Ð1) include the following: pervasive political mistrust between the
rulers and their subjects, which has led to the general erosion of trust as
a Ôsocial capitalÕ in Afghan society beyond the circles of immediate fam-
ily, close kin, and ethno-linguistic/sectarian communities; commoditi-
zation of loyalties due to corruption, nepotism, and cronyism within a
political economy of dependency and patron-client ties; exploitation of
Islam (and other convenient ideologies) to preserve self-interest and
the privileges of family, tribe, or ethnic group; and political marginaliza-
tion and alienation of women and the so-called minorities (but also
some Pashtun clans and tribes), who were often treated as mere Ôinter-
nal-colonialÕ subjects, complemented with some degree of contempt,
especially on the part of certain government officials. 
One of the most disastrous consequences of the century of rule from
Kabul was the onset of the Marxist coup of 1978, and the subsequent
national turmoil that culminated in the rise of the Taliban. This form of
tribal-based paternalistic state politics
has produced other equally pernicious
legacies, which if left unaddressed in
the new Constitution could have con-
siderable negative impact on the
promises of building democratic gov-
ernance in the country. Unfortunately,
the persistent demands from the lead-
ers of the current Transitional Adminis-
tration to re-establish the central gov-
ernment rule throughout the country Ð
i.e. by means of building another large
and expensive national standing army
and police Ð seem wrongheaded at
best, and disastrous at worst. Accord-
ing to a ÔSneak PreviewÕ of the recently
completed draft of the Constitution, by Amin Tarzi, in the R F E / R L
Afghanistan Report (Vol. 2, No. 4, 24 April 2003), the Constitutional
Drafting Commission has adopted, with very minor alterations, the
1964 Constitution of Afghanistan and submitted it to Chairman Karzai
as the new Draft Constitution of the country for further study and dis-
cussions. 
Any reasonable solution to the problem of future governance in
Afghanistan must address at least three sets of domestic concerns:
from the perspective of the war-weary and impoverished masses, es-
pecially the internally displaced and the returning refugees; from the
perspective of those who hold (or aspire to) power in the capital, Kabul,
and wish to expand their control over the rest of the country; and from
the perspective of the local and regional leaders and their supporters
who wish to retain their autonomy from the centre and ensure a signif-
icant stake in the future governance, reconstruction, and development
of the country. 
For the overwhelming majority of ordinary Afghans, the most press-
ing problem has been, and will remain, a general sense of physical in-
security in their homes, neighbourhoods, and the national highways
and roads in many parts of the country, especially in the eastern and
southern regions along the Pakistan borders. In view a recent study by
a World Bank team which points to a growing recognition that Ôthere
can be no peace without development and no development without
peaceÕ (http://econ.worldbank.org/prr/CivilWarPRR), a way must be
found in Afghanistan to break the vicious cycles of violence and pover-
ty. The resolution of the twin problems of peace and development is,
however, contingent to a large measure upon the actions of the inter-
national community in conjunction with the Afghan leadership, at
both the national and local levels.
Since they are currently unable to implement their strong central-
ized state project militarily, the Transitional Administration in Kabul is
feverishly trying to accomplish the re-centralization of the government
by financial, administrative, and judicial means through the activities
of the powerful Ministries of Finance and Interior, and the Supreme
Court. The mechanisms employed so far (with some degree of success)
include: the introduction of new banknotes and centralization of the
banking institutions, coupled with the demand by the Ministry of Fi-
nance (and Chairman Karzai) that all revenues from customÕs duties
collected at the border ports be forwarded to the central treasury.2 T h e
Ministry of Finance has been, however, less successful in centralizing
control of the flow of international assistance by the donor nations
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A quarter of a century of wars ending in
military triumphs Ð by the Mujahideen against
the Red Army and the Communist regimes;
b y the Taliban and al-Qaeda against the
Mujahideen-Northern Alliance forces; and
most recently by the US-led international
coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda Ð
have proven that achieving victory in the
battlefield is easier than translating that
victory into desired political objectives.
T h e persistence of political failures following
military victories in Afghanistan calls for
a reasoned explanation of this major gap
between means and ends, and a way out of
t h e painful cycle of violence in the country. 
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who prefer to spend their funds through the multitudes of internation-
al NGOs operating all across the country with the help of local and re-
gional authorities. The Ministry of Interior and the Supreme Court are
trying to accomplish their centralization projects by utilizing the best
weapon within the arsenal of person-centred sovereignty-based rule Ð
the appointment of loyal governors, other minor officials, and judges Ð
in those provinces where they can do so. Chairman KarzaiÕs virtual con-
trol over the appointments of the nine-member Constitutional Draft-
ing Committee and the thirty-five-member Constitutional Commission
may prove to be yet another powerful means for re-enshrinement of
the strong centralized state by preventing the consideration or discus-
sion of federalism or some other form of decentralization as alternative
forms of governance in the new draft Constitution of Afghanistan. Un-
fortunately for Afghanistan, the current Transitional AdministrationÕs
centralization project may prove to be extremely costly, both econom-
ically and in socio-political opportunities. Even if successful, such a
project will only further aggravate the bedevilling problems of nation-
al security as well as the mounting ethnic and regional tensions within
the country. 
From subjects to citizens
In order to pave the way for peace and development in Afghanistan,
the international community, together with the leaders of the Afghan
Transitional Administration, and the local and regional leaders must be
willing, at the minimum, to do three things, the first of which is to
abandon the assumption that security may be obtained only by means
of a large national army and police force. Instead, they ought to start
thinking that security is fundamentally a problem of deteriorating trust
as a valued social capital in Afghan society. Second, they should be
willing to move away from the old and oppressive practices of person-
centred sovereignty-based rule over an emasculated body of mistrust-
ing subjects, and to become political managers and civil servants who
are governing an empowered community of citizens. And third, they
should adhere to and practice the tried and tested principles of com-
munity self-governance by means of elections and/or recruitment and
hiring of civil servants rather than their appointment and dismissal by
the rulers at all levels of government administration. 
In the tense environment of a post-9/11 world, and in a war-ravaged
and heavily armed Afghan population, it is not surprising that the lead-
ers of the Transitional Administration see security solely in terms of
building a strong military and police force to declare war on their real
or imagined enemies. Such was also done by the USA after the 9/11 at-
tacks. Even with the enormous firepower of the US Armed Forces, the
war on terrorism is far from over, and US military victory remains in
doubt, despite declarations to the contrary. More importantly, the Ôwar
on terrorismÕ has not improved the sense of security for the American
citizens at home or abroad. The reason for this lack of progress in win-
ning this war may be the fact that the root causes of terrorism, which
are fundamentally political, are utterly ignored or denied. 
More than two decades of war and communal strife fuelled by hate
and suspicion, not only towards the government but also between var-
ious ethnic and tribal communities, has brought the level of general
trust within and between communities in Afghanistan to its absolute
minimum. Contemplating more war by the central government
against those whom they sometimes call the ÔwarlordsÕ Ð a verbal
weapon crafted by the Pakistani ISI in reference to those who resisted
the Taliban conquest of their territories Ð will only produce more hate
and violence. More importantly, the leaders of Afghanistan should take
note of the historical fact that a strong national standing army, even
when it was maintained at a huge cost, did not only defend the coun-
try; it also ÔinvitedÕ the Soviet invasion of 1979. The creation of the
70,000-strong national army currently contemplated, at even greater
financial cost, will be again a source of temptation by the rulers to be
used against their own citizens as was done in the past.
However, there is a viable alternative to improve national defence
against foreign enemies, as well as to boost internal security while lay-
ing important foundations for building communal trust. The verbal
weapons of ÔwarlordÕ and Ôwarlordi s mÕ, so widely used by the media,
government officials, some researchers, and most ÔexpertsÕ on the af-
fairs of the country, should be abandoned. A concerted effort must be
made to work with local rural communities to officially form and regis-
ter community-based national defence units. This does not, however,
mean that there is no need for a national army and police or a central
government. Rather, it requires diligence in making a systematic as-
sessment of how to re-organize appropriate governing structures in
which the roles, powers, and responsibilities of the central, regional,
provincial, and local governing bodies are clearly defined and the nec-
essary institutional means (such as the appropriate size of the national
army and police force) are made available to exercise their requisite
powers and to fulfil their governance obligations. The establishment of
such a viable state structure capable of stabilizing the country for na-
tional reconciliation and reconstruction requires further wisdom in en-
shrining the principle of community self-governance through elec-
tions and/or recruitment of the civil servants. Adopting community
self-governance will be a crucial step toward a fair and equitable treat-
ment of all ethnic, regional, and tribal groups alike. This will be possible
only when a properly designed and organized complete census of the
countryÕs population is taken and appropriate demographic standards
are established for organizing administrative units and electoral con-
s t i t u e n c i e s .
The opportunity is here, and the expectations, of both the battered
peoples of Afghanistan and a caring and concerned international com-
munity, are very high. Are the leaders of Afghanistan ready to embark
on a new and alternative political course which could transform the
constitutive principles of governance in order to lay the foundation for
a gradual and healthier change in the political culture of Afghan soci-
ety? The Afghan leaders at both the centre and the periphery, the opin-
ion makers at home and abroad, and the international advisors and an-
alysts must steer clear of the sterile debates about federalism, war-
l o r di s m, and the like. What requires close examination and adoption is
a clear set of constitutive governance principles, which could truly help
transform the impoverished masses of Afghan subjects into loyal and
responsible citizens of their own communities Ð as well as a peaceful
Afghan state. Such a set of democratic governance principles must re-
ject and put an end to the possibility of reverting to the familiar pat-
terns of person-centred politics, and of sovereign rulers with their
cadre of kin and cronies holding on to power. It is for the sake of future
generations, and in the hope of eliminating from Afghanistan and the
world one of the principle political causes of terrorism Ð the sovereign-
ty-based oppressive militaristic regimes in multi-ethnic states Ð that
the leaders of Afghanistan must display the requisite wisdom and dili-
gence to enshrine the right set of governance
principles in the new Constitution of Afghanistan.
To do otherwise will mean the loss of a truly gold-
en opportunity for the people of Afghanistan, the
region, and the world.
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After more than a decade of intense
discussions between various Muslim
organizations and successive Minis-
ters of Interior, ambassadors, scholars,
experts, etc., a representative board
for the Muslim worship in France was
finally elected in April 2003. Its first
general assembly meeting took place
in Paris on 3 May 2003. Notwithstand-
ing many critics, the Conseil Franais
du Culte Musulman (CFCM) c o n s t i-
tutes an elected national body in
charge of issuing Ôprincipal statements
on central religious topicsÕ1 and embodying the partnership with pub-
lic authorities, nationally and locally. The CFCM is made of a general
assembly and twenty-five regional agencies called the Conseils R-
gionaux du Culte Musulman (CRCM) in charge of the daily manage-
ment of the Muslim communitiesÕ affairs, in particular relations with
the French public administration. This step represents a victory in
many ways, although the nature of this victory differs according to the
actors that have been committed to the project since its launching by
Jean-Pierre Chevnement, former Minister of Interior, in the fall of
1 9 9 9 .
Several Cabinets had long tried to provide a solution to the question
of representation of Islam as a worship in the French context. P. Joxe
was the first (in 1989) to try to set up a council of reflection on Islam in
France, followed by Charles Pasqua and the creation of a council of
representation of French Islam and the editing of a charter of the Mus-
lim worship in France. In October 1999, Jean-Pierre Chevnement fol-
lowed up the previous initiatives with a new concept encapsulated in
the label of ÔConsultation sur lÕislam de France-IsticharaÕ with a clear
objective of setting up a board of Muslim representatives in charge of
working as a partner with the state on religious issues. The notion of
ÔconsultationÕ appeared from the very beginning as the main legiti-
mating factor guiding the public project of helping Muslims set up a
representative institution. It started like a fairytale full of promises,
and should have been concluded in May 2002 with the elections of
the CFCM. After many rescheduled polls, resignations, and new ap-
pointments, the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy in the government in June
2002 gave a new impetus and accelerated the process, which turned
out to be somewhat of a Ôforced weddingÕ that finally ended as a Ômar-
riage of convenienceÕ after the surprising results of the 6 and 13 April
e l e c t i o n s .
The initial step of the ÔConsultationÕ had been to list the main questions
and call for concrete and rapid solutions to certain issues: the creation
of denominational organizations as foreseen by title IV of the law of
1905, the creation of new places of worship, and defining the status of
the religious staff. On 3 July 2001, a decisive step was taken with the
setting up of a framework agreement elaborating on the principles
and legal basis that organize the relationship between the public au-
thorities and the Muslim worship. The framework agreement opens
with the declaration of loyalty to the Republican fundamental princi-
ples and more specifically to the constitutional principles of freedom
of conscience. One of the priorities of the Consultation consisted of
identifying the most suitable procedures for the designation of the
representative board (CFCM). Several Muslim representatives laid
down the method for the rapid emergence of an authoritative body for
Islam in France. The choice would be made on the Ôchurch basisÕ: the
elections would intervene in the places of worship and buildings ruled
by declared associations. While it was decided to hold elections, the 4
to 5 million Muslims living in France
were not asked to go directly to the
polls in April.2 Instead, they were repre-
sented by 4031 delegates stemming
from 995 places of worship officially
registered as associations, the number
of persons representing each place
being related to the size of the site. The
elected board would then become an
association of the July 1901 law type.
On the one hand, the Consultation
opened real opportunities for dialogue
and raised some important issues for
the CFCM agenda. On the other hand, it only covers part of the prob-
lem and is perceived as a constraint for those associative leaders who
feel they have been excluded from the process. 
Does the CFCM represent the Muslims?
Since its implementation, the Consultation has been gathering dif-
ferent categories of Muslim representatives. One is made of federative
structures such as the Grande Mosque de Paris (GMP), the Union des
Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF), the Fdration Nationale
des Musulmans de France (FNMF), the Tabligh, the Turkish DITIB Ð also
known as the Comit de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France
(CCMT), and the Fdration Franaise des Associations Islamiques
dÕAfrique, des Comores et des Antilles (FFAIACA). Large independent
mosques like, among others, the Islamic cultural centre of Evry, al-Islah
mosque in Marseille, or the mosque in Mantes-La-Jolie constitute an-
other category of participants, to which should be added the so-called
Ôqualified personalitiesÕ, a heterogeneous group of converts, scholars,
and experts. The process did not achieve unanimity among Muslims,
mostly due to its working methods rather than its initial purpose. A lot
of Muslim associative leaders felt ÔobligedÕ to participate in order not to
be excluded from important dossiers. Several voices from associative
leaders (whether or not participants in the Consultation) have in par-
ticular very strongly criticized the participation of associations and fed-
erations considered not to be representative of a moderate Islam. This
was particularly the case after Sarkozy who, last June and July, met
with the leaders of UOIF on a bilateral basis. Soheib Benscheikh, main
mufti of Marseille, has been one of the strongest opponents from the
inside Ð having participated in the Consultation for a while Ð and from
the outside. Calling the whole process a Ôbureaucratic m e c h o u i aÕ, he
stressed that the French government should get rid of Ôthis post-colo-
nial approachÕ: ÔThe Ministry of Interior even called this Consultation i s-
t i c h a r a, with a publication associated to it whose title is in Arabic! But
we are in France! It seems like one is looking for Òlocal colourÓ, folk-
l o r e . Õ3 The paternalism charges denouncing the Ôneo-colonialÕ attitude
of the government towards the Muslim communities at large have
been the most frequent attacks against the entire initiative. The evolu-
tion of this process of institutionalization of Islam had also the ambi-
tion to solve the problem of the role of the states of origin. On different
occasions (questions of the financing of the places of worship, media-
tion of the King of Morocco in the first Ôveiling affairÕ in 1989), the co-
administration of Islam both by the French government and by the
states of origin clearly demonstrated the insufficiency of the French
policies in this domain. An affair for domestic policy or for foreign af-
fairs, the issue hardly found a proper space on the French political
agenda. The Consultation itself still remains highly influenced by a
diplomatic management. Indeed, the census forms for the mosques in-
dicating the size and squared metres would have been diffused by the
Algerian consulate on behalf of the Paris mosque, the Moroccan con-
sulates having given their support to certain associations.4
Current Issues
France is the second country in Western
Europe, after Belgium in 1998 (see I S I M
N e w s l e t t e r 2, p. 26), to have elected
a representative Muslim council.
T h e formation of the Conseil Franais du Culte
Musulman (CFCM) was carefully controlled by
t h e Ministry of Interior and despite the
substantial support it has received for its
general purpose of consultation, many have
questioned the degree to which the CFCM
truly reflects the composition of
t h e M u s l i m community. 
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A French Touch?
ject is, however, not the same from one
context to another depending upon the
national and local political structures:
does it aim at monitoring and regulating
(controlling?) the Muslims? The French
framework of laicity adds even more
complexity: to what extent does the
state go beyond its neutrality in actively
supporting the creation of a representa-
tive body (for example, since June 2002,
its direct intervention as a mediator be-
tween competing structures running for
elections)? 
Now that the CFCM is elected, the cen-
tral question deals with its capacity to
provide the Muslim population living in
France with the right answers to their
multiple questions. In an interview for
the Muslim journal La Medina, Sarkozy
declared shortly after being appointed
that Ô[t]he purpose of the Consultation is
to represent Islam of France, not Islam in
FranceÕ,7 based on what he called the Ôre-
ality of the fieldÕ, explaining thus the
dominant role of the regional commit-
tees. Until now, these challenges have
been resolved thanks to the state having
delegated to the local authorities the
means and competences for managing
religious issues (e.g. Muslim plots in
cemeteries or the decision to exclude a
veiled student from a public school). The
training of imams will be one of the first
questions to be answered by the newly
elected board. Around 1,000 imams are
working in France, 90 per cent of whom
are foreigners (often with insufficient
levels of French language capacities, un-
clear status, and dependency on foreign countries, notably Algeria, Mo-
rocco, and Turkey): the problem is multi-faceted. It is actually conceived
as involving not only the Ministry of Interior and the CFCM but also as an
issue covered by the Ministry of Education. It seems that the university (in
particular the faculty of Islamic Studies) could be mobilized in shaping
the proper format to be adopted in France, something probably along
the lines of an intermediary between a pure faculty of theology and a re-
ligious seminary.
One week after the second round of the elections, visiting the annual
meeting of the UOIF in Le Bourget, Sarkozy was severely booed when he
stated that women should be bareheaded when
posing for pictures for their national identity cards.
The immediate controversy (in particular activated
by the media) that followed clearly illustrates the
limits of the CFCM both as an institution and as an
authority as far as its regulating capacity is con-
cerned. Moreover, if the French state has demon-
strated a public commitment to treat Islam equally
in comparison with other worships, it seems impos-
sible to solve, in one and the same body, the social
issues raised by the visibility of religious signs in the
public space.8 Jean-Pierre Raffarin, French Prime
Minister, noted in his discourse in front of the first
CFCM General Assembly meeting on 3 May 2003:
ÔReligion is coming back and it is good news to me.Õ
The veil is certainly going to be, again, a hot and
central topic in France for the coming months. But
this time, it will open up a discussion that goes far
beyond the issue of equality of Islam and other
worships and the individual right of a Muslim to be
respected as a citizen.
The elections of the CFCM are certainly the most ÔperformativeÕ aspect
of the whole project. Chevnement conceived it as a Consultation em-
phasizing the participative and deliberative components of the repre-
sentation perspective. The two-round elections have been perceived
as a means of legitimizing the institution. The rate of participation was
approximately 88.5 per cent. Two points should be made in that re-
spect. First of all the diversity of the trends: there is not a single associ-
ation that could be considered as a winner that would dominate exclu-
sively the CFCM. The elections have demonstrated the diversity of
trends within the French associations of Muslims. The explicit loser of
the elections is the Grande Mosque de Paris, which, despite its repre-
sentation all over France, gathered only 12 per cent of the national
votes. Dalil Boubakeur has, however, been confirmed as president of
the CFCM as he was designated to this position last December after a
meeting of the COMOR. The two winners of these first elections of the
CFCM are the FNMF, with 39 per cent of the votes, and the UOIF, with
27 per cent. Who should sit around the RepublicÕs table? One central
aspect of the consultative nature and one of the main results of the
elections has been called by certain experts a ÔdemocratizationÕ of
I s l a m .5 It illustrates in a way the political skills of the various organiza-
tions, in particular in terms of tactical moves and construction of al-
liances that will probably appear as soon as the CRCM are officially or-
ganized and identified. Will then the CFCM and the CRCM be able to
work jointly and efficiently? 
A French touch?
In France, the principle of laicity is based mainly on a denominational
definition of religion, meaning that religions exist for the French state
through their religious institutions.6 In many respects, the French institu-
tionalization process of a representative structure is very much similar to
what occurs elsewhere in the European Union in terms of public policies
dealing with the recognition of Islam as a worship. Muslims are almost
everywhere systematically disqualified for their incapacity to provide the
state with a unique and unified speaker, preventing thus its institutional-
ization, its ÔchurchificationÕ. The meaning of this institutionalization pro-
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Modern migratory movements within
religions often raise hopes of a brighter
future. Intellectuals in new diasporas
like to attribute to themselves the
heroic mission of reforming their reli-
gion and the world. When Judaism set-
tled in America in the mid-nineteenth
century, the emerging Reform move-
ment, initiated in Germany, was at its
apogee. Leaders accordingly hoped
that the new context would liberate
Jews from Ôthe literal and metaphorical
ghettosÕ of Europe.1 In European Islam,
this has been the case too. Very often,
the continent is seen as fertile ground for the conceptualization of a
new i j t i h a d. In France, in particular, the theme ÔFrance, une chance de
lÕislamÕ dominates the public debate, but the idea finds many echoes in
other countries as well. 
Soheib Bencheikh, the Ômufti of MarseillesÕ, Dalil Boubakeur, rector of
the Mosque de Paris and now president of the newly established Con-
seil franais du culte musulman, and more recently Tariq Ramadan all
share the claim that the Islamic Reform will be thought out here in Eu-
rope first and transposed to
the Muslim world later. In
Britain, the chairman of the
Sharia College, Zaki Badawi,
thinks the same. For some,
this new ground offers an
excellent opportunity to rid
Islam of its juridical slant,
and to free it from its old
and inadequate reflexes. For
others, it is an opportunity
to develop a new Islamic ju-
risprudence, purified from
centuries of corruption and
t r a d i t i o n s .2
Embodied in the ideology
of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which sees Islamic law as
evolving, the elaboration of
a jurisprudence of minori-
ties (fiqh al-aqalliyyat) un-
derscores one such tenden-
cy. Promoted by authorita-
tive figures such as Taha J.
A l w a n i ,3 president of the
Fiqh Council of North Amer-
ica, and Yusuf Qaradawi,4
this f i q h is nevertheless con-
troversial even among the
ulema. For Said Ramadan al-
Bouti, it is an effort to split the community, and create f i t n a.5 A c c o r d i n g
to the members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, it is an undisguised attempt to
change the basics of Islam. Despite repeated claims by Qaradawi that it
is Ôjust another branchÕ, there are signs that this new jurisprudence
may yet have an impact far beyond the minority populations. Strug-
gling to integrate the European context into Islamic normativity, schol-
ars engaged in this reflection are forced to search for the elusive dis-
tinction between tradition and religion, and risk in turn further desta-
bilizing the edifice of Islamic f i q h, already under pressure in the Muslim
world. 
E C F R
The European Council for Fatwa and
Research (ECFR), created in London in
1997 to fill up the authority gap in the
West, is an example of an institution
that presents itself not as a Ôcompetitor
or alternative to the established coun-
cils of jurisprudence in the Islamic
worldÕ, but rather as a complement,
aiming to Ôcontribute to a reflection on
the f i q h of minoritiesÕ.6 Members define
the f i q h of minorities as twofold: a re-
actualization of old juridical opinions
(selective i j t i h a d) and the resolution of
the new problems arising from modern societies (new i j t i h a d). In prac-
tice, however, the ECFR undermines the authority of muftis in the Mus-
lim world by giving different answers to old queries. The thirty member-
strong Council issues rulings to questions that are characterized by
eclecticism (t a l f i q), necessity (d a r u r a), and facility (t a y s i r). Five years
after its foundation, if the ECFR is still struggling to establish itself as an
authority in Europe, it has succeeded in attracting much criticism from
the Muslim world. The fatwa issued in 1999 allowing mortgages in cer-
tain conditions provoked fervent reactions throughout the Muslim
world. Though not new, based on classical sources, and even conserva-
tive in regards to some previous rulings,7 the institutional framework
provided by the ECFR disseminated the fatwa and weakened the inter-
diction stated by numerous imams throughout Europe and supported
by prominent ulema abroad. The ruling issued concerned exclusively
the West, but the rationalization of the idea that economic need ren-
ders licit previously forbidden practices became very controversial
within Muslim communities, and the hint that bank interest was not a
form of usury (r i b a), discussed in the sessions (though finally dropped
from the text of the fatwa), raised concerns. 
In 2001, another question raised in Europe gave the Council further
world notoriety. In a typical procedure for a Western Muslim, a married
woman in Ireland who had just converted to Islam went from one mufti
to another asking about the status of her marriage (to a non-Muslim),
not understanding why this was problematic with respect to Islamic
law. The question arrived at the doorstep of the Council, which after in-
tense debate issued a ruling giving the woman the choice to remain
married or to divorce.8 Importantly, according to the members, this de-
cision was made possible by European ' u rf : since husbands respect their
wives in the West, and since women have inalienable rights in these
countries, they can remain married to a non-Muslim. In the internal dis-
cussions it was also argued that, since the Prophet himself did not re-
marry his Companions following their conversion, marriage in Islam is
not a religious but a civil contract. The implications of this judgment are
wide, but in the aftermath of the uproar that followed, notably from al-
Azhar, the Council tried to minimize them. In public, all the members re-
main adamant against the possibility of a marriage between a Muslim
woman and a non-Muslim man, and deny any possible repercussions
for the Muslim world.9
It seems thus that the ECFR is playing a greater role in Islamic ju-
risprudential debates. In a globalized world, the members are deeply
aware of the media impact of a fatwa, and very explicitly take it into
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .1 0 The relations with the other, older councils of f i q h i n
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, mindfully established by the Council from the
start, are already under strain.1 1According to one member, the Council
is now receiving questions from the Muslim world and, along with that,
warnings against issuing fatwas towards the East. In the composition
of the ECFR itself, the pressure of the Islamic heartland is making an im-
pact: the number of scholars from the Muslim world, initially conceived
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The European Council for Fatwa and Research
(ECFR), created in 1997, is one of the most
remarkable initiatives in the developing field
of jurisprudence for Muslim minorities living in
the West. Unlike the Fiqh Council of North
America, established a few years earlier, the
ECFR includes scholars from the Middle East,
a sign that this particular legal discourse also
affects believers in Muslim majority countries.
Many of the issues at hand go beyond the state
of post-migration. Consequently, the ECFR has
to find a balance amongst a variety of views
and expectations in Europe and beyond.
Adjusting Islamic
L a w to Migration
Tenth session of the European Council for Fatwa and
Research, Dublin, January 2003.
When studying Muslims in Europe, one cannot escape the relationships
of domination that tend to impose a reference framework that perma-
nently places Islam and the West in opposition to one another. For more
than any other religion today, the forms of identifying oneself as a Muslim
are profoundly influenced by a narrative (active from the local to the in-
ternational level) that puts into circulation a whole series of images and
stereotypes, which make Islam seem religiously, culturally, and politically
foreign, strange, and exceptional.
Research on Islam in Europe has not always managed to avoid the snare
of exceptionalism. In particular, scholars of Islam and political scientists of
the Arab world, as well as certain sociologists and anthropologists, are
often criticized for emphasizing the role of Islam itself, as a system of
norms and values, in the process of integration of Muslims in Western so-
cieties. Such a culturalist approach indeed runs the risk of becoming es-
sentialist and a-historical, a fact that has been underscored by researchers
working in the tradition of Edward SaidÕs Orientalism.
One way to avoid such a dead end is to take into account the modes of
interaction between Muslim groups and different segments of Western
societies. This implies refusing to essentialize both the minority and the
dominant culture, and understanding the social construction of Muslim
communities within the dialectic formed between surroundings (secular
ideology/nationalism/Islamophobia) and group resources. Such is the ap-
proach developed by the Network of Comparative Research on Islam and
Muslims in Europe (NOCRIME). NOCRIME is composed of nine scholars
from seven countries: France (Valerie Amiraux, Jocelyne Cesari), Germany
(Gerdien Jonker), the United Kingdom (Sean Macloughin), the Nether-
lands (Nico Landman), Sweden (Jonas Otterbeck), Italy (Ottavia Shmidt di
Friedberg, Chantal Saint Blancat), and Spain (Gema Martin-Munoz). Al-
though they come from various disciplinary backgrounds Ð sociology, an-
thropology, political science, religious studies, and history Ð they share an
interest in research from a grassroots perspective, fluency in interdiscipli-
nary research methods, and privileged connections with major Muslim
organizations in their respective countries. 
Amongst the relevant dimensions of NOCRIMEÕs research agenda are
the following:
Ð the variety of religious practices and social interactions related to
Islamic affiliation;
Ð internal differentiation within Muslim groups (secular Muslims versus
observant believers, gender differences, Sufi religiosity, the case of
Islamic converts);
Ð typologies of interactions with non-Muslims (adaptations to context,
what kind of dialogue and with which segments of European societies:
religious groups, representatives of social and political institutions,
etc.); and
Ð Muslim organizations, activism, and forms of leadership.
The goal of NOCRIMEÕs approach is to examine the gap between the
racialization of national discourses, the meta-discourse on Islam as an
enemy, and the diversity and fluid nature of MuslimsÕ attitudes. In other
words, studying the way that Muslims respond to a reference framework
that has been imposed on them and that is based on a relationship of
domination, does not mean that Muslims are prisoners of this framework,
nor does it mean that they model themselves according to the identity
that has been assigned to them. Although often considered as an Ôexcep-
tional caseÕ, Muslims are not always such an exception.
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as temporary, then limited by the constitution to one-fourth and later
increased to one-third of the total number, is now about to reach 50
per cent: in a deal to appease the muftis of the Muslim countries who
had been left out, the leadership of the ECFR has pursued Ð not with-
out some internal opposition Ð a policy of inclusion to reduce criticism
and give the Council weight, in particular in the Muslim world. For the
time being, this policy translates into conservatism in the fatwas, and
renders the ECFR somewhat ineffective in dealing with European is-
sues. But led by conservative Muslim figures with credibility both in the
Muslim world and in Muslim communities in the West, the f i q h of mi-
norities could yet be an opportunity to free Islamic jurisprudence from
some of the constraints of the East. This is, for some, its true meaning:
the f i q h of minorities, Alwani unashamedly concedes, is in fact a Ôpolit-
ical conceptÕ, aiming at Ôclearing the roadÕ and creating a space for re-
flection in the West based purely on the Q u r ' a n and s u n n a, which he
hopes will one day be transposable to the East.1 2Whether the short-cir-
cuiting of tradition is possible remains to be proven. The debate, how-
ever, is open.
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The relationship between the phenomena of modernity and religion
has exercised scholars in many fields over recent decades. For exam-
ple, one of the original exponents of the secularization paradigm in the
late 1950s and 1960s, sociologist Peter Berger, had, by the end of the
millennium, recanted his earlier position saying: ÔThe big mistake,
which I shared with everyone who worked in this area É was to be-
lieve that modernity necessarily leads to a decline in religion.Õ Steve
Bruce, sociologist and firm adherent of the secularization thesis,
quotes this statement in an article in which he attempts to rescue Berg-
er from the folly of his recantation.1 While BruceÕs view may now be
regarded as ÔunfashionableÕ2 in sociology of religion circles, echoes of
the ÔmodernityÐreligionÕ dichotomy are very much present in studies
related to modernity, contemporary Islam, and fundamentalism. 
Modernist or fundamentalist?
Elsewhere I have argued that a ÔmodernÕ conception of the state
need not imply discontinuity with the past (as implied by the secular-
ization thesis) when conceived within parameters of a religious tradi-
t i o n .3 The 1925 case of the Egyptian ' a l i m Ali Abd al-Raziq illustrates the
point. Abd al-Raziq argued in Islam and the Roots of Authority that nei-
ther the Q u r ' a n nor the Prophetic tradition supported the view that the
ProphetÕs role was both political and religious; it was, indeed, merely
spiritual. Since there was no essentially
Islamic form of government and the
modern state was conceived of as sec-
ular, the spheres of the political and
the religious needed to be kept sepa-
rate in the modern, colonial-dominat-
ed states in which Muslims lived. Abd
al-Raziq examined and rejected the
views of the fourteenth-century philo-
sopher-historian Ibn Khaldun who ar-
gued, according to his modern inter-
preter Muhsin Mahdi, that religion
must be politicized Ð a notion clearly
not alien to the Islamic tradition. In
other words, Abd al-Raziq examined
his own tradition seriously, debated
with it, and found it wanting for mod-
ern times with regard to the nature of
the political. Although his views were
vigorously denounced at the time and
led to his dismissal from al-Azhar, his
argument was the product of a histori-
cally evolving, differentiated Islamic
tradition. His contemporary oppo-
nents, drawing upon the same data of the tradition, claimed that Is-
lamic societies all shared essential elements, which marked their histo-
ry and moulded the paradigm of their social and political development
in the modern world. 
It is curious that this latter position is labelled by Western scholars as
ÔfundamentalistÕ, while that of Abd al-Raziq is called ÔmodernistÕ; or
that the ÔfundamentalistÕ position is held to be ideological, while Abd
al-RaziqÕs is not when both views are about the disposition and institu-
tional framework of political power. The main point here is that tradi-
tion can be employed in various ways, irrespective of differing visions
of the past and demands for the present, none of which logically im-
plies a radical break with that past. Expressed in terms of one of the
many debates on modernity and tradition (religion), Ôdetraditionaliza-
tionÕ, the example of Abd al-Raziq and his rivals would be best de-
scribed, not in a manner that makes the characteristics of past and pre-
sent mutually exclusive (and hence discontinuous), but rather as coex-
isting inasmuch as Ôdetraditionalizing processes do not occur in isola-
tion from other processes, namely those to do with tradition mainte-
nance and the construction Ð or reconstruction Ð of traditional forms of
l i f e Õ .4 The arguments of Abd al-Raziq and his rivals might then be de-
scribed as examples of Ômodernity-as-traditionÕ and Ôtradition-in-
modernityÕ respectively. 
Legal and theological uses
A second, illuminating case is that of the concept of jihad. The dis-
tinction between the legal and theological uses of the term is well
known. Writing in a theological context, al-Ghazali (d. 1111) called Ôtrue
jihadÕ the struggle against oneÕs inner desires. Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) laid
out the juristsÕ approach to jihad, ex-
pounding impartially the contested
positions over various points related to
the theme of the Ôlesser jihadÕ, or fight-
ing Ôin the way of GodÕ. For example,
one controversy arose over the imamÕs
choices in dealing with captives of war:
he could pardon, enslave, kill, or re-
lease them either by way of ransom or
as a Ôprotected personÕ (d h i m m i) in
which case a head tax was imposed;
some scholars taught that captives
may never be slain, based upon the
consensus of the ProphetÕs compan-
ions. Ibn Rushd noted that technical
differences of opinion emerged among
scholars owing to the apparent contra-
diction between certain Q u r ' a n i c v e r s-
es, the inconsistent practice of the
Prophet, the contradiction between
the manifest interpretation of the
Q u r ' a n and the ProphetÕs deeds, or to a
general and particular rule in the texts
being at variance.
The later jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) concurs both with the view
that captives taken in fighting unbelievers may not be killed, and with
the discretion allowed the imam as to their appropriate disposition;
he adds, however, that some jurists were of the opinion that the op-
tions of releasing captives or ransoming them had been abrogated. In
his discussion on jihad, Ibn Taymiyya, in contrast to that of Ibn Rushd,
Modern Discourse
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have striven to eliminate them.Õ
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does not deal with the technicalities of the various viewpoints em-
bedded in the material sources of the law.5 His priorities lay else-
where. Perhaps as much moralist as jurist, idealist yet pragmatist, Ibn
Taymiyya has been described as one of the most notable scholars of a
fourteenth- to fifteenth-century ÔrevisionistÕ trend within the develop-
ing discourses of the Islamic legal tradition, especially in his views on
the closely related themes of violence resulting from fighting against
rebels and bandits or from blind obedience to the ruler. He was a revi-
sionist inasmuch as he attempted to deconstruct the traditional dis-
courses on the law of rebellion and to focus upon what he took to be
its Ôunprincipled and lawless tendenciesÕ. In his view, the traditional
law tended Ôto simultaneously encourage rebellion and lend support
to rulers against rebels regardless of the substantive claims of the
rulers or the rebels.Õ6 Given the highly unstable times in which he lived
and his denunciation of all manner of f i t n a, he stressed Ôthe impera-
tive of unity among MuslimsÕ and Ôthe ideal of the state as the protec-
tor of order and stability, and guarantor of correct religion or ortho-
d o x y . Õ7 He argued further, however, that the individual Muslim should
keep his own conscience pure and avoid obeying a rulerÕs sinful com-
mand in a patient, non-violent way. In any course of action, there are
costs and benefits, and where they need to be weighed in the bal-
ance, that which yields the greater benefit or averts the greater cost
should be adopted.8 Although he discusses in passing both offensive
and defensive forms of jihad, his chief preoccupation is with the need
to confront recalcitrant Muslim groups (Kharajites and the like) who
refuse to abide by certain obligations of the s h a r i ' a such as payment
of z a k a t. Writing from different legal, regional perspectives and his-
torical contexts, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyya were both engaged in
and with a developing, authoritative juristic culture; for each, the past
and present formed a continuous reality that nonetheless accommo-
dated differences and changes in emphasis and direction.
Modern authoritarian voices
With the advent of modern times, understood broadly as the past 150
to 200 years where Muslim societies are concerned, a Ônew sense of anxi -
etyÕ9 becomes apparent in writings on jihad. This reflects the ubiquitous
presence of Europe; its physical presence in the form of colonial control of
Muslim lands; and its accompanying institutions and ideas and the chal-
lenges they posed. To cite one example among many, in the short work
by Mahmud Shaltut published in the 1940s before he become Shaykh al-
Azhar (1958Ð1963), the author speaks of Ôour days of weakness and
decayÕ. The purpose of his essay was to rectify the popular European idea
that Islam had been spread by the sword. Indeed, he notes, the Qur'an
had provided instruments to secure peace and eliminate aggression long
before the establishment of the modern League of Nations. Moreover,
the sacred text provided general principles that could constitute a hand -
book for the ethical conduct of warfare ranking alongside similar modern
works.10 It is true that, with the exception of the principle of abrogation,
he is less concerned (in the vein of Ibn Taymiyya) with the legal technical-
ities of controversies over various points of the law of jihad. He constructs
his argument following an exegetical method, which consisted in Ôcol-
lecting all the [Qur'anic] verses concerning a certain topic and analyzing
them in their interrelationÕ and by working in light of the main stages of
the ProphetÕs life and those of his first two successors.11 Twice he cites
from the work of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1209). Shaltut is described as a
ÔmodernistÕ and follower of Muhammad Abduh. Acknowledging a crucial
feature of modernity, the nation-state, Shaltut argues that the relation
between Muslim and other states is by nature a peaceful one, a proposi-
tion based firmly on the Qur'an. Where normally ÔfundamentalistsÕ (along
with Orientalists) are charged with being essentialist in their depiction of
the Islamic tradition, ShaltutÕs ÔmodernistÕ discussion of jihad is equally so;
however, unlike the Orientalists who insisted on the utter difference be-
tween Islam and the West, here Shaltut attempts to show that the two
essences are similar. Like his contemporary Abd al-Raziq, a trained reli-
gious scholar, Shaltut engages closely with the sacred text and tradition
to produce his modernist, but nonetheless authoritative argument. 
By way of contrast, we may note the lecture on jihad delivered in 1939
by the most influential ÔfundamentalistÕ thinker of the last century, Abu'l
Ala Maududi (d. 1979). A gifted, largely self-trained polemicist, Maududi
was acutely aware of the challenges of modernity posed to Islam in British
India. His response is equally modern. He declares at the beginning of his
address that ÔIslam is a revolutionary ideology and programme which
seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in confor-
mity with its own tenets and ideals.Õ12 ÔMuslimÕ is the name of that Inter-
national Revolutionary Party. The Qur'anic citations employed (with one
exception) bear no relation to those used in the discussions on jihad of,
say, Ibn Rushd or Ibn Taymiyya. Rather they focus on MaududiÕs abiding
concern to replace the tyrannous and idolatrous rule of man over man
with that of law of God for the benefit, ultimately, of all mankind. This
would be achieved by jihad, Ôfighting in the way of GodÕ, not from crude
personal ambition for power or gain. In this instance, MaududiÕs views ap-
pear more radically novel and less engaged with tradition than Shaltut,
and hence, more removed from the thought of his classical predeces-
sors.13 MaududiÕs position on jihad could then be labelled ÔauthoritarianÕ
rather than ÔauthoritativeÕ (Shaltut), taking him to be the creator of a new
discourse rather than receiver of an existing one.14
To return to the beginning: the hard version of the secularization thesis
postulates a universal and dramatic decline, or disappearance, of religion
as society ÔmodernizesÕ. Even some participants in the debates on Ôdetra-
ditionalizationÕ, mentioned above, adopt the hard view that characterizes
the past and present as mutually exclusive. Efforts at tradition mainte-
nance or reconstruction are, in my view, more crucial for an understand-
ing of this process in contemporary Islamic societies. I have tried to show
that a modernist (Abd al-Raziq) may engage closely with tradition to ar-
rive at a modern view of the state in which the religious and political are
separate spheres; and how a thinker like Maududi may, at one point,
seem to abandon tradition altogether, although he clearly intended to
support it elsewhere. Overall his thought may be described as Ôtradition-
in-modernityÕ. 
What is seldom acknowledged is that the strident authoritarian voices
of contemporary religious fundamentalists have confronted for decades
the powerful forces of secular fundamentalism, which have striven to
eliminate them. One consequence of this has been the muting through
co-optation by secular fundamentalists of the religiously authoritative
voices of modernists. We have yet to see whether in the future a just bal -
ance can be achieved between ÔreligionÕ and ÔmodernityÕ. The debate
continues.
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Any effort at the reconstruction of Islamic thought, whether in the
modern period or medieval period, has to sift through the debris of his-
tory in order to explore the limits of the material-cum-historical in its
encounter with what is transcendent. This is one of many lessons I took
from the Muslim Intellectuals workshop in April 2000 organized by
ISIM. This gathering to a large extent was also about history: how do
Muslims with their inherited subjectivities navigate an era that is very
different to what their forebears in time experienced? 
It is with gratitude that one recalls those stimulating three days of
conversation that Muhammad Khalid Masud and Martin van Bruinessen
organized, an event that few institutions of higher learning are keen to
undertake in order to foster critical exchanges between Muslim intel-
lectuals. Ironically, even at modern universities in the Muslim world,
critical, open, and serious debate about Islamic thought is woefully ab-
sent. For many of us who met for the first time, it
was also a chance to explore our mutual differ-
ences and agreements as well as bond in solidari-
ty. Some of the insights developed by several of
those in attendance are captured in Farish NoorÕs
collection of interviews, New Voices of Islam.1
What was unique to this gathering was the fact
that Muslim intellectuals were invited to seriously
discuss issues of critical concern to the contempo-
rary Muslim world. It happens rarely that a bold
act can break the spell of an unfathomable ortho-
doxy within the Western academy that hardly pro-
vides space for these kinds of discussions on Mus-
lim thought. When such opportunities are provid-
ed they are often linked to some agenda to sell a
reformist version of Islam or pedal the generosity
of some superpower. The ISIM provided us with a
forum to speak frankly to each other with only col-
leagues and graduate students in attendance. It
was a scholarly forum in which our self-identity as
Muslims was not camouflaged by some veneer of academic dissimula-
tion. We had an opportunity to express ourselves, irrespective of
whether we belonged to large or small, significant or marginal con-
stituencies. Most importantly, we had a venue at a reasonably safe dis-
tance from the hysteria of apostasy-mongers who become outraged at
the mere whisper of difficult and uncomfortable questions in matters of
religion. 
Ambivalence of Western academy
In the modern Western academy the role of the Muslim intellectual is
fairly ambivalent. One does not wish to be uncharitable, but percep-
tions are often more truthful than all pious declarations. At times Mus-
lim intellectuals fulfil the requirements of ethnic and cultural diversity
on campuses; on other occasions they lend some aura of ÔcredibilityÕ to
the teaching profile; and at worse they serve as native informants.
Often the intellectual agenda falls by the wayside. 
Islamic studies and Muslim thought in the modern university lack the
passion and commitment displayed in other fields of study. Think of
how any de rigueur programme in philosophy, Western literature, stud-
ies in Marxism, liberalism, feminism, gay and lesbian studies, sociology,
debates in ethics, and political studies pulsates with raw passion and
one soon realizes that the field of Islamic studies has a great deal of
catching up to do. But one is also forced to ask why Muslim thought is
not as a matter of course offered the same space and opportunity for
critical interrogation, or why the space in the academy is not used for
such legitimate pursuits, in more than just a few venues.
One reflex that immediately rings true is the fact that not too many
of the people engaged in the study of Islam in the modern Western
academy are invested in the field as a life-form, as a worldview, or even
as an ideological or cultural formation of sorts. A variety of motiva-
tions, not all of them reprehensible, animate the study of Islam; per-
haps, the most tranquilizing motive is one brought about by profes-
sional indifference. Since the stakes are so low, should there be any
wonder why the field is so sedate, except for the magnified attention
to political Islam, a code word for ÔIslamicÕ or ÔMuslimÕ terrorism. 
Thus we see serious studies and re-readings of Augustine or Aquinas
find positive acclaim in scholarly circles appreciated by scholars of pol-
itics, law, and Christian thought. However, when Masud writes I s l a m i c
Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abu Ishaq al-ShatibiÕs Life and Thought, his
critics are quick to point to the dangers that his scholarship poses for
trying to seek out the relevance of the Muslim past for the present. He
summarizes the views of one critic in the preface of the revised edition
of his study re-titled ShatibiÕs Philosophy of Islamic Law in characteristic
M a s u di a n understatement and self-composure: Ôthe reviewer found
the study with an underlying purpose and cautioned that Òthere are
dangers to scholarship in research linked to a search for material
wherewith to lay the foundation of a twentieth-century renaissance in
Islamic thoughtÓ.Õ2
It is indeed astounding that this criticÕs comment did not gain the at-
tention of scholarship earlier for rebuttal and challenge. For if anything
the essence of law is about the continuities in practice and the cultiva-
tion of a sense of history. Legal discourses are also deeply etched in the
psychology and subjectivities of communities. Indeed, practices con-
stitute the essential confluence of myth and history. While MasudÕs
critic begrudges his search for the mutable in Islamic law as part of the
project towards the reconstruction of law, among more seasoned his-
torians an understanding of ideas in the light of the past and their rel-
evance to the present is welcomed. The construction of a historical cul-
ture, observes Peter Brown, premier contemporary historian of early
Western antiquity, Ôdoes not begin with understanding the past but
with opening oneself to the present. It involves containing, in oneself,
the confusion and dismay that ensues from the rejection of stereo-
types, and from the tentative and hotly debated elaboration of new
ways of understanding human affairs.Õ3 In BrownÕs view, interrogating
the past with searching questions with the present in mind, may even
be salutary. Avoiding the temptation to write the past solely in terms of
the present is a burden every serious historian of ideas must overcome.
Masud too accomplishes this task admirably. Even though the present
may not determine a reading of the past, we cannot escape the para-
dox evoked by the French thinker Michel Foucault that no matter how
hard we try to unlock the unfathomable remoteness of the past, our
writing of history will always be a history of writing the present.4
The above observation adds to the larger point that I wish to make:
engaged scholarship, different from the role of a public intellectual, is
still the target of ridicule and contempt within the academy. For too
many in our field it is an anathema to allow engaged scholarship to
take place in the hallowed portals of academia before the alarm bells
of confessionalism are set off, despite the application of the most criti-
cal tools of analysis.5
Annually Christian theologians, philosophers, and thinkers meet at
Villanova University at a conference sponsored by Prof. John Caputo.
The Radical Orthodoxy group meets frequently at the University of
Virginia and Cambridge with Prof. John Milbank and Prof. Graham
Ward, respectively. These precedents ought to pave the way for more
frequent gatherings of Muslim intellectuals to take place, hopefully
without the predictable hysterical chorus of fundamentalism being
associated with such events.
Modern Discourse
Configuring Muslim Tho
On the Need to be Earnest about Hi
ÔWe study history
not in order to
resurrect the
solutions of the
past, but to learn
from experience.Õ
Modern Discourse
Historicizing traditions
What Masud does in his own work on Shatibi and what was common
among the scholars gathered during the Muslim Intellectuals workshop
in Leiden was that each of us was, to a lesser or greater degree, engaged
in historicizing the disciplinary traditions of Muslim thought, followed by
attempts to re-think and re-theorize vital aspects of the disciplines and
intellectual traditions. Historicizing the traditions is critical to the under-
standing of the present, without becoming a prisoner to historicism. For
critical to any meaningful self-understanding is the need to provide a
narrative as to why things had changed and to get an accurate picture of
how ideas, practices, and beliefs were implemented in the past; more
importantly, it helps us understand how two identical ideas applied in
different epochs may actually have opposite outcomes. Karl PopperÕs
derisive contempt for historicism notwithstanding, he was right to con-
clude that the emotional appeal of historicism enables us to express Ôthe
feeling of being swept into the future by irresistible forcesÕ.6 One must be
suspicious of those who dismiss historicism in its entirety, for they often
harbour private wishes that the winds of change do not blow at all Ð or if
they do blow, then they should only blow into t h e i r s a i l s .
A certain amount of historicization is precisely what Shatibi does so
well in his study of Islamic law. He is a superb interpreter with an acute
sense of his own time and place as well as the historical context in which
ideas take root Ð masterly sentiments and skills that are carefully woven
into his elaboration of the law. One of the tasks that Shatibi accomplish-
es more profoundly than others is his rare ability to share with his read-
ers a sense of the anthropological context of the first iteration of Islamic
law. One of his major working presumptions is that the revealed law Ð
s h a r i ' a Ð is by design completely compatible with the cultural formation
of the founding community of early Islam. Since the community of Ara-
bia on the eve of the birth of Islam was short on literate skills, it was an
unlettered s h a r i ' a Ð s h a r i ' a ummiyya Ð for a largely unlettered community. 
It is imperative, says Shatibi, that those addressed by the norms of the
s h a r i ' a discourse have some kind of predisposition and comfort-zone
with the practices proposed by the revealed law; otherwise the law
could have questionable effects on the subjects. This presumption goes
to the heart of ShatibiÕs project on the philosophy and ethics of Islamic
law. Without this piece of foundational historicizing, an explanation of
the dynamics of the law would be absent and much would be lost by
way of nuance and cultural contextualization.
ShatibiÕs very compelling argument, one that Masud explains at
length, is that when the Q u r ' a n invokes and makes references to ethics,
historical events, geographical and meteorological phenomena, and
when it highlights a repertoire of astrology and healing, then in all these
matters the yardstick of understanding must take the cultural and his-
torical experience of the unlettered Arab community of the seventh cen-
tury as the benchmark. Otherwise, we will be guilty of attributing mean-
ings to events and ideas that were not intended in the first place. (He is
not interested at this point to explore how additional meanings can be
construed from the Q u r ' a n when read in a different time and place.) His
point is that the s h a r i ' a is organic to the Arab culture of the time, and not
a code from Mars. Of course the revelation endorses most of the prac-
tices in vogue, while amending and abrogating some. In fact, Shatibi has
such a positive view of the status quo, that he goes as far as quoting the
Prophet who says that Ôgoodness lies in the customaryÕ (al-khayr ' a d a)
and, in the end, Shatibi says, that the repetition of fine customary prac-
tices lead to the enlightenment of the soul.7
Pushing the supremacy of transcendence
Interestingly ShatibiÕs modern commentators are less inclined to his-
toricize or accept his historical reading of the revelation. Shaykh Abd
Allah Daraz continues to wrestle with the medieval authorÕs interpreta-
tion of history on the marginalia of a l - M u w a f a q a t. Daraz challenges
ShatibiÕs claim that the various refer-
ences in the Q u r ' a n to scientific phe-
nomena, history, and culture were not
popularly known. Only the lites, says
Daraz, knew this. But ShatibiÕs point is
not about the extent of diffusion of
knowledge, as much as it is about the
authority of what is known. Contrary to
ShatibiÕs thesis, Daraz points out that
some of the phenomena of the Q u r ' a n
are understood with greater sophisti-
cation and complexity today than at the time of revelation! One still
would like to know on what basis the claim can be made that our
knowledge of history and society is superior to that of our forebears,
instead of just saying that we had acquired different understandings of
the same phenomena. Shatibi, it appears, is trying to grasp the his-
toricity of revelation and his claims to authority comprise a fine bal-
ance between history and transcendence. By contrast, his modern
commentator tries to base his authority exclusively on arguments of
transcendence and eschew history in the process. 
Of course Shatibi was trying to make sense of how a heteronomous
law and ethics, namely related to the will of God and outside of human
will, simultaneously also relates to our lived (historical) experiences
and subjectivities. One of the reasons why contemporary thinkers latch
on to the historicist musings of early scholars like Abu Hamid al-Ghaz-
ali (d. 505/1111), ' I z z al-Din Ibn ' A b d al-Salam al-Sulami (d. 660/1262),
Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388), and Shah Wali Allah (d. 1176/1762)
is that the aforementioned figures have grappled with the dilemmas of
how a revealed law (s h a r i ' a) relates to changing social contexts. In fact
these past jurists offer us a language to articulate the intersection of
the historical and transcendent in the practice of the law. 
One of the most salient questions is this: how can Muslims be re-
quired to practise s h a r i ' a rules Ð rules that no longer constitute any
part of their subjectivity? Or to put it another way: in the face of the al-
tered subjectivities of Muslims that occurred through complex histori-
cal processes, how do they and why should they adhere to laws that
are no longer in harmony with their lived experiences and subjectivi-
ties? To the contrary, in many places Muslims find that what passes as
the s h a r i ' a no longer reinforces or sustains their subjectivities, as was
the case among earlier communities when there was some reasonable
ÔfitÕ between law and subjectivity. Instead, now the law compels one to
undertake actions that are in contradiction to oneÕs autonomous ethi-
cal and moral sensibilities. It is here that history becomes important. It
is critical to check the historical record in order to examine whether
Muslims in the past struggled with analogous issues: were they con-
fronted by situations in which heteronomous morality was in conflict
with autonomous morality? And if so, how did they manage to resolve
the tension? 
We study history not in order to resurrect the solutions of the past,
but to learn from experience. That is why critical thinkers in law and
ethics like Ghazali and Shatibi are so important;
they offer us rich portraits of social experiments.
But if history offers us neither an analogous
precedent nor a sketch of an experience, then it
does not mean that a creative solution is impossi-
ble. Only a form of Ôhistorical fundamentalismÕ
makes the present absolutely contingent on the
past: that something in the present can only be
solved if it was already prefigured or solved in the
past Ð a crude form of q i y a s-based (analogy-
based) reasoning applied to history! For if some-
thing was already solved in the past, why does
the issue still beg a solution? Glimpses of history
offer us emotional comfort in times of insecurity,
as Popper remarked. The memorable words of
the Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) when asked by
God: ÔHave you then no faith?Õ rings with a similar
truism. ÔSure I doÕ, answers Ibrahim, but like a true
empiricist adds: Ôbut [let me see it] so that my
heart may be fully set to restÕ (Q u r ' a n 2:260). For
thinkers like Shatibi and his admirers over the
centuries, history or Ôto see itÕ is indeed impor-
tant, but not to the point of deifying what is seen.
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istory and Transcendence
was not simply ÔmodernÕ (a feature of modernity) but also ÔmodernistÕ
(a proponent of modernity). Activists described themselves and their
goals by the Arabic terms j a d i d (new) and m u ' a s i r (contemporary), the
Turkish terms y e n i (new) and g e n  (young), and similar words in other
languages. (By contrast, m u d a, Malay for ÔyoungÕ, was initially a pejora-
tive term applied by opponents to the modernist Islamic movement.) A
second characteristic involved the
usage of a self-consciously Islamic dis-
course. Activists were not simply Mus-
lims, but also wished to preserve and
improve Islamic faith in the modern
world. This combination of characteris-
tics emerged in the first part of the
nineteenth century, as several Islamic
states adopted European military and
technical organization, and various
Muslim travellers to Europe brought
back influential tales of progress and
e n l i g h t e n m e n t .
Modernism distinguished the mod-
ernist Islamic movement, beginning in
the nineteenth century, from previous
Islamic reform movements, which did
not identify their values as modern, and
from contemporaneous competitors,
such as traditionalists who rejected
modern values. Finally, it distinguished
the movement from two of its succes-
sors, which supplanted modernist Islam
in many regions in the middle of the
twentieth century: on the one hand,
secularists who downplayed the impor-
tance of Islam in the modern world,
privileging nationalism, socialism, or
other ideologies; and, on the other
hand, religious revivalists who es-
poused modern values (such as social
equality, codified law, and mass educa-
tion) but downplayed their modernity,
privileging authenticity and divine
mandates. Late in the twentieth centu-
ry, the combination of modernist and Is-
lamic discourses was revived in a subset
of modernist Islam that I have labelled Ôliberal IslamÕ, which sought to re-
suscitate the reputation and accomplishments of earlier modernists.
The boundaries of the modernist Islamic movement could be impre-
cise, but its core was clear: a set of key figures who served as lode-
stones for Muslim intellectuals of the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Three figures in particular were famed throughout the Is-
lamic world: Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Iran, 1838Ð1897), his stu-
dent and collaborator ' A b d u h, and ' A b d u h Õ s student and collaborator
Muhammad Rashid Rida (Syria-Egypt, 1865Ð1935), plus regional pio-
neers Sayyid Ahmad Khan (North India, 1817Ð1898), N a m õ k K e m a l
(Turkey, 1840Ð1888), and Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Crimea, 1851Ð1914).
Supporters cited and debated the statements of these figures, espe-
cially the periodicals they edited: Afghani and ' A b d u h Õ s a l -'Urwa a l -
W u t h q a (The Strongest Link), published in Paris, 1884; RidaÕs a l - M a n a r
In 1903, Duncan Black Macdonald (1863Ð1943), a prominent early
scholar of Islam in the United States, wrote that Islam does not allow
constitutionalism because the caliph Ôcannot set up beside himself a
constitutional assembly and give it rights against himself. He is the suc-
cessor of Muhammad and must rule, within [divine] limitations, as an
absolute monarch.Õ Yet within a few years of that statement, some of
the leading scholars of the Islamic
world were arguing exactly the
contrary. Muhammad ' A b d u h ( E g y p t ,
1849Ð1905) Ð the highest-ranking reli-
gious official in Egypt Ð wrote privately
in 1904 that he supported a parliamen-
tary democracy. In 1908, Mehmed Ce-
maleddin Efendi (Turkey, 1848Ð1917) Ð
the chief religious authority of the Ot-
toman Empire, appointed directly by
the caliph Ð said that he too supported
constitutionalism. Also in 1908, two se-
nior scholars of S h i ' i Islam telegraphed
their support at a crucial moment in
IranÕs Constitutional Revolution: ÔWe
would like to know if it would be possi-
ble to execute Islamic provisions with-
out a constitutional regime!Õ
MacdonaldÕs blanket statement about
the incompatibility of Islam and consti-
tutionalism also ignored, or dismissed,
the previous half-centuryÕs crescendo of
proposals for Islamic constitutionalism.
These proposals formed part of a move-
ment that generated tremendous intel-
lectual ferment throughout the Islamic
world in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. This movement sought
to reconcile Islamic faith and modern
values such as constitutionalism, as well
as cultural revival, nationalism, freedom
of religious interpretation, scientific in-
vestigation, modern-style education,
womenÕs rights, and a bundle of other
themes that these authors and activists
associated with modernity. The Muslims
engaged in this movement saw the ten-
sion between Islamic faith and modern values as a historical accident, not
an inherent feature of Islam. The modern period both required and per-
mitted this accident to be repaired Ð the threat of European domination
made repair necessary, and the modern values associated with European
domination made repair possible. The modernist Islamic movement pio-
neered the formation or reformation of educational institutions; agitation
for political liberalization or decolonization; and the establishment of a
periodical press throughout the Islamic world.
Defining modernism
One defining characteristic of this movement was the self-conscious
adoption of ÔmodernÕ values Ð that is, values that authors explicitly as-
sociated with the modern world, especially rationality, science, consti-
tutionalism, and certain forms of human equality. Thus this movement
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(The Beacon), published in Cairo, 1898Ð1935; Sayyid Ahmad KhanÕs T a h d-
hib al-Akhlaq (Refinement of Morals), published in Aligarh, 1870Ð1896;
N a m õ k KemalÕs H  r r i y e t (L i b e r t y) and I b r e t (W a r n i n g), published in Paris
and Istanbul, 1868Ð1873; and GasprinskiiÕs T e r c  m a n / P e r e v o d c h i k (T h e
I n t e r p r e t e r), published in Bakhchisaray, Crimea, 1883Ð1914. Even au-
thors who disagreed with the modernist Islamic project located them-
selves in relation to these central figures.
The recent resuscitation of Islamic modernism has focused largely on
this handful of famous predecessors. Yet the modernist Islamic move-
ment was not limited to central figures. Around the Islamic world,
other authors were influential in their regional contexts, from South
Africa to East Europe to Southeast Asia, even if they were not so well
known to other Muslims or scholars of Islam. In South India, for exam-
ple, the leading modernist of the early twentieth century was Muham-
mad Abdul Khader Maulavi (Malabar, 1873Ð1932), commonly known as
Wakkom Maulavi, who published Malayalam-language newspapers in-
spired by a l - M a n a r. The Russian Empire produced numerous pioneer-
ing Islamic modernists during the same period, including Abdullah
Bubi (Tatarstan, 1871Ð1922), whose activism on behalf of Russian
democracy and Islamic reform led tsarists and Muslim traditionalists to
cooperate in his repression. In eastern China, Y a ' q u b Wang Jingzhai
(China, 1879Ð1949) urged his fellow Hui Muslims to adopt both an Is-
lamic identity and a Chinese nationalism in accordance with contem-
porary standards.
Century-long debates
The modernist Islamic movement was never monolithic, and varia-
tion, even deep disagreement, existed on virtually all subjects. Modern
values included both state-building and limits on state power; litism
and egalitarianism; discipline and liberty; Europhilism and anti-imperi-
alism. The modernistsÕ Islamic faith encompassed both mysticism and
abhorrence of mysticism; strategic use of traditional scholarship and
rejection of traditional scholarship; return to a pristine early Islam and
updating of early practices in keeping with historical change.
The debates associated with this variation generated arguments that
continue to be re-invented today, often with little awareness of their
past use. For example, it is common today for modernist Islamic writ-
ings to cite the Q u r ' a n i c verse Ôand seek their counsel in the matterÕ
(s u r a 3, verse 159) as justification for parliamentary democracy Ð as
N a m õ k Kemal did in 1868. The argument that Islamic exegesis must be
tailored to ever-changing contexts can be found in AbduhÕs 1881 essay
ÔLaws Should Change in Accordance with the Conditions of NationsÕ, as
well as the 1908 essay by Musa K a z õ m (Turkey, 1858Ð1920), ÔReform
and Review of Religious Writings According to the Requirements of the
AgeÕ. The notion of intellectual progress, which privileges contempo-
rary scientific approaches over earlier authorities, can be found in the
writings of Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi (Syria, 1866Ð1914): ÔIf people were
limited to the books of the ancients, then a great deal of knowledge
would be lost, penetrating minds would go astray, articulate tongues
would be blunted, and we would hear nothing but repetition.Õ
Freedom of speech
The central intellectual issue of the modernist Islamic movement,
I propose, was freedom of speech: the right to say novel things in an Is-
lamic discourse. In order to defend modern values, modernists had to
defend the right to defend modern values. This they did by referring to
the particular challenges and opportunities posed by the onslaught of
modernity; by arguing that their own, often non-traditional educations
qualified them to speak on Islamic issues; by pioneering new forms of
discourse, such as newspaper essays and theatrical performances; and,
finally, by laying out their modernist vision of Islam. These problemat-
ics remain vivid today for Muslims who wish to espouse modern values
in an Islamic discourse.
The freedom of speech was often associated with the defence of i j t i-
h a d, whose original meaning of Ôintellectual effortÕ was extended to
encompass rational interpretation more generally, and with denuncia-
tion of t a q l i d, a term that modernists took to mean blind, irrational im-
itation of tradition. All of the lodestone figures in the modernist Islam-
ic movement weighed in on this theme, as did others, including
Muhammad Husayn N a ' i n i (Iran, 1860Ð1936): ÔT a q l i d of religious lead-
ers who pretend to present true religion is no different from obedience
to political tyrants. Either one is a form of idolatry.Õ Both N a ' i n i a n d
Khayr al-Din (Tunisia, 1822Ð1890) Ð S h i ' i and Sunni, respectively Ð
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defended the right of all Muslims to make independent religious
judgements, citing the precedent of the second caliph, ' U m a r ibn al-
Khattab (634Ð644), who invited all Muslims to judge the propriety of
his actions.
Yet many Islamic modernists, like other modernist intellectuals, re-
mained litist. Ali Suavi (Turkey, 1838Ð1878) rejected a definition of
freedom that permitted Ôsaying whatever comes to oneÕs mindÕ, giving
the example of a French newspaper that denied the existence of God.
' A b d u h offered a warning from the early centuries of Islamic history,
when Ôevery opinion-monger took his stand upon the liberty of
thought the Q u r ' a n enjoinedÕ, leading to dangerous schisms. Ahmad
Khan Ð while favouring freedom of speech on the pragmatic grounds
that open debate advanced the search for truth Ð was dismissive of
Ôthe opinion or independent judgement of every Tom, Dick, and HarryÕ.
Other modernists limited i j t i h a d to those who agreed with them. R i-
fa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (Egypt, 1801Ð1873) supported religious freedom
Ôon condition that it adheres to the principles of religionÕ Ð meaning
the principles that he emphasized. Rida supported Ôfreedom of reli-
gion, opinion, speech, writing, dress, and workÕ, but not for the Ôhorde
of hereticsÕ who engage in Ôchatter, sophistry, audacity in mixing right
with wrong, and insolence in criticizing their opponents or criticsÕ. Sev-
eral authors Ð though not all Ð contributed to the polemic between the
Sunni and S h i ' i sects, considering the other to be disqualified from i j t i-
h a d by their imperfect faith. And competition within the movement
led to other polemics Ð for example, RidaÕs resentment at GasprinskiiÕs
leadership of pan-Islamic conference planning in Cairo, or the Calcut-
ta-based challenge to Ahmad KhanÕs North Indian leadership of the
modernist Islamic movement in South Asia.
In sum, the modernists sought to breach the monopoly of traditional
religious scholars over Islamic interpretation, and to limit the relativis-
tic damage of this breach, through a single manoeuvre. They ex-
pressed confidence in their own qualifications Ð seminary training,
modern education, or personal virtuosity Ð as compared both with
scholarly traditionalists and the ÔmassesÕ.
The Azeri Turkish caption of the original cartoon (Mulla Nasruddin, 22 September
1906, pp. 4Ð5) was entirely different: ÔI cure the ill by writing down verses [from
the Qur'an].Õ The cartoon said nothing about constitutionalism, but rather mocked
an old-fashioned religious practice. Europeans saw an image lampooning an
Islamic scholar and inverted its meaning, from anti-traditionalism to anti-
m o d e r n i s m .
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In recent years considerable attention has been paid in modern Islam-
ic studies to the emergence of new Muslim intellectuals seeking to re-
formulate and reinvigorate elements of tradition and to open new av-
enues of inquiry to solve contemporary Muslim problems. This phe-
nomenon has been seen, variously, as an ÔIslamic reformationÕ, ÔIslamic
modernismÕ, Ôprogressive IslamÕ, and Ôliberal IslamÕ, to cite but a few of
the standard appellations currently in use. It has most frequently been
associated with figures such as Abdolkarim Soroush, Fatima Mernissi,
Nurcholish Madjid, Amina Wadud, Ali Bulac, Abdullahi an-N a ' i m,
Khaled Abu el-Fadl, and Farid Esack Ð again, to name but a few. These
writers have all undoubtedly made hugely important contributions to
contemporary Muslim thought. It has, however, been extremely diffi-
cult to gauge the influence and impact of their ideas within the wider
Muslim world. To a large extent, this is a problem of language Ð both
linguistic and discursive. The majority of those associated with this
trend tend towards an academic discourse which limits their reader-
ship to only the most highly educated. In a number of cases, key works
have not been translated into Muslim languages, or face distribution
problems and/or political barriers to wider dissemination. In short Ð
and without seeking to belittle the crucial and in some cases revolu-
tionary contributions that these writers have made Ð it could be ar-
gued that contemporary reformist Islam has become too closely asso-
ciated with a narrow group of ÔsuperstarÕ intellectuals.
There have been those who cite this fact as evidence that reformist
Islam actually has very little in the way of a Muslim audience today, or
that European and North American academics celebrate these figures
because they conform to a Western normative ideal that has very little
basis in the reality of contemporary Muslim culture. Contrary to this lat-
ter position, it will be the contention of this article that progressive
Islam is indeed alive and well (and, more importantly, growing) in the
wider Muslim world, but that its future lies not, or not only, in promot-
ing an ever-proliferating roster of innovative hermeneuticians Ð but
rather in gaining an understanding of how the general tendencies of
this reformist impulse circulate in the daily practice of Muslim masses
at the grassroots level. Without detracting from the originality of much
reformist thought today, it can be argued that a great many of these
writers are representative Ð rather than exclusively generative Ð of
ideas that already permeate Muslim communities. Contrary to popular
images of Muslim culture as stagnant and backward-looking, much ev-
idence suggests that the pragmatism which characterizes Ô(trans)local
knowledgeÕ Ð to mix a Geertzi a n standard bearer with a dose of Ap-
padurai Ð leads many Muslims to engage in a critical reformulation of
tradition as part and parcel of adapting to life in a complex, globalizing
w o r l d .
At the outset we should note, of course, that it would be a severe
misrepresentation to claim that all the work done to date under the
rubric of progressive Islam has been confined to the realm of academic
discourse. A number of feminist writers, in particular, have very prof-
itably combined innovative textual work with social activism in ways
that usefully illustrate the mutual constitution of theory and practice
(Amina Wadud is an important example in this regard). We could also
point to the important human rights and social change advocacy work
undertaken by Abdullahi an-N a ' i m in recent years. Likewise, it would
do extreme injustice to the work of many associated with this move-
ment not to recognize that their intellectual contributions have often
been inspired by Ð or served as the necessary solutions to Ð very par-
ticular dilemmas and real world problems, some of which have had
tragic personal consequences for those involved. There are indeed im-
portant linkages between Muslim intellectualism and social activism
today. The aim here is thus not to critique the more intellectual dimen-
sions of progressive Islam, but rather to argue a case for expanding the
research agenda. There could be no better complement to the philo-
sophical and conceptual contributions in this area than to be able to
show that much of what is often described in specialized (and some-
times less accessible) academic language actually permeates the level
of everyday practice right across the Muslim world. There are already a
number of writers whose work helps to point us in the right direction Ð
I think particularly of John BowenÕs Muslims through Discourse, and also
the various titles in PrincetonÕs ÔStudies in Muslim PoliticsÕ series.
Reimagining boundaries
In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, however, there are new im-
peratives in the field of progressive or pluralist Islam. Much popular
discourse has, unfortunately, once again come to focus on issues of in-
tolerance and violence in Islam. Muslim voices and analysts of Islam
have found themselves on the defensive, constantly challenged and
required to provide evidence for the existence of Ômoderate MuslimsÕ
(as if Muslimness in and of itself somehow connotes immoderation). In
this climate, pointing to the Abdolkarim Soroushe s and Muhammad
S h a h r u rs Ð however important their work may be Ð is not enough. The
selective and limited appeal of such authors masks the extent to which
Muslim settings far removed from the influence of academic discourse
are today nevertheless experiencing a dynamic, pluralistic engage-
ment with tradition. Likewise, it is worrying and dangerous that certain
severely myopic madrasas in South Asia should be perceived as repre-
sentative of general global trends in Islamic education. There exist
countless other sites of knowledge production and dissemination in
the Muslim world, many of which are contributing to a popular reimag-
ination of IslamÕs normative boundaries. The remainder of this article
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will hence be devoted to identifying and suggesting possible routes
and lines of inquiry that may allow the pluralism of contemporary Mus-
lim practice to move more clearly to the foreground of todayÕs work on
progressive Islam. Again, it is not being suggested that the intellectu-
alist dimension of this project be abandoned or even reduced in prior-
ity, only that bridges to the world of progressive practice should attract
equal attention and have greater prominence within the field than is
currently the case. We should also of course be attendant to the fact
that the very notion of Ôprogressive IslamÕ represents an epistemologi-
cal and normative quagmire. There is not the scope here to engage
thoroughly with these latter questions, and it will be assumed for the
sake of argument that we can identify today something like an emerg-
ing tradition of critical or progressive Islam even if we are not always
comfortable with such labels.
Being Muslim in Europe
Islam in Europe is perhaps one of the richest contexts in which these
themes might be explored. While the intellectual contributions of a
figure such as Tariq Ramadan Ð particularly his highly influential 1998
book To Be a European Muslim Ð are well known, less attention has
been paid to attempts in recent years to put the ethos of civic en-
gagement that is central to this project into practice. What do Muslim
audiences, especially the younger generation that forms his core con-
stituency, do with RamadanÕs ideas? Some of the most innovative ef-
forts in this regard can be seen by shifting the lens with which we view
Islam in Europe from the national to the wider European level. The
tendency in the literature thus far has been to produce rather atom-
ized studies of Islam in specific European countries. This work has un-
doubtedly been of immense value. There is, however, a growing ten-
dency among many young Muslims in Europe to reach beyond the
confines of national boundaries in their networking efforts. There is a
sense in which the future of Islam in Europe is tied to the larger fate of
Europe as a post-national project. The lived experience of being Mus-
lim in Europe is one of negotiating plural affiliations and allegiances
to multiple traditions Ð an endeavour that resonates with the Euro-
pean ideal of a citizenry grounded less in territorial identity, but com-
mitted instead to a wider normative vision. Interestingly enough, one
may describe the notion of the u m m a h in very much the same terms.
There exist today institutions that embody this new trend, perhaps
none more so than the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student
Organizations (FEMYSO), founded in 1996 to provide a social context
in which various national Muslim youth organizations might come to-
gether in order to discuss and act on matters of common interest. The
Forum has in recent years established itself as a credible voice and re-
source for the next generation of European Muslims, and has formed
valuable linkages with institutions such as the European Parliament.
Insofar as one of the key challenges facing the generational transition
within European Islam has been the question of a successful move
from the insularity and ÔghettoizationÕ that characterized the first gen-
eration of Muslim immigrants to a culture of public engagement and
political participation on the part todayÕs young European Muslims,
groups such as FEMYSO indicate some important paths towards the
practical implementation of something like a ÔEuropean IslamÕ.
Everyday practice in Southeast Asia
Another context in which the project of progressive Islam has long
been tied to everyday practice is Southeast Asia. The history and expe-
rience of Islam in this region has been one of syncretism and hybridity
Ð resulting, it could be argued, in an intrinsic predisposition towards
religious pluralism. Western policymaking circles have, unfortunately,
tended to focus on the minority of radical movements in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines in the wake of 11 September and the Bali
bombing of October 2002. This approach threatens to eclipse the fact
that Southeast Asia is actually the major Muslim world region most
likely to provide, in the long run, a model of critical Islamic practice
that accommodates emerging global norms while preserving and re-
formulating crucial aspects of Islamic tradition. It is telling that some of
the regionÕs intellectual luminaries Ð such as MalaysiaÕs Chandra
Muzaffar and Farish Noor Ð are also heavily involved in practical human
rights work. Turning to Indonesia, the innovative work of figures such
as Nurcholish Madjid and the late Harun Nasution have found continu-
ity in the various research institutions associated with the IAIN network
(recently consolidated into a National Islamic University). Numerous
Muslim NGOs have emerged in the wake of SuhartoÕs fall from power,
and are beginning to solidify the strands of an increasingly important
civil societal layer in Indonesia. Out of the network of pondok pesantren
religious schools, for example, have emerged in recent years social
movements that take the lead in progressive social agendas such as
womenÕs reproductive health and rights, and this from a sector gener-
ally viewed as ÔtraditionalÕ and disengaged from mainstream social is-
sues. To be sure, there are plenty of p e s a n t r e n that conform to the
more detached, unworldly model (or whose real world engagements
lead to more malignant agendas). Yet it would be worrisome if, throw-
ing out the baby with the bathwater, we were to ignore the ways in
which in some cases the grassrootedness of such institutions allows for
the mobilization of social capital to much more progressive ends.
Aside from the various national and re-
gional contexts of Europe and Southeast
Asia cited above, it is increasingly impor-
tant today to appreciate the transnational
and global dimensions of efforts towards a
progressive Islam. While much of the cov-
erage of transnational Islam has tended to
focus on terrorist networks and various
ÔWahhabiÕ linkages of late, we are missing
much if we do not also take into consider-
ation global Muslim activity of a rather dif-
ferent nature. From the Progressive Mus-
lims Network organized out of South
Africa by Farid Esack to the phenomenal
transnational circulation of work by the
Qatari-based Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, it
is evident that Muslim thinkers who en-
gage more dynamically with tradition un-
doubtedly possess a growing global audi-
ence. And, again, it is not only isolated in-
tellectual figures or narrowly subscribed
specialist groups at work in this vital inter-
national context. Transnational progres-
sive Islam has a vital practical face, too. In
the work of groups such as Women Living
under Muslim Law, we find a critical orien-
tation toward traditional legal knowledge
on gender issues transformed into a
transnational solidarity movement con-
necting women in several dozen coun-
tries. And in the case of TurkeyÕs Glen
movement, to cite another example, we
find elements of Sufi spirituality fused with socio-economic liberalism
in a highly successful transnational educational project. Dozens of
Glen-sponsored schools, emphasizing a modernist curriculum
against a backdrop of Ônon-invasiveÕ Islamic morality, now operate
throughout much of the Balkans and Central Asia.
The preceding examples represent only a few avenues for the poten-
tial exploration of how the intellectual dimensions of progressive Islam
are taking root in the realm of social practice. To be sure, much impor-
tant work in this direction is already being undertaken by numerous
doctoral students and recently graduated Ph.D.s. Meena Sharify-Funk
in the United States, for example, is looking at the critical hermeneutics
of classical and modern Muslim philosophers within the context of
transnational womenÕs movements. Ermete Mariani in France is re-
searching the global political economy behind the diffusion of Sheikh
QaradawiÕs ideas, and Bekim Agai in Germany has interpreted the
Glen project as a reformulation of Islamism into a new ethics of edu-
cation. The comparative ethnography of progressive Islam Ð that is, the
appreciation of contemporary reformist thought as embodied in the
pragmatics of everyday Muslim life Ð is the vital next step for the study
of Islam in the modern world. A new attention to the social locatedness
of critical Islamic practice will produce a far more comprehensive and
nuanced understanding of a phenomenon heretofore seen as confined
to a largely self-referential circle of intellectual lites. The social reality
of progressive Islam is far more diverse and significantly wider in
s c o p e .
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Egypt is home to the largest number of
Orthodox Christians in the Middle East.
Comprising 6 to 18 per cent of the total
population, about 60 per cent of Copts
live in Upper Egypt. Historically, rela-
tions between Egyptian Christians and
Muslims have varied. Under Nasser, ex-
pansion and secularization of public
institutions brought new groups into
the nationÕs citizenship, but adherence
to Arab de facto secularism meant that
Islam continued to represent the reli-
gion of society. Islamic revivalism and
the stateÕs Muslim identity emerged
more clearly following SadatÕs i n f i t a h,
the effects of which led to a Ôcrisis of
faithÕ among some in socialist and cap-
italist paths to modernity. Under Sadat,
the government promulgated a consti-
tution that made Islam the religion of the state and articulated a
dichotomy between women as public citizens and private family mem-
b e r s governed by s h a r i ' a law (Shukrallah 1994). During the 1970s and
1980s, Islamists used this dichotomy to challenge reforms to the codes
of personal status. Like fundamentalist discourses elsewhere, Islamist
discourse emphasized Ôcultural authenticityÕ and the Ômoral structure
of societyÕ, and a focus of this discourse was gender (ibid.:17).
Gender politics and religious identity
A Ôfrenzy of interpretationÕ over female genital cutting arose in Egypt in
1994 after a broadcast by CNN depicted the lay circumcision of a young
girl. In response, the mufti of Egypt publicly declared that female genital
cutting has no foundation in the Qur'an, and Sheik Gad al-Haq Ali of al-
Azhar university issued a fatwa that female circumcision honours Muslim
women. A committee of medical experts also issued warnings about the
procedures of untrained practitioners, leading the minister of health to
decree that doctors could circumcise girls in designated facilities and at
fixed times and prices. International criticism and the reported deaths of
girls who were circumcised in hospitals instigated a renewed ban on the
practice in state hospitals, which was overturned and then reinstated in
1997. This example illustrates how public Ôcontrol of symbolsÕ becomes
tied to control of the state (Sedra 1999:220). 
Responses to the increasingly Islamic character of the Egyptian state
have included sectarian strife and the proliferation of religious voluntary
organizations.The growth of Christian social services is said to reflect a
growing ÔCoptic activismÕ (Zeidan 1999:60) and a mission of the Church to
gather its stray (Nikolov 2002). For example, the Coptic Evangelical Orga-
nization for Social Services (CEOSS) began in the 1950s as a literacy pro-
ject. Charged with serving Muslim and Christian communities, CEOSS
separated from the Egyptian Evangelical Church and undertook activities
in agriculture, income generation, education, infrastructural develop-
ment, and health in Beni Suef, Minya, and metropolitan Cairo. In the
1970s, CEOSS identified female genital cutting, early marriage, and Ôbridal
defloweringÕ as harmful customs and established womenÕs committees in
the villages in which it worked as part of a Ôdeliberate effortÕ to empower
women (Tadros 2000:26). By 1994, CEOSS received 75 per cent of its fund-
ing from North America and Europe and was the only private voluntary
organization (PVO) to be registered with the US Agency for International
Development (Sullivan 1994). The Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical, and
Social Services of the Coptic Orthodox Church also has served CairoÕs
poor since 1962, and has since expanded its services to women and girls,
endorsed participation of women in development, and undertaken activ-
ities to eradicate female genital cutting in 24 communities (Nikolov 2002).
The Christian community in Egypt is
noted for having strong international
ties (Sullivan 1994). 
These examples reflect a trend among
Christian voluntary organizations to pro-
mote an integrated vision of womenÕs
empowerment as a marker of Coptic
identity and to develop international
partnerships that support their activi-
ties. Although Christians were marginal-
ized from debates over the meaning of
gender symbols in shari'a law, they did
not face ideological conflict over female
genital cutting within their leadership
(Abdel-Hadi n.d.), and the proliferation
of Christian social services provided a
public space in which Christians could
address social problems according to
the values of their tradition (Nikolov
2002). It is therefore possible that declines in the prevalence of female
genital cutting began among Christians before its practice in Egypt
gained international attention and that this integrated view of womenÕs
empowerment catalyzed negative effects of higher maternal education
on the odds of circumcising Christian daughters. The emphasis that
Islamists placed on womenÕs traditional identity may have stalled similar
declines and effects among Muslims. 
The diverging prevalence 
This study is based on data collected in 1996 from 1504 married moth-
ers between the ages of 15 to 54 and residing in seven districts in Minya
Governorate. Local interviewers gathered information about socio-de-
mographic characteristics of respondents, husbands, and co-residents.
Respondents answered questions about their circumcision status, the
perceived effects of circumcision and non-circumcision, the circumcision
status of daughters aged five years or more, intent to circumcise uncut
daughters, and age at circumcision and circumciser of cut daughters. 
Minya is an agrarian governorate located about 200 kilometres south of
Cairo. About 20 per cent of the residents are Coptic Christians, and most
remaining residents are Muslim. Over the last quarter century, Minya has
been a site of sectarian conflict and efforts by PVOs Ð most notably CEOSS
Ð to advance comprehensive programmes of development. In 1982,
CEOSS founded its first womenÕs committee consisting of 12 female rep-
resentatives of all churches in the predominantly Christian village of Deir
El Barsha (Abdel-Hadi n.d.). Members of the committee received training,
supervised projects, and raised awareness to prevent practices like fe-
male genital cutting. In 1995, CEOSS intensified its anti-female-genital-
cutting programme in 22 communities. Although declines in the rate of
female circumcision were observed in predominantly Muslim villages, de-
clines were greater in homogeneous, Christian villages (PRB 2001). No re-
search has compared attitudes and behaviours regarding the practice
among Muslims and Christians in Minya prior to these efforts.
This study shows that about two-thirds of mothers and about half of fa-
thers in Minya have no education. Educational attainment is higher
among younger mothers, and a higher percentage of Christian than Mus-
lim mothers in this group have secondary or more education (21.8 versus
15.5 among 25- to 34-year-olds). Just over half of all households own no
major assets, and about 20 per cent of families live in urban settings. 
Circumcision is nearly universal among Muslim and Christian moth-
ers (99 and 96 per cent respectively), but the probability that daugh-
ters aged 10 to 14 are circumcised is 0.75 (Yount 2002). Adjusted odds
of circumcising a daughter are 4.5 times higher among Muslims than
Christians (ibid.), and a higher percentage of Muslim than Christian
Body & Politics
The arrival of female genital cutting
t o northeastern Africa predates that of
Christianity and Islam, and Muslims,
Christians, and Jews continue the practice
today. Popular association of the practice with
religious ideals has justified its continuation,
and beliefs that the practice contradicts
religious principles have justified its
abandonment. Anthias and Yuval-Davis
(1989) argue that strategic use of Ôgender
symbolsÕ concerning the sexuality of women
can reproduce religious boundaries, and this
process of differentiation may involve
national or transnational political bodies that
endorse or oppose selected symbols. This
framework helps to understand the diverging
prevalence of female genital cutting among
Christians and Muslims in Egypt. 
Diverging Prevalence of 
Female Genital Cutting
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mothers with secondary or more education compared to those of moth-
ers with less education, but only a modest decline in this probability by
educational level of Muslim mothers. Also apparent is a sharp decline in
the predicted probability of reporting positive effects of circumcision
among Christian mothers with secondary or more education compared
to those with less education, but little difference in this probability by
maternal education among Muslims.
Findings are consistent with the idea that popu-
larization of Islamist ideology casting women as
keepers of Ôtraditional identityÕ attenuated de-
clines in the prevalence of female genital cutting
among Muslims in Minya when efforts by Christ-
ian PVOs to eradicate Ôtraditional practicesÕ en-
hanced such declines among Christians. Sectarian
tensions in Minya during this period also may
have limited the diffusion of competing ideals
about gender, reinforcing the potential for diverg-
ing trends. This interpretation corroborates femi-
nist theory that religious groups may use gender
symbols in a process of differentiation that nation-
al and transnational political bodies reinforce. Al-
though one cannot infer a causal relationship be-
tween the activities of CEOSS, attitudes pertaining
to the practice, and observed patterns of female
genital cutting among Christians and Muslims in
Minya, ideologies and behaviours favouring de-
cline appear to have spread among Christians
while Islamists were promoting womenÕs tradi-
tional identity. Whether recent legislation against
female genital cutting in Egypt will lead all Mus-
lims and Christians to abandon the practice re-
mains a question for future research.
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Table 1. Adjusted Odds of FGC-Related Behavior and Attitudes,
Christians vs. Muslims, Minya Egypt
O R a (95% CI)
Daughter's circumcision status (1776 circumcised, 1424 uncircumcised) b
Circumcision intended
(vs not, uncircumcised daughters) 0 , 1 9 ( 0 , 1 2 , 0,30) * * *
Circumcised (vs not) 0 , 3 1 ( 0 , 2 2 , 0,44) * * *
Excised (vs other) 0 , 4 5 ( 0 , 3 3 , 0,63) * * *
Mother's perceived effects of circumcision (n=1504)c
Identifies alternatives 1 , 5 3 ( 0 , 5 1 , 4,59)
B l e e d i n g 0 , 5 9 ( 0 , 3 9 , 0,90) *
S c a r r i n g 0 , 7 4 ( 0 , 3 3 , 1,65)
Good for the girl 0 , 4 0 ( 0 , 2 3 , 0,67) * * *
Satisfies the husband 0 , 6 1 ( 0 , 2 8 , 1,32)
N o r m a l 0 , 8 1 ( 0 , 5 1 , 1,27)
C l e a n 0 , 5 2 ( 0 , 3 2 , 0,83) * *
B e a u t i f y i n g 0 , 6 6 ( 0 , 3 6 , 1,21)
O t h e r 0 , 8 4 ( 0 , 4 8 , 1,50)
Any positived 0 , 4 9 ( 0 , 2 8 , 0,87) *
No effect 1 , 6 7 ( 0 , 9 0 , 3,11) *
Mother's perceived effects of non-circumcision (n=1504)c
Marital problems 0 , 7 7 ( 0 , 4 7 , 1,26)
U n a t t r a c t i v e / u n f e m i n i n e 0 , 6 0 ( 0 , 2 8 , 1,27)
Fertility problems 1 , 3 3 ( 0 , 4 7 , 3,75)
U n c l e a n 1 , 1 6 ( 0 , 4 6 , 2,92)
Not good for girl/girl's reputation 0 , 3 6 ( 0 , 1 8 , 0,74) * *
Excessive sexual desire/commit "sin" 0 , 5 7 ( 0 , 3 9 , 0,85) * *
Health problems 1 , 6 4 ( 0 , 9 6 , 2,81) +
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
a All models are adjusted for maternal age, maternal educational level, paternal
educational level, household assets, urban/rural residence, and district. Models for
daughter's circumcision status are additionally adjusted for daughter's age,
daughter's birth order (among living daughters), and maternal circumcision status.
b Standard errors in all models are adjusted for non-independence of reported
behaviour of mothers with more than one daughter age 5 yrs or older.
c Standard errors in all models are adjusted for the multi-stage, stratified, cluster-
sample design.
d Desired by religion, normal/tradition, beautifying, good for girl, satisfied husband,
c l e a n s i n g / p u r i f y i n g .
Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of FGC-Related Attitudes and Behaviour by Religious Affiliation
and Maternal Education, Minya Governorate
C i r c u m c i s e d Any Positive Effect
Daughters >=5 yrs (n=3212) Mothers of Daughters (n=1504)
Pred. Prob. (95% CI)a Pred. Prob. (95% CI)b
C h r i s t i a n
Mother's education (none) 0 , 9 2 ( 0 , 8 8 , 0,95) 0 , 7 9 ( 0 , 6 5 , 0,89)
P r i m a r y / p r e p a r a t o r y 0 , 8 7 ( 0 , 7 5 , 0,94) 0 , 7 6 ( 0 , 6 1 , 0,86)
Secondary + 0 , 4 3 ( 0 , 1 6 , 0,75) 0 , 4 6 ( 0 , 2 4 , 0,70)
M u s l i m
Mother's education (none) 0 , 9 7 ( 0 , 9 5 , 0,98) 0 , 8 6 ( 0 , 7 4 , 0,93)
P r i m a r y / p r e p a r a t o r y 0 , 9 6 ( 0 , 9 4 , 0,98) 0 , 8 5 ( 0 , 7 3 , 0,92)
Secondary + 0 , 9 1 ( 0 , 8 1 , 0,96) 0 , 8 2 ( 0 , 6 6 , 0,92)
Note: Predicted probabilities are estimated for modal respondentsresidents of Samaloot district, mothers age
35-44 without education, father's without education, households without major assets, residence rural. For
models for daughter's circumcision status, probabilities are estimated for first born (among living
daughters) aged 15+ years, and mother circumcised.
a Standard errors in all models are adjusted for non-independence of reported behaviour of mothers with
more than one daughter age 5 years or older.
b Standard errors in all models are adjusted for stratified, cluster-sample design.
daughters are more severely cut (30 versus 43 per cent excised).1 T h e
cumulative probability of circumcision has declined with successive
age cohorts of daughters, but particularly among Christians (Figure 1).
Although a majority of Christian and Muslim daughters still are circum-
cised, a lower percentage of Christian than Muslim mothers intend to
have uncut daughters circumcised (54 versus 85 per cent).
Common perceptions of the effects of circumcision are that the prac-
tice is good for the girl, cleansing/purifying, desired by religion, normal/a
tradition, beautifying, and satisfying for the husband (ibid.). Mothers as-
sociate non-circumcision with problems in the domains of marriage, fer-
tility, and physical and psychological health. Non-circumcision also is be-
lieved to cause overly sexual or ÔsinfulÕ behaviour and to be unattractive,
unfeminine, unclean, or bad for the girlÕs reputation. A few Muslim moth-
ers claim that not circumcising daughters to imitate foreigners is undesir-
able, and some mothers state that the practice is required or a norm.
Table 1 shows adjusted odds (and 95 per cent confidence intervals) that
a daughter is circumcised and that a mother perceives selected effects of
circumcision and non-circumcision for Christians versus Muslims. Adjust-
ed odds of intended, actual, and more severe circumcision are lower
among Christian than Muslim daughters. Compared to Muslim mothers,
Christian mothers have lower adjusted odds of reporting that circumci-
sion is good for the girl, is cleansing or purifying, or has any positive ef-
fect, and have lower adjusted odds of reporting that non-circumcision is
bad for the girlÕs reputation or leads to excessive sexual behaviour.
Table 2 provides predicted probabilities (and 95 per cent confidence
intervals) of circumcision among daughters and predicted probabilities
of reporting positive effects of circumcision among mothers, by religious
affiliation. Probabilities are derived from logistic regression models that
include an interaction between maternal education and religious affilia-
tion, and are computed for ÔtypicalÕ Minyan residents (first-born daugh-
ters aged 15 or older; mothers aged 35 to 44 without education and cir-
cumcised; fathers without education; families living in rural Samaloot
district and owning no major assets). Results show a sharp decline in the
predicted probability of circumcision among Christian daughters of
Figure 1. DaughtersÕ Cumulative Probability of Circumcision by Age and Religious Affiliation, Minya, Egypt
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To anybody familiar with Islamic juris-
prudence it will come as no surprise
that a great variety of opinions about
cloning can be found among contem-
porary ulama. Basically they all refuse
the notion that cloning (i s t i n s a k h) is in-
terference in GodÕs prerogative to the
creation of life (k h a l q), which is defined
as creating something new from noth-
ing. Since cloning only makes use of
materials that already exist (the egg
and the implanted DNA taken from an-
other person) in order to make a copy
of it, the whole procedure cannot be
considered as k h a l q. Furthermore, Mus-
lim scholars do not consider the em-
bryo in its first stages of development a
person. Most ulama state that ensoul-
ment does not take place until the fortieth day after inception, while
others extend this period to 120 days.1 Therefore one argument
brought forward particularly by the Catholic Church in the context of
cloning is completely absent from Muslim discussions: that is, the high
number of failed attempts that are necessary to successfully bring
about the making of one single clone. This argument is based upon the
notion that the embryo has to be granted the legal status of a human
being, from the very moment of successful inception onwards Ð a con-
viction that does not exist in Islam. Yet, in spite of that, the Islamic Fiqh
Academy at Jedda issued a statement
already in 1990 placing a ban on the
creation of embryos by cloning for the
single purpose of embryonic stem
cells. This offers an interesting parallel
to discussions in Europe and the USA
about this issue. On the other hand, it
is interesting to note that the repro-
duction of organs by cloning, which is
a highly controversial issue in the West,
is treated as unproblematic in Muslim
statements. This technique would
make it possible to take cells from a
person in order to manipulate and im-
plant them into a ÔhostÕ animal so that
cell tissues or even whole organs could
be bred, carrying the DNA of the cell
donor. Subsequently, these organs
could easily be transplanted to the donor and substitute a dysfunc-
tional organ. Muslim jurists argue for the permissibility of this tech-
nique since it would serve the human good. This argument Ð the so-
called principle of m a s l a h a Ð had already been called forth in the 1970s
and 1980s to justify the transplantation of organs.2
But only few ulama go as far as to state that there would be no prob-
lem about cloning at all. For example, the Lebanese m a r j a ' Husain Fadl
Allah argues that cloning is nothing but a discovery of new possibilities
within the framework of GodÕs creation.3 According to him, this discov-
ery could only come about thanks to GodÕs will. The fact that this new
means of reproduction was hitherto unknown to mankind did not have
any effects on its morality per se. Another example is test-tube babies,
which were known to mankind only for a few decades but were easily
integrated into the framework of s h a r i ' a law. (It should be noted of
course that these statements were made during a radio interview.) The
same argument, that any scientific discovery is only possible due to
GodÕs consent and therefore cannot be rejected as per se morally
threatening, can also be found in a booklet of the Iraqi Shii scholar
Muhammad S a ' i d a t -Tabataba'i a l - H a k i m .4 In addition he refers to the
Q u r ' a n i c story that Jesus did not have a biological father, taking this as
proof that there are ways of creating human beings that differ consid-
erably from the one which is commonly known. Consequently the ar-
gument is rejected that cloning would be a deviation of the usual tech-
nique of reproduction and therefore would constitute an infringement
on God-given laws. It goes without saying that there is a considerable
diversity of opinion among Shiites as well. For example, the Shii schol-
ar Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Din refuted cloning by referring to the
Q u r ' a n (4:118Ð19), where Satan, after being condemned by God, states:
ÔMost certainly I will take of Thy servants an appointed portion: And
most certainly I will lead them astray and excite in them vain desires,
and bid them so that they shall slit the ears of the cattle, and most cer-
tainly I will bid them so that they shall alter GodÕs creation [k h a l q A l l a h ] ;
and whoever takes the Shaitan for a guardian rather than Allah, he in-
deed shall suffer a manifest loss.Õ5
In this statement cloning is interpreted as altering GodÕs creation.
Therefore it is seen as part of the devilÕs scheme to lead mankind
astray. This Q u r ' a n i c citation is commonly made use of in statements
outwardly rejecting i s t i n s a k h.
Repercussions for s h a r i ' a
The mentioned comparison of cloning to in vitro fertilization (IVF)
made by Fadl Allah hints at an important restriction that is always added
by those allowing i s t i n s a k h. Muslim scholars almost unanimously allow
the technique of IVF if the wish of a married couple to have children can-
Medical Ethics
The debates about the pros and cons of
cloning in the media are usually dominated by
views of the Christian churches, philosophers,
and lobbyists. Yet the issues raised by cloning
are, for several reasons, affecting mankind in
general and therefore cannot be solved by
representatives and opinion leaders
predominantly from the so-called ÔWestÕ only.
Among these reasons is the fundamental
question of whether our concepts of ÔmanÕ,
ÔpersonhoodÕ, and consequently ÔmankindÕ
have to be reformulated in the light of recent
scientific progress. It is obvious that a final,
universally acceptable answer to this question
cannot be arrived at if representatives of
religions such as Islam, Buddhism, or
Hinduism are not included in this debate.
Muslim Voices
o n C l o n i n g
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not be fulfilled in any other way. Yet they all refuse the use of material Ð
be it semen or eggs Ð that are not taken from the two themselves. Such
a case would be clear adultery. The same rule is therefore applied to
cloning: it could only be allowed if carried out within the framework of a
valid marriage, i.e. DNA taken from a man could only be implanted into a
womanÕs egg if the two are married to each other.6
This restriction in turn hints at the major objection that is raised by
Muslim scholars to cloning and eventually leads to its outward rejection
by most of them. Since the newly born child would not carry a mix of the
DNA of his mother and father, but would only be a copy of one of them,
it would become impossible to determine its exact relation to its par-
ents. For instance, what would be the status of a female baby whose
DNA is identical to her ÔmotherÕsÕ? She could neither be termed Ôdaugh-
terÕ, nor ÔsisterÕ, nor ÔmotherÕ. This confusion would have decisive reper-
cussions in other fields of s h a r i ' a law. For example, the very elaborate
guidelines about marriage or inheritance could not be applied anymore
since they are essentially based on a clear definition of the relational sta-
tus of a given person within the framework of the family. Therefore the
strongest objection raised by Muslim jurists completely differs from
those of Christian representatives, who focus primarily on the immorali-
ty of the act of cloning itself. For most of the Muslim authors consulted
so far this seems to be a marginal aspect only. They usually judge the
matter more in the light of its effects, coming mostly to the same con-
clusion, i.e. that cloning should be forbidden. The weakness of judging
on the effects rather than the nature of a certain act has already been
pointed at in a statement by the Iraqi scholar Mahrus al-Mudarris, who is
one of the few Sunni jurists arguing for the permissibility of cloning.7
There is, however, one objection that is raised by Muslims, Christians,
and even some scientists alike: the contradiction of cloning to the princi-
ple of the diversity of GodÕs creation. This argument is put forward, for
example, by the famous Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi as well as by
representatives of the Church, who argue that accepting this diversity
also implies accepting things which are considered ugly or ill. The fear of
Christian representatives that cloning and genetic engineering taken to-
gether might eventually lead to the creation of a new class of humans
who are designed according to the desires, tastes, or even fashions of
people is partly shared by the ulama. They base
their argument on the Q u r ' a n i c statement (95:4):
ÔWe created man in his best formÕ (ladaq khalaqna
al-insan fi ahsan taqwim). Yet this does not lead to
an outward rejection of genetic engineering as
might be expected. Using the principle of m a s l a h a
once again, it is argued that genetic engineering
does not contradict religion in cases where it is
used for the healing of diseases. All other cases are
interpreted as interference in GodÕs creation.
The Ôdiversity argumentÕ is also picked up by sci-
entists. They point at the fact that reducing biodi-
versity would cause a lower ability to resist illness-
es. But they seem to be less afraid that mankind
might develop into an assembly of clones, which
are based on only a couple of models: Ô[I]t appears
unlikely that ÒcloningÓ in humans will become
commonplace. It is more likely that humans will continue to reproduce
using the traditional method, which appears to be much more pleasur-
a b l e . Õ8
Going through the contemporary statements of Muslims and Muslim
jurists on cloning, one cannot avoid the impression that most of them
were caught by surprise. Time and again it can be read in publications
from the 1990s that the whole issue of cloning would be restricted only
to animals, since science would still be ages away from the cloning of hu-
mans. Therefore new developments in this debate might be expected
against the background of almost daily news about human clones in the
media. From the vocabulary being used it can also be gleaned from the
sources that cloning was considered a mere ÔWesternÕ phenomenon.
Therefore the majlis al-fiqh al-islami at Jedda was very concerned in its
guidelines on cloning issued in 1997, which held that, among other
things, cloning should not be ÔimportedÕ into Muslim countries. Of
course this view does not only overlook the existence of substantial Mus-
lim communities in the West but also the fact that non-Western coun-
tries such as Korea or China also play an important
role in research on and the development of
cloning techniques.
In addition, the analogy of cloning and IVF men-
tioned above once again gives an indication of
why it might become necessary for Muslim schol-
ars to deal with the issue of cloning more system-
atically. As has been said, IVF is seen as unproblem-
atic as long as no DNA material from a third person
outside of the marriage is used. This rule allows
bringing about pregnancy in the majority of rele-
vant cases, because the problems with conception
relate to aspects other than the sperm or the egg.
But a number of cases remain, where either eggs
or sperm are defective and consequently do not
allow pregnancy. In these cases cloning could rem-
edy the situation within the framework of a valid
marriage. It is interesting to note that the permis-
sive statement about i s t i n s a k h by Mahrus al-Mu-
darris mentioned above, was included in a recent
publication about test-tube babies by an Iraqi
medical doctor highly active in the field of IVF.
Apart from the mere fact that IVF, genetic engi-
neering, and abortion are treated together with
cloning, the wording as well as the arrangement of
MudarrisÕs statement shows that this issue can eas-
ily be integrated into the framework of discussions
about birth control. These discussions in turn are
far from marginal in the contemporary Arabic
w o r l d .
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Western model of AIDS prevention is inappropriate in an Islamic con-
text. He suggests instead that an Islamic AIDS prevention model be de-
v e l o p e d .
Organizations such as MAC and Islamic Careline have attempted to re-
spond to BadriÕs concerns about a Western AIDS prevention model by
using their understanding of Islam and moulding it into an AIDS preven-
tion model for Muslims. However, it is respectfully submitted that if oneÕs
understanding of Islam is based on principles of inequality and judg-
mentalism, those principles are invariably going to filter into an AIDS
prevention model developed in the name of this Islam. 
When Farida MohammedÕs husband discovered she was HIV positive,
he took her to the nearest hospital and left her there to die. Since
there was little the hospital could do for someone who had full-blown
AIDS, they sent her back home unable to deal with her problems.
S h e had no home to go to and eventually ended up living with a man
who provided her with accommodation in exchange for sex. When
h e became tired of her, Farida and her baby son roamed the streets
o f Johannesburg, South Africa, searching for shelter and food. On
t h e verge of death, Farida discovered NkosiÕs Haven and was taken
i n by Gail Johnson. Her own community continues to reject her.4
MACÕs attitude towards Muslims living with HIV/AIDS, such as Farida
Mohammed, have been determined, first, by their aversion to Western
culture, morals, and ethics and, second, by a need to replace the West-
ern model of AIDS prevention with something more Islamic. In essence,
Muslim responses to HIV/AIDS are reactionary and defensive. They are
reactionary because they believe Western culture to be in direct conflict
with Islamic culture Ð their reaction is therefore to instinctively reject
anything Western believing that whatever is Western must be un-Islam-
ic. For example, promoting the use of condoms, associated with a West-
ern AIDS prevention model, will automatically be deemed un-Islamic
without giving much thought to the value of a condom campaign. 
The responses are also defensive because they realize that by reject-
ing the Western model of AIDS prevention, a void is created. Thus,
since there is no thought-out Muslim response to AIDS prevention,
Muslims respond by arguing that the Q u r ' a n and h a d i t h are sufficient
guides to developing an AIDS prevention model. Their responses ulti-
mately amount to sophisticated versions of what religious leaders
have been preaching for centuries. 
MACÕs response to the AIDS pandemic is based on conservative in-
terpretations of Islamic texts and is therefore out of sync with the social
realities faced by Muslims living with HIV/AIDS. Unfortunately, the
AIDS prevention model advocated by MAC is also reflective of the gen-
eral Muslim response towards people living with HIV/AIDS. 
Positive Muslims
The formation, in July 2000, of Positive Muslims, an awareness-raising
and support group for Muslims living with HIV/AIDS was an important
step in the development of a comprehensive AIDS prevention model.
The groupÕs founding members decided on its formation despite the ex-
istence of MAC, because they wanted to move away from the Malik Badri
approach to AIDS prevention and also wanted to place more emphasis
on dealing with people who had already been infected with HIV/AIDS.
Positive Muslims developed a Ôtheology of compassionÕ: a way of
reading the Q u r ' a n and understanding the h a d i t h in a manner that fo-
cuses on Allah as a compassionate being. Their mission statement in-
cludes the following objectives:
Ð We believe that a non-judgmental approach should be adopted
when dealing with people who are HIV positive. Our concerns are not
related to how one became infected; instead we believe that those
who are HIV positive must be accepted as they are.
Health & Society
Muslim communities have never responded to the HIV/AIDS pandemic
in a homogenous way. There have always been differences of opinion
and approaches to dealing with HIV/AIDS. The following analyses Mus-
lim attitudes towards fellow Muslims living with HIV/AIDS by compar-
ing the approaches of two Muslim AIDS prevention and support
groups in South Africa.
Muslim responses to HIV/AIDS in South Africa have ranged from non-
judgmental and compassionate support to violent threats being made
against Muslims who publicly disclosed their HIV status. Faghmeda
Miller, an HIV-positive AIDS activist, is one such individual who was
threatened. Miller, who is one of the founding members of Positive
Muslims, an awareness-raising and support group for people living
with HIV/AIDS, states in a television interview:
ÕMy problem was with the head of the Muslim community, which we
call the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), and other bodies. They didnÕt
feel happy that I disclosed because according to them I am a woman
and women are supposed to keep quiet. And secondlyÉthey
saidÉyou knowÉsome of them, I wonÕt say who, some of them said
I should be stoned to death because they believed, they still believe,
some of them, that itÕs a curse from God, and because of that I should
have been stoned to death. But I didnÕt stop there. I carried on telling
people about my HIV status.Õ1
Miller is one of a few brave individuals who have publicly declared
their HIV status. She, together with other members of the Muslim com-
munity, has challenged the orthodox Muslim approach to HIV/AIDS
and has provided an alternative voice to mainstream Muslim religious
leadership. While orthodox religious institutions continue to preach
uncompassionate morality, progressive Muslim organizations such as
Positive Muslims have provided HIV-positive people with the support
and counselling they require.
Muslim Aids Committee
The Islamic Medical Association (IMA) together with the Jamiatul-
Ulama, joined to form the Muslim Aids Committee (MAC) and Islamic
Careline during the mid-1990s. These groups focus on educating Mus-
lims about the spread of HIV/AIDS and claim in their pamphlets that
ÔIslam is the cureÕ. They argue that ÔAIDS is primarily an ethical and
moral problemÕ that can only be eradicated by strongly discouraging
sexual promiscuity and by encouraging those who have contracted
HIV Ôto promote and maintain [an] Islamic lifestyle and repent for their
past actionsÕ.2
Although there is no way to gauge whether or not the Muslim Aids
CommitteeÕs prevention programme has been successful, a number of
HIV-positive Muslims have complained about the prejudicial manner in
which the MAC operates. 
This is not surprising considering the fact that MAC advocates the
Malik Badri3 approach when dealing with HIV/AIDS prevention. BadriÕs
ÔIslamic approachÕ to resolving the AIDS crisis is premised on his belief
that AIDS is a punishment from God unto those who have engaged in
immoral sexual behaviour. His approach comes across as retributive
and judgmental and would certainly alienate Muslims seeking assis-
tance. In some ways, however, Badri is correct when he argues that a
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Ð Our primary focus is to provide support for those who have already
been affected and to educate our communities so as to prevent the
spread of HIV/AIDS. Our approach to prevention includes, but is not
limited to, abstinence from sex outside marriage, faithfulness during
a relationship, and the use of condoms in appropriate circum-
s t a n c e s .5
The approach to AIDS prevention adopted by this organization is
similar to the Ugandan ÔA-B-CÕ approach, and includes abstinence,
being faithful, and the use of condoms. There is furthermore no dis-
crimination with regard to how one contracted the virus or on the
basis of oneÕs sexual orientation. 
Positive Muslims has primarily focused on empowering women in
their awareness campaigns and has conducted several workshops on
Muslim women and HIV/AIDS. Based on their research, the organiza-
tion believes that women are the most vulnerable group in the Muslim
community in terms of contracting HIV. This is not only because
women are biologically more susceptible to HIV infection than men,
but also because of patriarchal religious and cultural practices that pre-
vent women from effectively negotiating their sexuality.
The primary difference between Positive Muslims and MAC is that
the former organization bases its approach on the Ôtheology of com-
passionÕ model, whereas the latter uses BadriÕs Islamic model. The AIDS
prevention model adopted by Positive Muslims is far more compre-
hensive in terms of the range of services that it provides and adopts a
more open-minded and progressive approach to AIDS education. It
also focuses on empowering women by strongly discouraging Islamic
practices that make women more vulnerable to contracting HIV. This
model is also a reflection of progressive Muslim attitudes often found
on the fringes of Muslim society. In many ways, MAC still reflects the
mainstream Muslim response to the AIDS pandemic. 
It has been suggested that faith-based communities exert a powerful
influence on the priorities of society and the policies of national lead-
ership. Unfortunately, orthodox Muslim responses to HIV/AIDS have
negatively influenced the social priorities of this community by con-
cluding, amongst others, that AIDS is a curse from God. However, by
developing the notion of a Ôtheology of compassionÕ, progressive Mus-
lims have been able to provide non-judgmental and compassionate
support to people living with HIV/AIDS. It is submitted that these pre-
vention models are intrinsically connected to the way in which Mus-
lims approach religious texts and in many ways mirror Muslim re-
sponses towards people living with HIV/AIDS.
Ultimately, the AIDS pandemic must be confronted, and open-mind-
edness is essential to properly dealing with the various issues that arise
with respect to the virus in the Muslim community. Finding a Muslim
response to HIV/AIDS based on compassion does not by any means
equate to bowing down to a Western model. On
the contrary, it signifies a responsible and realistic
approach to the fact that those who are HIV posi-
tive are of us and we are of them. 
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A D V E R T I S E M E N T
The forced displacement in 1948 and
the occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza in 1967 resulted in one of the
most complex and largest refugee
problems. Over 50 per cent of the ap-
proximately eight million Palestinians
live in exile and 70 per cent of the total
comprises refugees. After 9/11, while
all attention focused on Kabul and
Baghdad, the Israeli government
seized the opportunity to break the
second Intifada and marginalize the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
Violence, closures, and curfews aim to undermine the desire for a
ÔPalestinian National communityÕ. Yet, through ÔvirtualÕ interactions, a
transnational virtual Palestinian community Ð and thereby identity Ð is
now in the process of (re)construction. What it means to be a Palestin-
ian is addressed and produced through online practices. Palestinians
around the world communicate directly with each other, something
not imaginable during the first Intifada (1987Ð1993), or before the so-
called Oslo peace process when Israel even controlled the postal ser-
vices. Today, family members commemorate martyrs by Internet distri-
bution and create their own sites to find lost relatives or display their
community/family history. But what are the possibilities and limita-
tions of the Net in facilitating the imagination of a transnational Pales-
tinian nation, while also functioning as a tool for political mobilization?
Internet is a relatively new phenomenon in anthropological research.
Basically labelled as ÔcyberspacesÕ, Ôonline worldsÕ, ÔInternet communi-
tiesÕ, perhaps the best way to conceptualize these groupings is to think
of the Internet as a communication medium whereby ÔspaceÕ is a social
construct, evaluated through the meanings conferred to it, yet con-
stantly referring to a particular territorial ÔplaceÕ. In a globalized Ôinfor-
mation ageÕ we find a greater diversification of alternative voices in the
public media. One assumption in current debates is that the nation-
state no longer features as the privileged space for the imagination of
identity. Palestine offers exciting examples of Computer Mediated
Community (CMC) styles. Even though the nation-state concept is
weakening, the particular situation of Palestinians evokes precisely the
strong drive for an independent state and self-identification with a na-
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tion Ð especially since their identity is
consistently contested. Here public
symbols representing national inde-
pendence are, for example, the Pales-
tine Broadcast Corporation (PBC), the
transmission mast (dating from the
Mandate period), the headquarters of
the Palestinian National Authority, and
the main Internet provider (PalNet). In
January 2002, the IDF blew up the
newly built and operating offices of
Palestinian television/PBC. In April
2002, as part of Operation Defensive
Shield, troops destroyed Palestinian radio stations and bombed the
transmission mast. With the shutdown of PalNetÕs power source in July
2002, Palestinians were temporarily unable to go online. However, ac-
cording to ISP (Internet Service Providers) the number of users of Pal-
Net registered a growth from 3 per cent in 2000 to a current 8 per cent. 
Stories collected amongst refugees in Lebanon and Palestine clearly
express a sense of isolation and suffering. All interviews, drawings,
posters, discussions, and songs depict an agonizing spirit, and hopes
of returning to the homeland abound. One way of dealing with this is
through strengthening personal ties via the Internet. Though music,
lifestyle, and romance are favourite topics, current politics are domi-
nating the style and discourse on the Net more than anything else. 
Alternative images
Analysing the impact on Palestinian lives of the current political situ-
ation, two words will certainly come up: closure and curfew. They have
given space, place, and time different meanings. Internet access be-
came an alternative for a society being crippled figuratively and literal-
ly. Chat rooms, websites, and mailing lists provide the infrastructure for
a Palestine represented in a cyber world, reaching even Palestinians in
the diaspora who do not have access to Internet since appeals, com-
muniqus, and images can be printed from the Net, reproduced, and
circulated on university, mosque, or caf walls. For example, historical
pictures from before 1948, those of the 1948 and 1967 exoduses, and
pictures of the second Intifada are amongst the most downloaded and
forwarded images. The first two sources articulate a certain nostalgia
and mourning, while the latter express resistance, and hope. 
Interwoven in all the texts and images produced on the Net are re-ar-
ticulations of meanings about Palestinian culture, history, and identity.
One immediately notices that self and group identity of Palestinians
(inside and outside) is a very important subject. This is especially seen
on refugee camp websites that were set up to find a solution to the
physical return of the Palestinian diaspora to the homeland. By recog-
nizing the impossibility of movement from the diaspora to the Pales-
tinian territories, mailing lists also constitute important means of
opening up discussions between individuals from distant places in a
cost-effective manner. The discussions range from scientific to social,
political, and cultural issues, like the eventual return to the homeland
or mismanagement of the PNA. A good example of Internet projects is
the Across Borders Project, which links different refugee camps with
each other. Interaction between Palestinians from Dheisha refugee
camp in Bethlehem with Sabra/Shatila refugee camp in Lebanon, and
Jalazone refugee camp in Ramallah with Palestinians in Sydney, Aus-
tralia, are revolutionary examples.
Muslim activists actively use the Internet in many ways. Islamic
groups never officially discouraged using the Internet. Palestine-info,
hosting Islamic-related Palestinian political movements like Hamas, is
one of the most important examples of eagerness amongst religious
parties to push their info through the Net. Yet these popular groups
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The imposition of often extreme restrictions
and the daily use of violence have severely
affected Palestinian society. Numerous
curfews and roadblocks prevent people from
visiting relatives and friends, and from
travelling for work or education. As a result
o f the ÔrealÕ disruption of their lives,
a n increasing number of Palestinians
compensate their loss of freedom by ÔvirtualÕ
mobility on the Internet. In doing so, they
reconstruct the notion of a transnational
Palestinian community and identity.
Cyber Intifada and
Palestinian Identity
E l e c t r o n i c
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may find themselves isolated in a cyber public sphere. It is striking to
find that Hamas and Hezbollah, or even the Marxist PFLP and DFLP, are
rarely mentioned or linked on (pro-)Palestinian websites. The reason is
not always political disagreement with these Ôradical movementsÕ.
Often it is the fear of losing (potential) credibility and resources when
associated with these ÔunwantedÕ groups.
But religious motivations and preferences also influence the use and
development of Internet. Some perceive it as a ÔnewÕ phenomenon to
be controlled and channelled. At the only Internet caf in a South
Lebanese camp near Saida (a stronghold of Islamic parties) all comput-
ers had mirrors on the wall behind the users so the owner could see
what was being viewed online, and a curtain fully separated female
from male costumers. For some critics this was an example of reli-
giously motivated censorship; for others it actually created practical
opportunities, in particular for women and girls to (be allowed to) par-
ticipate in a public sphere.
Grassroots capacity of the Net
Political messages and other aims expressed through the Internet
take place on local and global levels. Apart from the ÔglobalÕ-based
sites like Electronic Intifada,1 the number of Palestinian ÔdiasporicÕ and
locally based sites, discussion lists, and projects are strikingly active. At
the same time it is important to note that the PNA does not even have
the technical/political ability to control PalestiniansÕ Internet usage. In-
ternet proves that control cannot be absolute, making it a blessing and
a curse. In other words, the grassroots capacity of the Net endows it
with a political significance; it injects democratic participation into
otherwise oppressive societies. The fact is also that cyber space is not
an occupied territory and cannot be sealed by Israeli tanks and check-
points (as yet). Al-JazeeraÕs live shots of the killing of the Palestinian
child Muhamed al-Dura were immediately spread on Internet and be-
came a symbol of the Intifada; the BBCÕs footage of the Jenin market
killings of Palestinian children by Israeli tanks in June travelled faster
than imaginable through news groups, hyperlinks, and listserves. 
Apart from all the online e-mailing, chatting, printing, downloading,
writing, mobilizing, surfing, and even Net phoning, the Internet caf
became also an offline place where people meet, exchange news, re-
ceive messages, drink coffee, or just wait and look around. It is actually
a smart, or rather ÔsafeÕ, public place because it is not really a ÔcafÕ (in
the negative sense it has in Arab society). For most parents it is accept-
able to let sons and daughters spend hours in an Internet caf for study
purposes Ð although of course the other social ac-
tivities are part of such outings. The Internet caf
provides secrecy, anonymity, and even a space
that can be a meeting point for political factions
to motivate their ideology or ideas through spe-
cific sites or computer software. 
It cannot be overstated how important the so-
cial impact of Internet is when physical contact is
impossible. When the Across Borders Project
started in 1999 it was with the aim of providing
the Palestinian community Ôaccess to a worldwide
audience where their views can be expressed,
and assist the refugee community in the process
of family reunificationÕ by linking the approxi-
mately 50 refugee camps scattered throughout
the Middle East.2 It became obvious that the
Palestine-Israeli-American conflict was not just a
military war; it was also a media war. Organizations and activists were
forced to regroup and rethink their tactics. Web design companies
were even offering free services in order to increase Palestinian pres-
ence on the web. Local and international Palestinian Internet projects,
presenting features and eyewitness reports mushroomed and became
serious alternatives to mainstream media. These activist groups and
projects have in common that they approach and mainly target the in-
ternational world/Western audience and almost solely work online.
The website statistics report of the Palestine Monitor in August 2002
showed that the site had been visited more than one million times. In
September the most active day of the month was 20 September, right
after the attack on ArafatÕs headquarters. 
Escaping their depressive state of isolation, travelling to friends or
family in Palestine or in other countries via the Internet gives a sense of
freedom. At the same time it empowers the people to participate in the
political fight and Intifada by live confrontations with (pro-)Israelis on
the Net, or by playing cyber games. In this Ôcyber IntifadaÕ pro-Israel
and pro-Palestinian groups attack and sabotage each other with virus-
es and hackings. As one Palestinian web-user in Lebanon said: ÔWhen I
watch the news on television I feel I canÕt do anything. But on Internet
I feel I am facing an Israeli myself.Õ 
The impact of the Net is sometimes idealized, however: uneven dis-
tribution of and access to the Internet and a bias towards Anglo-Amer-
ican language and culture do pose a threat. Nonetheless, positive
changes are currently seen as well. Many more Arab-language sites
and chat rooms, with Arabic transliterated in Latin script, using sym-
bols to express specific tones or letters, are also good examples.3 F r o m
a historic materialist perspective, it is obvious that innovations in digi-
tal technology are impressive, without thinking that technology in it-
self is the determinant of change: ÔInternet is not meant to be the solu-
tion, though it is an important tool. É [T]here is the danger that after
spending hours on the Internet you think youÕve done the fight for the
Palestinian cause that day. And so you might not go out to participate
in a demonstration, which can be more effective. Internet is not going
to save Palestine, but it is going to contribute to [its] liberationÕ (coor-
dinator of the Palestine Monitor) .
Internet remains an important ÔfacilitatorÕ. Instead of focusing on in-
dividual access, efficiency, and outcomes, it is therefore beneficial to
explore broader-based access like community centres, public libraries,
Internet cafÕs, and universities. Since it circumvents traditional forms
of censorship and provides news and opinions to which the US-Israeli
pact and Arab regimes would rather not allow public access, individu-
als, groups, and movements can use new technologies to combat Ôrul-
ingÕ entities. This reminds us of the continual tactical inventiveness of
ordinary people in their everyday practices. Research on these issues
has the important task of trying to find answers to how these political
meanings and practices can be reformulated for post-colonial times,
relating them to the digital age and to identity-formation in a dias-
poric context. 
Youths in a Palestinian camp corresponding via Internet
w i t h youths in a Lebanese camp. 
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For much of the Nizari Ismaili commu-
nityÕs past, the study and writing of its
history have been conducted based on
sources produced by its enemies and
detractors. Only since the beginning of
the second half of the twentieth centu-
ry have significant strides been made
with S h i ' i and Ismaili studies to help re-
claim a more accurate portrayal of the
communityÕs history, doctrines, and
culture. This has largely been due to
the recovery and publication of nu-
merous manuscripts and the establish-
ment of institutions that encourage
and facilitate scholarly study of the communityÕs past. Unfortunately,
studies of the contemporary Ismaili community have yet to receive the
same attention. The application of interdisciplinary studies, contempo-
rary methodologies, and studies of Ismaili popular culture have not
been given the same importance as studies of the pre-modern com-
munity and its literature. To add to this, a
strong culture of documentation is lacking
amongst many community members, placing
the collection and writing of the communityÕs
contemporary history in potential jeopardy. 
What makes the recording of the communi-
tyÕs contemporary history even more urgent
are the many changes that have occurred in
the communityÕs recent past. Migration and
dislocation of Iranian, Tajik, and Afghan Is-
mailis and greater communal awareness of its
own diversity have facilitated a much larger in-
teraction amongst the communityÕs cultural
and ethnic groups over the last decade and a
half. These encounters have resulted in a shar-
ing, borrowing, and exchange of cultural tradi-
tions, devotional literatures, and other forms
of expression, but have left some Ismailis to
grapple with, make sense of, and adjust to
changes in the communityÕs ritual and liturgi-
cal repertoire and cultural constituency.
The Internet has been one mechanism that
has assisted elements of the community in ad-
dressing these concerns. Community mem-
bers have used varied computer technologies,
from websites and e-mail listservs to weblogs
and IRCs, to discuss, negotiate, and debate the boundaries of commu-
nity and identity. The majority of the first Ismaili users of what we now
call the ÔInternetÕ tended to be university students and immigrants to
North America who were engaged in academia or engineering and sci-
entific industries in the early 1990s. This soon expanded to include sim-
ilar profiles of community members in Europe. Early participation by Is-
mailis on the Internet was through newsgroups, primarily those deal-
ing with Islam and Sufism, indicating how many immigrant Ismailis
constructed their own identities and worldviews in the absence of Is-
maili-specific forums. In early 1994, the beginning of an organized at-
tempt by members of the community resulted in the emergence of
several private mailing lists or listservs dedicated specifically to the use
of community members. Mailing lists
that authorized membership based on
questions of affiliation to particular j a-
m a t k h a n as, or places of Ismaili social
and religious congregation, were used
by listowners to ÔverifyÕ Ismaili identity.
Of the three earliest groups, the ISN (Is-
maili Social Network), run by two dis-
sentient Ismailis, dealt primarily with
theological and doctrinal issues.
Ummah-net and Ilmnet, based in the
United States and Canada, respective-
ly, tended to attract university stu-
dents and young professionals and
dealt with a wider range of issues. All three groups, based in North
America, and generally having overlapping members, marked the be-
ginning of a very interesting process that paralleled to some extent
discussions that were occurring offline, especially amongst university
students and young professionals who were born or had spent the ma-
jority of their lives in the countries of Europe, Canada, or the United
S t a t e s .
Responses to modernity
Many early dialogues on these lists were primarily concerned with re-
sponses of certain community members to issues of modernity and
globalization and the particular ways in which these impacted the
practice of the faith. Due to the nature of these discussions, they quick-
ly gained the attention of local and international institutions of the
community, who were weary of the Internet and its related technolo-
gies, primarily because they provided a forum for unmediated discus-
sion and access to unauthenticated versions of the firmans, or private
guidance of the imam to the community. Many users of these lists,
however, constructed the Internet in very different terms: more so as a
liberating, seminal tool allowing relatively open dialogue and provid-
ing a forum for discussions with other like-minded Ismailis.
In 1995, the appearance of the first ÔIsmailiÕ website of a grand nature
appeared. Heritage, later to be known as FIELD (the First Ismaili Elec-
tronic Library and Database) was run and operated by two Ismailis
based in Montreal. Heritage and other less ambitious websites that had
emerged began to provide a more public face than the earlier mailing
lists and were seen as a welcome resource by many Ismailis. Providing
community members (and others) access to devotional literatures,
audio and video recordings, and a plethora of photographs and infor-
mation about the activities of the imam of the community, Heritage
soon became one of the most popular ÔplacesÕ for Ismailis on the Inter-
net and its success spawned many other sites that aspired to match its
quality, breadth, and scope.
Beginning in 1996, the Aga Khan, spiritual leader of the community,
began to publicly address the role of the Internet and noted its impor-
tance as a modern tool. Since that time, several other speeches in vary-
ing public contexts have presented his understanding of the Internet
and its role in promoting positive cultural and educational change and
vocational collaboration. Soon after the first of these speeches, many
of the institutions of the Ismaili community, primarily consisting of the
member bodies of the Aga Khan Development Network began to
emerge on the Internet. These, at one level, marked the first sanc-
tioned institutional presence on the Internet of the Ismaili community
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The Nizari Ismailis are a global community of
S h i ' i Muslims living in more than twenty-five
countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, North
America, and Australasia. They are led by His
Highness Karim Aga Khan, forty-ninth in a line
of living hereditary imams. Increasingly,
Ismailis become aware of the wide diversity
within the larger community as well as of the
vulnerability of various local groups and their
particular traditions, in particular in Central
Asia. Internet provides a means to address
these concerns albeit that access to internet
i s as yet unevenly spread.
The Nizari Ismaili
Community 
and the Internet
Ô... there is a perceived
notion amongst many
community members that
some aspects of the ritual
and liturgical life of other
Muslim communities are
somehow more ÒIslamicÓ
than their own practices.Õ
In the contemporary world in which the notion of a Muslim ortho-
doxy seems to assert itself more strongly than in the past, especially
from within the u m m a, many Ismailis have had the challenge of de-
fending their own pluralistic practice in the spectrum of Muslim diver-
sity without seeming apologetic. Much of this is due to a lack of shared
vocabulary and succumbing to the pressures of a perceived ortho-
praxy. Over the last fifty years, the community has seen several
changes in its ritual practice, including an in-
creased number of English, Arabic, and to some
extent Persian terms in its rituals and an added
significance on the use of the intellect in the in-
terpretation, ethics, and practice of the faith,
rather than the strong emphasis that was placed
on ritual in the past. This is complicated further as
there is a perceived notion amongst many com-
munity members that some aspects of the ritual
and liturgical life of other Muslim communities
are somehow more ÔIslamicÕ than their own prac-
t i c e s .
Negotiating identity online
As a result of these factors many of the web-
sites, and more so the discussion groups and list-
servs, are constantly brimmed with messages re-
lating to what constitutes Ôright practiceÕ, looking
to those with knowledge and authority for an-
swers. Prior to the Internet, there were very few
outlets where community members felt they had
a voice that could be heard. Critiques and de-
bates about the community within the family or
j a m a t k h a n a context were perceived to be disre-
spectful and unnecessary rather than fruitful.
Amongst younger members of the community,
the Internet has become a forum where their con-
cerns have been given a voice and members of
the community are able to discuss issues of com-
mon concern and apply contemporary critical
tools to aspects of the faith.
Websites have quickly become spaces of re-
search for personal understanding as well as for
use in religious education classes and communi-
cating Ismailism to non-Ismaili friends and col-
leagues. The downside, however, is that although
there may seem to be a pluralism of practice that
has developed, measures of authority online have
quickly changed. Strident users are quickly im-
bued with authority by listmembers as they are
often seen to have the most knowledge and de-
bates usually continue to occur until something
close to a consensus is established or one party
leaves the discussion. While this gives a sense of
satisfaction to many users, and irritates others, in
the end, one can argue that pluralism of opinion
within the community has been affected by these discussions. ÔUn-
orthodoxÕ views can be quickly dismissed or counter-argued using a
whole series of devices to undermine opinions presented.
By exploring the interactions that take place on the Internet not sim-
ply as a distinct, disconnected forum divorced from individualsÕ offline
realities, one can argue that the coherency and continuity that exists
between peopleÕs off- and online worlds is key to understanding how
identity negotiations take place on the Internet. For the Nizari Ismailis,
the Internet has provided a ÔspaceÕ where community members can
enact discussions and engage with others in hopes to better under-
stand their own history and evolving identity in the complex cultural
and religious landscape they inhabit.
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and were seen by many members of the community as a progressive
and welcomed move.
Today, the Ismaili Internet landscape is much more populated. There
are sites, spearheaded by individual community members, dealing
with everything from religious and social issues to professional inter-
ests and an increasing number of dating sites that provide a venue for
single Ismailis to meet other Ismailis from around the world. A growing
number of localized sites in languages ranging from French to Urdu
have also begun to appear so as to more effectively deal with Ismaili
populations that either are not English-speakers or who prefer to oper-
ate in an ethno-cultural sphere in addition to under a purely religious
u m b r e l l a .
In the years since 1996, the demographics of Internet users have also
changed. Issues of bandwidth and accessibility to the Internet, which
acted as a gate privileging North American and Europeans users, were
no longer a significant concern with the online landscape of the com-
munity, reflecting the global changes in Internet use. Ismailis from the
Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia now form
an integral part of the Ismaili userbase that is online. Whilst early users
of the Internet tended to be under thirty-five years of age, the Internet
today is used by a much wider age-range within the community, espe-
cially in eastern Africa, Europe, the Indian subcontinent, and North
A m e r i c a .
The last fifteen years offline
To fully appreciate and understand the value of what is happening
on the Internet, it is necessary to begin to look at the history of the
community over the last fifteen years to examine why the Internet has
become such an important forum for negotiating and discussing what
it means to be an Ismaili in the contemporary world. Up until that time,
many Ismaili communities, primarily linked by geography and lan-
guage, saw themselves in isolated terms and tended to refer to them-
selves in a vocabulary that associated or affiliated them with caste,
tribe, linguistics, or communal progenitor rather than one that
grouped them under the larger umbrella of ÔIsmailiÕ. The community
most in touch with and involved in leadership activities hailed from the
Indian subcontinent and had a history that involved the migration of
significant members to East Africa and the French African colonies,
amongst other places, before settling in Western Europe or North
America beginning in the late 1960s or early 1970s.
In 1988, the Aga Khan began to issue a series of firmans, which were
made available to the various j a m a ts, or communities, throughout the
world, in which for the first time in a detailed manner, he raised the
issue of Ismaili cultural diversity and pluralism of practice amongst and
within the various communities. At this time, there had already been
some migration and an attempt to settle displaced members of the Is-
maili community from Iran and Afghanistan to Canada, but generally
the community of Indian origin had tended to think of themselves in
hegemonic terms, with their rituals and prayer, cultural practices, and
places of worship as normative to the Ismaili tradition. The settlement
of these non-Indian Ismaili communities raised an interesting paradox.
In one sense, there was an increased sense of fraternity between the
host community and ÔnewÕ community that they had come to en-
counter. However, an exoticism still existed and while there were at-
tempts to appropriate certain cultural and religious practices, many of
the Ismailis who had become accustomed to their own forms of prac-
tice saw their inherited rituals as threatened. On the other side, many
of the ÔnewÕ communities did not have access to the symbol systems,
the language, or the religious institutions that were so commonplace
and established among the culturally Indian j a m a t Ð and this caused
many to continue their own ways of practice privately, both individual-
ly and communally, outside the j a m a t k h a n a e n v i r o n m e n t .
Over the last fifteen years, other communities have emerged and re-
established contact with the imam of the community, namely commu-
nities in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and to some extent western China.
Communities in the Arab-speaking world have forged closer relation-
ships with the communal and institutional leadership of the communi-
ty and attempts at creating an umbrella Ismaili identity through a com-
mon constitution, institutional structures, liturgy, and places of wor-
ship have facilitated and assisted this process. Of course, many rich and
vibrant local traditions continue to survive and this diversity of practice
is constantly stressed by the imam of the community as a strength
rather than a weakness.
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tempts to disseminate Georgian nation-
ality among the inhabitants of Ajaria go
back to the late nineteenth century
when political control over the region
shifted from the Ottoman to the Tsarist
Empire. These early attempts were
largely unsuccessful and up to the Sovi-
et era inhabitants of Ajaria primarily de-
fined themselves in terms of religion
and locality.
Soviet attempts to curtail the influ-
ence of Islam had more lasting results.
Starting in the late 1920s, Soviet author-
ities arrested and deported numerous
religious leaders and they closed or de-
stroyed virtually all mosques and madrasas in Ajaria. Such measures were
similar to atheist policies in other parts of the Soviet Union, but the con-
ditions in which they occurred were unusual. The Soviet regime had
granted Ajaria autonomous status but not, as usual, on the basis of Ôna-
tionalityÕ or ÔethnicityÕ. Rather it was granted with regards to religious af-
filiation. This meant that Ajarians were unable to further their interests in
the name of the Ôdevelopment of nationsÕ, since in official classifications
of their group Ajarians were Georgians and only differed in their religious
background. Moreover, for a long time the political lite of Ajaria consist-
ed predominantly of non-Muslim Georgians who held strong anti-Turkish
and anti-Islamic sentiments, and eagerly adopted Soviet policies aimed at
curtailing the influence of Islam. These and other factors caused severe
problems for the organizational structure of Islam Ð problems that were
very difficult to overcome even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
During the Soviet period the Muslim Ajarians increasingly started to
identify themselves as Georgians. An important reason why national dis-
course became effective in Ajaria was that expressions of Georgian na-
tional identity were then Ð at least partly Ð disconnected from religion. In
other words, because religion was banned from the public domain, Ajari-
ans could come to see themselves as Georgians. This state of affairs
changed in the late 1980s when, in the wake of national resurgence,
Georgian nationality was tightly reconnected to Christianity. In the
emerging hegemonic discourse Georgian and Muslim identities became
incompatible, creating a dilemma for Ajarians who saw themselves as
both. 
Incompatibilities 
State-atheism and a dominant national Georgian discourse provided
the basis for accelerated Christianization of the region after the commu-
nist collapse. This can be further illustrated by looking at the way religious
and national identities have been negotiated in everyday life on the fron-
tier. In the post-Soviet era, increased expectations of what it entails to be
Muslim ran counter to increased demands for displaying loyalty to the
Georgian nation. This forced inhabitants of Ajaria to articulate their social
identities in new ways. During my research in Ajaria it was fairly uncom-
mon for Ajarians to present themselves as different from Georgians, and
instead most people made it clear that they considered themselves to be
Georgians, sometimes specifying that they were Muslim Georgians. They
stressed that ÔreligionÕ and ÔnationalityÕ were different categories, but dis-
tinguishing between the two often proved difficult. For example, young
Muslims spoke frequently of painful encounters with Christian Georgians
in which their religious affiliation was challenged or ridiculed, or in which
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Before the Soviet period, Ajarians ad-
hered to Sunni Islam and were de-
scribed in Russian administrative docu-
ments and travel reports as devout Mus-
lim believers and staunch opponents to
Christian forces attempting to occupy
the region. During the Soviet period,
state policies weakened Muslim reli-
gious institutions and largely relegated
Islam to the domestic domain. Never-
theless, with time it became clear that
Islam retained importance as a space of
personal refuge. Despite this Ôpersis-
tenceÕ of Islam in Soviet years, an accel-
erating process of conversion to Chris-
tianity took place immediately after the Soviet collapse. This process was
paralleled by the establishment of new churches and spiritual schools,
both of which were part of the Georgian Orthodox ChurchÕs stated intent
to Christianize the region. To understand the current decline of Islam and
rise of Christianity, the process needs to be interpreted in light of the
structural position of Ajaria within (Soviet) Georgian administrative and
ideological frames. The particularities of AjariaÕs position resulted in in-
compatibilities of national and religious identities as played out in the
politics of everyday life. As religious and national identities are tightly in-
terwoven in Ajaria, changes in the nature of the ÔstateÕ have had discern-
able effects on the rigidity and shape of a new religious frontier. 
D i s / c o n t i n u i t i e s
The political leadership of Ajaria and the local intelligentsia express
clear-cut views on Islam. They typically present Islam as an undesired
residue of the Ottoman past and stress that it is only a matter of time be-
fore Ajaria will be fully Christianized. Conversions to Christianity are pre-
sented as a return to AjariansÕ ÔnativeÕ Georgian faith and as the comple-
tion of a process of Ajarian Ôre-unificationÕ with the Georgian nation. At-
In the Caucasus as elsewhere in the former
Soviet Union, religion gained important
momentum after the abolishment of state-
atheism and the demise of communism.
T h e renewed importance and visibility of
religion in this region is often explained as
a return to, or revival of, pre-Soviet religious
practices and beliefs. However, the religious
dynamics in GeorgiaÕs southwestern
autonomous region Ajaria radically contest
such explanations. Here, the borders between
Islam and Christianity are shifting in favour of
the latter following increased confrontations
with post-Soviet Georgian nationalism.
Shifting Frontiers
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i n Post-Soviet Ajaria
C e l e b r a t i n g
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t h e A j a r i a n
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they were derogatorily called ÔTatarsÕ or ÔTurksÕ. Difficulties of reconciling
Muslim and Georgian identities were further strengthened by the new
educational system and the regional and national media which put great
emphasis on the Georgian Christian tradition and Christian elements in
Georgian language, culture, and history. 
The difficulty of restoring or maintaining Islamic lifestyles was also evi-
dent in many aspects of everyday life. For most Muslim Ajarians, ÔnewÕ de-
mands of Islam ran counter to the ways they had led their lives until re-
cently. Of course non-observance of religious demands was also consid-
ered sinful during the Soviet period, but recently the issues gained signif-
icance. Informants explained that during Soviet times it was completely
normal to combine Muslim identity with a lifestyle that violated Islamic
codes of behaviour. For anyone employed in a public function, continued
observance of religious demands was not a possibility and this was ac-
cepted even by Muslim leaders. As one informant put it: ÔWe didnÕt think
badly of anyone who drank at work or offered wine to guests; those
things were simply unavoidable.Õ But whereas then it was accepted be-
haviour for Muslim men to drink alcohol, to eat pork, or to withdraw from
the Ramadan, today it is more complicated to abstain from religious de-
mands and still maintain Muslim identity. The new possibilities for reli-
gious proliferation after socialism changed the expectations of how Mus-
lims should behave, expectations that have been hard to live up to. Infor-
mants frequently mentioned that Georgian customs of hospitality and
sociability necessitated violation of religious rules. To quote one infor-
mant: ÔWe have a long tradition of wine drinking. You have to serve wine
and drink together. People would think badly of you if you said that alco-
hol was prohibited in your house. It would be the same as saying that you
are not a Georgian.Õ The case is insightful because in Georgia the exten-
sive rituals of drinking are an integral part of everyday politics, of defining
who is who, and of expressing gratitude and respect. In Ajaria, moreover,
drinking has become a very powerful symbol of Georgianness. Abstaining
from it has not only made oneÕs social position difficult but has also been
interpreted as a rejection of the Georgian nation. 
Similar dilemmas were voiced when Muslim Ajarians talked about their
aspirations. Many young Muslims had the feeling that Islam pulled them
backwards instead of bringing them forwards. They worried about how
the insistence of Muslim leaders to teach children Arabic influenced kidsÕ
performances at school and how a Muslim life might handicap their fu-
ture. These young Muslims were often oriented towards city life, which
had in recent years become more explicitly associated with Christianity.
These dilemmas demonstrated the incompatibility of certain versions of
Islam with the demands of the larger national society. In part this was a
legacy of the Soviet period. During that period representations of culture
and ethnicity were stripped of all Islamic connotations. This meant that
the lifestyles of Muslims could not be legitimized by the language of eth-
nicity and culture, but were instead seen as village traditions or as left-
overs of a ÔbackwardÕ past. This continued to incapacitate the appropria-
tion of Islam in ÔculturalÕ and ÔethnicÕ presentations of ÔselfÕ, at least among
those who had embraced the national Georgian ideal. But these difficul-
ties also hint at possible breaches in the frontier. Over the last ten years,
new versions of Islam have been introduced and the relevance of the
state in the lives of individuals has changed. 
Frontiers of identity
Inhabitants of Ajaria have responded differently to the dilemmas out-
lined above. A brief summary of the material gathered in the district cen-
tre of Khulo Ð a town of 6,000 inhabitants located in the Ajarian highlands
Ð offers further insight into the patterns of religious change. 
Families in which one or several members converted to Christianity in
recent years had typically belonged to the Soviet middle class. They at-
tributed much value to education and sent their children to Georgian
cities to attend university. Members from these families used to have po-
sitions in the state structure and often had lived part of their lives in urban
areas in Georgia. They were less inclined to comply with local customs
and traditions and more apt to conform to what was seen as ÔmodernÕ or
ÔcivilizedÕ Georgian society. Civil servants, teachers, and higher adminis-
trative personnel dominate the ranks of new Christians. This educated
class actively contributes to the furthering of Christian expansion be-
cause it strengthens the prevailing nationalist Christian discourse in
Ajaria among their students, in the press, and simply because of their so -
cial position as brokers between the political lite and the local popula-
tion. What is more, the fact that the middle class increasingly turns to
Christianity contributes to the further isolation of Muslim voices.
Families that at least nominally adhered to Islam tended to have occu-
pations related to agriculture and technique; they predominantly ac-
quired only primary education and usually married within the region.
They defended their religious affiliation in terms of familial and commu-
nal identity and stressed that they remained true to the beliefs and values
of their parents and grandparents. While upholding the value of Islamic
traditions they also by and large accepted the messages of Georgian na-
tionalism. This ambiguous stance did not solve the incompatibility of
Muslim obligations with expectations of ÔGeorgianÕ behaviour in daily life,
resulting in dilemmas that over time often led to withdrawal from direct
involvement in religion. In other words, these Muslims acted in an envi-
ronment in which identification with Islam was contradicted by the de-
mands of a state within which they imagined their lives. 
However, among the younger generation there are those who found
new ways of integrating competing discourses in their personal lives.
New contacts across the formerly impermeable border with Turkey of-
fered new visions of Islam that seem more compatible with the aspira-
tions Ajarians hold for the future. Young men who had studied in Turkey
brought back a ÔpurifiedÕ version of Islam that served as an alternative to
the Ôvillage IslamÕ to which they objected. Moreover they used the exam-
ple of Turkey to prove that ÔmodernizationÕ and ÔIslamÕ were not mutually
exclusive. Interestingly, among those who were the least bothered by na-
tional discourse and its negative portrayal of Islam were entrepreneurs
who engaged in transnational trading activities. For them, it seemed,
Islam served as a space of refuge that eased the uncertainties of the post-
socialist era and was valued as a source of common identity in establish-
ing contacts during their travels to Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
These examples suggest that in some ways the state may lose its central-
ity in how people imagine and construe their lives. The opening of the
border with Turkey in the 1990s and the diminished capacity of the state
in providing for the necessities of life may cause people to structure their
lives increasingly around other points of reference, be they transnational
trading networks or religious centres in the Muslim world. 
In Ajaria the frontier between Islam and Christianity is changing. Be-
sides a shift of the frontier in favour of Christianity, the nature of that fron-
tier has changed as well. The ÔnewÕ demands of religion and nationality
have become increasingly difficult to combine, and the resulting contra-
dictions necessitate that Ajarians find new ways to reconcile religious and
national identities. The constant confrontation with the opposing ten-
dencies of Islamic and Georgian-national discourses has often forced
them to take sides. The result is the emergence of new religious bound-
aries on the frontier of the Muslim and Christian realms. But as the nature
of the state is changing it is uncertain how stable
these new boundaries will prove in the future. As
peopleÕs lives are increasingly detached from the
structures of the state, loyalties and frames of refer-
ences may shift and new borders of identity on the
religious frontier may consequently be drawn. 
P i l g r i m m a g e
t o D i d a c h a r a ,
a M u s l i m
village where
supposedly the
first Georgian
church was
built in the first
century AD.
I S I M N E W S L E T T E R  1 2 /  J U N E 2 0 0 3 4 7
Mathijs Pelkmans is a Ph.D. candidate at the
University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
H i s dissertation examines religion, ethnicity,
a n d politics in the Georgian borderlands. 
He is currently at the Max Planck Institute for
Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany, where
h e is preparing a new research project on
religious conversion in Kyrgyzstan.
E-mail: pelkmans@eth.mpg.de
H E A TH E R J .  S H A RK E Y
4 8 I S I M N E W S L E T T E R  1 2 /  J U N E 2 0 0 3
In the late twentieth century, many
Muslim thinkers reflected on the Christ-
ian evangelical enterprise and identi-
fied it as part of a modern crusade
against Islam.1 Before the First World
War, many Christian missionaries them-
selves would have agreed with this as-
sessment. In 1910, for example, a British
missionary in Iran embraced the cru-
sading ideal in an evangelical manual
entitled Crusaders of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, or the Christian Missionary and the
M u s l i m. Asserting that Muslims were
Ôvictims of unconscious ignoranceÕ, he
urged his missionary colleagues to act
and evangelize Ôfor pityÕs sakeÕ.2 A year later, a British missionary in Al-
giers used less forgiving language to exhort her peers, by declaring that
Ôthere are other plans besides frontal attack, other methods beyond
random blows at the rock-wall. We have to find the cleavage, and get
the powder in!Õ3
Christian missions to Muslims
Militant rhetoric of this kind was typical in a period when American
and British evangelical Protestants, in particular, proclaimed a goal of
Ôevangelization of the world in this generationÕ and anticipated rapid
conversions. Work among Muslims was part of a larger global scheme
for proselytism that also included Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, practition-
ers of local religions, and even ÔOrientalÕ Christians (meaning Copts, Ar-
menians, and other adherents of Eastern churches whom Western mis-
sionaries often described as practitioners of a corrupted and enfeebled
Christian faith). 
British and American missionaries had been operating in India, Egypt,
and greater Syria since the first half of the nineteenth century, but their
work among Muslims intensified and expanded in the 1880s and 1890s.
At a time when the global evangelical movement was growing dramati-
cally, missionaries adopted the language of high imperialism by fre-
quently invoking metaphors of morally justified conquest and battle-
readiness. For example, following on the heels of the Anglo-Egyptian ÔRe-
conquestÕ of the Sudan in 1898, British and American missionaries en-
tered the region to bring Christianity to Muslims while voicing plans to
ÔavengeÕ Gordon (the British general who had died years earlier in Khar-
toum at the hands of Mahdist Islamic
revolutionaries).4 Surveying western
and eastern Africa more broadly, evan-
gelical groups braced themselves for a
war against Islam, Ôtheir avowed antago-
nistÕ (to borrow the words of one 1885
source), in the contest for African souls.5
Meanwhile, critical and adversarial at-
titudes toward Islam also surfaced in the
writings of missionary scholars who cul-
tivated reputations as experts on Islam
and affiliated themselves with universi-
ties and theological colleges. One of the
most prominent and strident of these
was Samuel M. Zwemer (1867Ð1952), an
American minister of the Dutch Reformed Church who established mis-
sions in Iraq and Bahrain, organized international missionary confer-
ences, founded and edited the journal The Moslem World, and published
several books including, for example, a study of the Islamic apostasy prin-
ciple which deterred easy conversion to Christianity.6 Zwemer consistent-
ly portrayed Islam as a fanatical, backward faith that was incompatible
with modernity, and predicted its ultimate collapse. ÔLike all other non-
Christian systems and philosophiesÕ, he wrote, ÔIslam is a dying religion.Õ
Declaring that Ôwhen the crescent wanes the Cross will prove dominantÕ,
Zwemer averred that successful Christian evangelization was imminent.7
Despite a bold vision for expansion, years of steady work in African and
Asian cities and villages, and the predictions of missionaries like Zwemer,
Christian evangelists gained relatively few Muslim converts, although
they wrote proudly and frequently about their success stories. Among
the latter were converts like Kamil Mansur, a Muslim-born, Azhar-educat-
ed Egyptian who in the 1930s became a Christian evangelist and preach-
er in Cairo. Such exceptional cases aside, however, missionaries had
greater success in ÔconvertingÕ indigenous Christians such as Egyptian
Copts, many of whom went on to form the independent Egyptian Evan-
gelical Church under the aegis of the American Presbyterians.
The social impact of missionaries on Muslim communities was never-
theless much greater than conversion rates suggest, for two reasons.
First, missionaries founded schools and clinics that contributed to the de-
velopment of modern educational and medical infrastructures. In the
process, they catered to and intensively interacted with Muslim men,
women, and children from across the social spectrum. Second, mission-
ary work galvanized Muslim intellectuals to resist Christian evangelism
and to question Western cultural influences. At the same time, it inspired
some Muslim leaders to establish Islamist organizations that could sup-
plant Christian missions in the provision of charity and social services.
This trend was particularly visible in Egypt, where, for example, a Young
MenÕs Muslim Association (YMMA) emerged to rival the American- and
Canadian-backed branches of the Young MenÕs Christian Association
(YMCA) in offering athletic, educational, and recreational services to
urban males. More significantly for Egypt and the wider Muslim world in
the long run, Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928,
citing opposition to Christian missionaries as a major grievance and mo-
bilizing force.
Beginning in the 1930s, many British and American Protestant groups
began to scale back their missions to Muslims throughout the Islamic
world and increasingly emphasized the non-evangelical dimensions of
their educational and medical work. Depression-era financial stringen-
cies, combined with growing doubts about the merits and ethics of the
global evangelical enterprise, played a role in prompting some of these
changes, but so did increasing pressure from Muslim nationalists who
demanded rights of access for Muslim children to mission schools with-
out obligatory Christian study. During the interwar era, institutions such
E n c o u n t e r s
Scholars frequently acknowledge the force of
political Islam in shaping the Muslim societies
of Africa and Asia, but seldom consider the
role that Christian activism has played in
these societies, particularly in the context
o f Western imperialism and globalization.
O f central importance here is the history of
Christian missionary attempts to convert
Muslims in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries Ð a period when the British, French,
and Dutch colonial powers lent their
protection to European and American
evangelical groups that operated within
t h e i r overseas empires.
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as EgyptÕs American University in Cairo (founded by Charles R. Watson,
a second-generation Presbyterian missionary and author of a work enti-
tled Egypt and the Christian Crusade8) responded to nationalist pressures
by downplaying or eliminating their evangelical connections while
highlighting their general goal of community service. These trends ac-
celerated during and after decolonization as Christian missionaries lost
the protection afforded by the European empires Ð a change that made
the cultivation and retention of local goodwill a necessity as never be-
fore and exposed missionary institutions to the possibility of national-
i z a t i o n .
Muslim responses to missions
Judging from the anti-missionary treatises that have constituted a
thriving genre in Arabic during the post-colonial period, many Muslim
thinkers have regarded Christian evangelism and its legacies as a grave
and continuing threat to the integrity of Muslim societies in a western-
ized, globalized world. At the same time they have asserted close and
continuing historical connections between a triad of t a b s h i r, i s t i ' m a r,
and i s h t i r a q Ð that is, Christian evangelism (often also rendered as t a n-
s i r, Christianization), Western imperialism (in its political, economic,
and cultural dimensions), and Orientalist scholarship on Islam and
M u s l i m s .9 A general assumption in many of these works is that Chris-
tians and Muslims remain locked as rivals and antagonists in a kind of
civilizational clash, thereby showing that the views of Samuel Hunting-
ton and his supporters find a reciprocal Islamocentric expression.1 0
While some Arabic writers have merely diagnosed the evangelical
threat or discussed its historical workings, others have offered advice
on how to respond in its wake. Thinking globally, some have urged Is-
lamic mission (d a ' w a) to counteract Christian evangelism, that is, by re-
versing the ÔcontestÕ for souls. Thinking locally, others have urged Arab
national governments to police more rigorously Western educational
institutions that enrol Muslim students. Governments must ensure that
Muslim students receive Islamic education and must try to protect
them from dangerous Western influences and practices, such as
mixed-sex socializing for unmarried teens and young adults. These ed-
ucational prescriptions pertain both to international schools that cater
mainly to expatriate children as well as to Western-style institutions
that have historical roots in missionary enterprises.1 1
Concerned with the gravity of the Christian threat, one Gulf Arab
writer has called for more isolationist measures and policies. He pre-
scribes the following measures: Arab lites (who often value English-
language education for their children) must stop patronizing Christian
schools and should avoid socializing with non-Muslims in general, and
Arab governments should shut down churches that serve expatriates,
institute policies against hiring non-Muslims as guest workers, and dis-
courage or otherwise restrict Muslim men from marrying Western
Christian women. While such marriages are permissible under Islamic
law, this author notes, they run the risk of Westernizing children within
the precincts of their own homes.1 2
Among Muslim writers, the most widely excoriated and despised
missionary is the aforementioned Samuel M. Zwemer, author of T h e
Disintegration of Islam. Zwemer died a half century ago, but many Ara-
bic works discuss him as if he were still alive and present him as the ar-
chetypal modern crusader, forging imperialism, Orientalism, and evan-
gelism into a pernicious anti-Islamic alliance.1 3 Strikingly, Zwemer re-
tains the admiration of some Christian evangelical groups today who
hail him as an ÔApostle to IslamÕ and as Ôthe greatest [modern] mission-
ary to the Islamic worldÕ; for these audiences, a couple of his books re-
main in print.1 4 A controversial and confrontational character during
his lifetime, Zwemer remains divisive even in death and in some sense
embodies the polarizing idea of the clash of cultures.1 5
Consign crusades to the past
In these Arabic works that discuss Christian evangelism, Muslim writ-
ers insist that the crusades are far from over. They argue that when the
original crusades proved to be a military failure, Christian powers later
adopted evangelization as a cultural weapon instead, aiming to de-
moralize Muslims and thereby to facilitate their subjugation.16 S i n c e
the work of Christian missionaries, thus construed, was a form of cul-
tural power-mongering, one writer has even suggested that the ideol-
ogy of Western evangelists should be described not as m a s i h i y y a
(Christianity) but rather as s a l i b i y y a (crusaderism): a political strategy in
the guise of religion.1 7
E n c o u n t e r s
The recent crusading rhetoric emanating from the United States, be-
fore and during the Anglo-American Iraqi invasion, may seem to lend
credence to claims about a persistent Western crusader-imperialist
mentality. Consider, for example, the US military programme to devel-
op a Ôcrusader artillery systemÕ and President George W. BushÕs post-11
September invocation (later retracted) of a ÔcrusadeÕ against Muslim ter-
rorists and their sponsors.1 8 Consider, too, debates about the political
Jesus occurring in the American arena. Rejecting narrowly pacifist inter-
pretations of his career (with implications for the Iraq conflict), one con-
servative think-tank analyst affirmed in a recent New York Times e d i t o r i-
al that Jesus was also, as the Bible declares, Ôthe Lion of the Tribe of
JudahÉwho judges and wages warÕ.1 9 One thing is certain: among both
Muslim and Christian audiences, the frequent use of militant Christian
metaphors in the current political milieu Ð for example, among some
American evangelicals who have been exhorting their followers to di-
rect Ôprayer missilesÕ and Ôcruise and scud prayersÕ to defeat the Iraqis in
war Ð can only worsen perceptions of global, religious-based conflict.2 0
There are at least two lessons to be learned from the history of mod-
ern Christian missions to Muslims. The first is that one cannot under-
stand political Islam without recognizing its tension-fraught relation-
ship to political Christianity and to the legacies of Western imperialism.
The second is that practical attempts to promote communal coexis-
tence and interfaith relations between Christians and Muslims must
reckon with this imperialist history while seeking to consign crusades
to the past.
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The Dutch government is one of the
main Western donors in Yemen and
numerous development projects have
been established and supported with
Dutch development aid.1 These pro-
jects are in most cases implemented in
cooperation with Yemeni ministries.
The Hodeida Urban Primary Health
Care Project was a bilateral project be-
tween the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Yemeni Ministry of Pub-
lic Health. Established as a pilot project
in one of the squatter areas of Hodeida
in 1984, the project extended its activi-
ties to all government health centres in
Hodeida in 1993. In 1999 Dutch sup-
port to the project came to an end and
the project assets and activities were
completely handed over to the Yemeni
Ministry of Public Health. 
In the fifteen years of its existence the project had come to be seen as
one of the most successful attempts to improve basic health care in
Yemen and the experiences in Hodeida functioned as a blueprint for
other projects and for health care policies in Yemen. The project was
considered a success for two reasons. First, a primary health care system
had been set up with a strong focus on preventive mother- and childcare
such as weighing and vaccinating children, pre- and postnatal care,
health education, family planning counselling, and home visits to moth-
ers in the areas around the
health centre. Second, the
project had successfully
trained women as m u r s h i-
d a t, while in other parts of
the country it was very diffi-
cult to recruit women. This
was due to the low status of
certain health care profes-
sions, the low level of edu-
cation of girls and women,
the heavy workload of
women (in particular in
rural areas), cultural notions
such as that of the male as
breadwinner, and gender
segregation Ð all of which
worked against womenÕs
employment. In eight yearsÕ
time almost one hundred
young women were trained
in Hodeida and employed
by the Yemeni Ministry of
Public Health. These women had moved out of their houses, taken up
paid work in health care, and, in some cases, even became managers of
clinics. Dutch development workers saw the m u r s h i d a t therefore as pio-
neers, who were able to improve the health situation in Yemen by pro-
viding preventive health services and in addition shifted the boundaries
of dominant gender ideologies by taking up paid work in the public
sphere. Yet, aspects of the work of the
m u r s h i d a t that were seen as emancipa-
tory, such as engaging in paid work and
carrying out home visits, also had their
downside. Some of the murshidat w e r e ,
for example, forced to take up paid
work, while doing home visits to unre-
lated families affected their respectabil-
ity negatively.
Three cohorts of m u r s h i d a t
The ways in which the m u r s h i d a t
benefited from their work or experi-
enced new forms of social control de-
pended much on the historical period
in which they became m u r s h i d a t a n d
on the social and economic status of
their families. In the fifteen years of the
project three cohorts were distin-
guished: the first cohort was trained in
1985 and 1986, the second cohort between 1988 and 1990, and the
third cohort after 1990. 
The women in the first cohort came from (lower-)middle class fami-
lies living in the city centre. They saw their training as m u r s h i d a t m a i n-
ly as a next step in their educational trajectory; they were not looking
for paid work. While both education and paid work of women were
negatively valued in their families, these women were inspired by the
revolutionary slogans of the 1960s in which the relationship between
education and development was promoted by the Yemeni govern-
ment. They saw their training as m u r s h i d a t as a form of self-develop-
ment; they highlighted, for example, their ability to overcome the ob-
stacles put up by their (male) relatives or by the local community. The
fact that the m u r s h i d a profession was a new phenomenon in Hodeida
was also helpful. It gave them ample opportunities to emphasize cer-
tain aspects of their work and to downplay other aspects in order to
make their work acceptable to their relatives. They stressed, for exam-
ple, that they were working with mothers and children and were not
having contacts with unrelated men, but they kept silent about the
home visits they carried out. The fact that they did not live in the squat-
ter areas where the project was located at first, made it easier for them
to hide the exact nature of their work from their relatives and neigh-
b o u r s .
The women in the second cohort, in contrast, were living in the squat-
t e r areas. Their parents were often rural migrants from villages in the
Tihama, the coastal strip on the Red Sea, or returnees from Africa.
While during the Imamate many Yemenis had migrated to East Africa,
they returned in the 1970s when nationalist governments came to
power there and migrants lost their favourable position. Also, YemenÕs
president al-Hamdi encouraged Yemeni migrants to return home and
promised them employment and free housing. Yet, al-Hamdi was as-
sassinated in 1977 and little of what he had promised ever material-
ized. The young women living in the squatter areas often felt obliged
to leave school in order to take up paid work. Becoming a m u r s h i d a
was a reasonable alternative, as it was less of a low status profession
than working in factories or domestic work. It was a new profession in
health care, focusing on mothersÕ and childrenÕs health, supported by
a foreign donor, and with a clear modern character as visible in the
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From 1993 until 1998, Marina de Regt was
employed as an anthropologist in what has
been regarded as one of the most successful
Dutch-financed projects in Yemen:
t h e Hodeida Urban Primary Health Care
Project in the port city of Hodeida. Working
together with a group of young women who
were trained as health educators (m u r s h i d a t
s i h h i y a t ), she was impressed by their strength
and motivation to bring about social change.
Yet, gradually she also gained insight into
t h e more ambiguous elements of their work,
as their training and employment had ushered
i n new forms of social control. Were
t h e m u r s h i d a t pioneers, successfully trans-
gressing gender boundaries in Yemen,
o r were they pawns, deployed to realize
t h e agendas of the Dutch donor and
t h e Yemeni state? 
Pioneers or Pawns? 
Women Health Workers
i n Y e m e n
ÕThe project was based on the
assumption that social change could
be effected through interventions Ð
by government institutions and
development organizations. Yet,
whereas numerous development
policies were designed, the s u c c e s s
or failure of the project was mainly
dependent on external factors
outside of their control.Õ
officials saw the training of m u r s h i d a t as a temporary solution for the
shortage of female health personnel. Supporting primary health care
was mainly seen as a gateway to foreign development aid while they
preferred the introduction of highly sophisticated curative technolo-
gy. The women trained as m u r s h i d a t were mainly interested in contin-
uing their education and in gaining a position of higher status than
that of m u r s h i d a. The fact that m u r s h i d a t ÔonlyÕ offered preventive ser-
vices, and therefore had a relatively low status in the community as
well as in the health establishment, made them long for higher posi-
tions. 
In addition to the different interpretations of the profession and the
subsequent negotiations that took place between the three main ac-
tors, local, national, and international developments strongly influ-
enced the course of the project. The project was based on the assump-
tion that social change could be effected through interventions Ð by
government institutions and development organizations. Yet, whereas
numerous development policies were designed, the success or failure
of the project was mainly dependent on external factors outside of
their control. For instance, the Gulf crisis and the subsequent presence
of young, educated women in need of paid work had positive conse-
quences for the project. Whether the project would also have been so
successful without their presence will remain an unanswered question.
While the women of the first and second cohorts benefited from the
fact that the profession was new and unknown, in the 1990s the m u r-
s h i d a profession became a generally accepted type of work for women.
On the one hand, this was a positive development. However, becom-
ing integrated at the lowest echelons of the health system, this also
meant that the profession lost its special status. The women trained
during the 1990s no longer enjoyed the advantages of working in a
new profession Ð this was the more so when they were no longer
trained solely by foreign donor organizations but
also by the Yemeni Ministry of Public Health.
Nonetheless, the profession was still attractive for
women of poor families because it was one of the
few ways to obtain government employment for
women with only six years of primary school.
Hence, the m u r s h i d a t can be seen both as pio-
neers and as pawns. They made strategic use of
the opportunities available and in some cases
transgressed gender boundaries. But in doing so,
they also encountered new forms of (self-)disci-
pline and social control. Whether and how they
benefited from the opportunities or were restrict-
ed depended on a variety of factors. Of major in-
fluence were the historical period in which they
entered the profession and the social and eco-
nomic position of their families. 
availability of project transport and new uniforms, and with financial
benefits such as the payment of overtime and a Ramadan bonus. The
fact that the m u r s h i d a t were government employed and therefore
benefited from important advantages such as a tenured contract with
a monthly salary, and the right to sick leave, maternity leave, and a
fixed number of holidays per year, also contributed to the positive
evaluation of the profession. The young women of the second cohort
saw their training and employment therefore as a form of upward mo-
bility and as a way to improve the social and economic status of their
families. 
The third cohort consisted mainly of young women who had been
born in Saudi Arabia but were forced to settle with their families in
Yemen in 1990 and 1991. As a result of YemenÕs position in the UN Se-
curity Council, in which it stood against military attacks on Iraq, the
governments of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States changed the resi-
dence rights of Yemeni migrants.2 Around 800,000 Yemenis returned
to Yemen, and many settled in Hodeida, the first major city after the
Saudi border. Within a year the population of Hodeida increased from
200,000 in 1990 to at least 300,000 inhabitants in 1991. The young re-
turnee women who had benefited from the well-organized education-
al system in Saudi Arabia were forced to interrupt their schooling. Be-
cause unemployment was rampant in Hodeida, their male relatives
were often unable to provide for their families. While these women
probably would not have taken up paid labour in Saudi Arabia, they
were forced to do so in Yemen. Brought up in a society in which paid
labour of women was negatively valued and where only professions
that required a high educational level, such as teaching and medicine,
were seen as respectable for women, they often saw their employment
as m u r s h i d a t as a decrease of status and they tried to improve their po-
sition in different ways. This was further stimulated because they faced
additional hardships as returnees from Saudi Arabia. Continuing their
education to upgrade their qualifications and become a nurse, mid-
wife, or even a doctor was one of the main strategies they employed.
Moreover, they also wore Saudi-style covered dress in order to empha-
size that they came from a modern country, where a high standard of
living was combined with a conservative form of Islam.
The politics of development 
Because the m u r s h i d a t profession was a new phenomenon in
Yemen, the three main actors in the project, the Dutch donor organi-
zation, Yemeni state institutions, and the m u r s h i d a t, could interpret
the profession differently. The Dutch donor organization emphasized
the importance of training and employing women as health educators
because they formed a link between the health centre and the local
community and were therefore able to establish a primary health care
system. The fact that the training of women also fit well in Dutch dis-
courses on women and development was a side effect. Yemeni state
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N o t e s
1 . In 1996 the Dutch government spent USD
37988 on development cooperation with
Yemen. In 2002 the Dutch government
increased its budget for Yemen to 50 million
euro in order to support the Yemeni
governmentÕs activities to fight terrorism
and to alleviate poverty in the six poorest
regions of the country.
2 . While other foreign guest workers in Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States needed a Saudi
sponsor (k a f i l) to obtain a residence permit,
Yemenis had always been allowed to work
without a sponsor and a residence permit.
From 19 September 1990, Yemenis lost this
special status.
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pline one into being organized; and
fasting is good for oneÕs health (Yõ l m a z
et al. 1997Ð9). Not only does rationaliz-
ing religion bring the classes into line
with the more conventionally secular
subjects, such as chemistry and nature
study (Starret 1998); it also paves the
way for the interpretation that secular-
ism and Islam complement each other.
Because secularism is not atheism, it
cannot be against Islam and because
Islam is a rational religion with com-
mitment to freedom, it embodies the principles of secularism anyway.
Because it does not mean atheism, it is a principle that guarantees the
protection of pure piety in the face of bigotry (ibid.). 
Furthermore, secularism is repeatedly explained as separation of re-
ligious affairs from state affairs, the stateÕs equal distance from all be-
lief systems, protection of peopleÕs religious and moral freedoms, pre-
vention of abuse of religion in political affairs, and a prerequisite of
modernization/westernization (ibid.). Yet the same texts avoid dealing
with the existence of a directorate of religious affairs within the state or
the o b l i g a t i o n to attend the religion classes. Kaplan (1996) concludes
that children are not Ôexpected to question the incongruity between
freedom of conscience and mandatory religion lessons in primary and
secondary schoolÕ. 
Sanctifying the modern nation
Textbooks for religion classes in Turkey can also be said to have be-
come a medium in which nationalism and militarism are inculcated. To
give a very crude numeric example, the one-hundred-page fifth grade
primer has twenty pages on love of homeland in addition to six pages
on Ataturk, laicism, and Islam; whereas the second longest chapter is
on belief in prophets, with twelve pages. This is a feature repeated in
all textbooks with varying degrees of emphasis. 
In fact, the sacredness of protecting the homeland is an overwhelm-
ing theme that finds its way into many seemingly irrelevant sections
such as Ônice habitsÕ or Ôsocial responsibilitiesÕ as well as more overt
topics such as homeland, patriotism, history of wars, etc. Homeland
and the Turkish flag are frequently associated with the blood of sol-
diers who died in wars with enemies (Yõ l m a z et al. 1997Ð9). This, then,
is tied into the sacredness of universal conscription. Because Ôprotect-
ing the homeland from all kinds of attacks is a sacred responsibilityÕ, Ôit
is improper for a Turkish man to evade conscription or avoid joining
the army using various excusesÕ (ibid.). 
Yet the climax comes when the military and the army banners are
listed among the Ôsacred valuesÕ that require reverence. The military as
an institution is given the venerable responsibility of protecting the
homeland against enemies, who are elusively defined in terms of Ôin-
ternal and externalÕ threats. Yet the texts do not stop there. They go on
to transform the army into a sacred value to be fought for: Ôthe Turkish
army is our most valuable wealth, composed of the sons of this home-
land, enabling our nation to live in security. Our army is the insur-
E d u c a t i o n
Universal religious education, which
every Turkish citizen receives in school
for five to eight years, is a relatively
under-researched aspect of studies on
the state and Islam in Turkey. Litera-
ture on the topic usually discusses
classes on religion in the contempo-
rary context in two distinct ways. On
the one hand, the introduction of reli-
gion classes into the curricula is seen
as a major compromise from Kemalist
secularism Ð that is to say, it is dis-
cussed as an important representation of the radical shift from the sec-
ular ideals of the early republican period, which the notion of the Turk-
ish-Islamic synthesis, overtly adopted in the 1980s, brought about. On
the other hand, several writers explicitly argue that compulsory reli-
gion classes, together with other legal and institutional practices such
as those of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, reveal that secularism in
Turkey has not necessarily been about the separation of sacred and
secular spheres, but rather a state control over acceptable definitions
and practices of religion (Parla 1992, T a r h a n l õ 1993). 
However, describing the secular practice in Turkey as state control
over the religious sphere Ð and universal schooling in religion as a
manifestation of this phenomenon Ð is a correct but insufficient expla-
nation. The textbooks for classes on religion and morality take up ideas
of nationhood, homeland, Ataturk, militarism, secularism, economic
and political solidarity, and orderliness as much as, and sometimes
more than, pillars of Islam and religious belief in general. The state
functionalizes religion and attempts to use it as a terrain to legitimize
other ideologies. Ultimately it involves a larger process of socialization,
reaffirming some of the basic premises of the republic.
Secularizing religion
A publication of the Ministry of Education, Din gretiminde Yeni Yak-
l a s i m l a r (2000), which addresses teachers, gives instructions for the
Ônew approachesÕ in religious training through several articles written
by ÔspecialistsÕ designated by the ministry. The preface self-appoints
the book as the guide that teachers should consult both in their gener-
al practices of teaching and also in understanding what religious in-
struction involves. It is said that if this aspect of education is neglected,
there is the danger of ÔothersÕ ÔbrainwashingÕ the students. These im-
plicit ÔothersÕ are in fact pervasive beliefs in society that religious edu-
cation Ôenables students to contemplate aboutÕ through its provision
of the ÔcorrectÕ information about religion and its ability to raise the
consciousness of students. As a result, precisely because religious in-
struction is transformed into ordered knowledge that requires special-
ization, it becomes the stateÕs responsibility to undertake its teaching
as Ônot all parents, not all families, can do this, or know enough them-
selves about religionÕ.
Naturally, it is not much of a new discovery to say that Islam and its
rituals are rationalized extensively in these books. For example, in this
context ablution helps keep one sufficiently clean; daily prayers disci-
In the debates on the issue of secularism and
Islam the Turkish Republic is often mentioned
as an example of how a Muslim society can be
governed by secular principles. Secularism
implies the separation of religion and state.
A careful reading of textbooks used in
universal religious education reveal that
Turkish secularism does not only entail state
control over the meaning of religion, but that
religion is also used to promote nationalism,
militarism, and the existing economic order.
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mountable guard of our state, flag, independenceÕ (ibid.). Hence an or-
ganization that would conventionally be seen as part of a secular na-
tion-state framework is turned into a holy institution that protects ven-
erable assets Ð and therefore is one itself. In his study of the eighth-
grade civic book, Kaplan (1996) notes how the state is depicted as a sa-
cred institution: Ôthe state from the religious point of view is an institu-
tion that Allah created for mankindÕs benefit.Õ The sacralization of the
army reinforces this veneration with a militarized nuance. 
Capitalizing social harmony
Just like the unquestioned premises of security and need for protec-
tion, societal peace is also a major preoccupation of these books. Sta-
bility and harmonious relations among people are naturalized by re-
sembling this state of affairs to the way the rest of nature functions
(Yõ l m a z et al. 1997Ð9). Kaplan (1996) argues that to the Turkish state
pedagogue, education is the means to impress a national culture that
can ensure social stability. The promotion of stability is especially sig-
nificant in a context where ethnic and socio-economic conflicts are in-
creasingly part of the agenda. Thus, any value that is promoted is
somehow linked with the maintenance of social peace and stability. 
One way in which this is done is by the promotion of Platonic division
of labour: Ôthe peace and safety of a society depends on the harmo-
nious work of people Ð who serve in different institutions and organi-
zations of the society Ð within the division of labour. If people do not
undertake their share of the responsibilities in a consistent manner,
the order of society will be disruptedÕ (Yõ l m a z et al. 1997Ð9). The
groups cited as forming integral parts of this totality are women as
mothers, men as fathers, children as helpers of mothers and fathers,
factory workers who are to complete their work in the best way possi-
ble, state officials who have to work in a timely fashion and in harmony
with their managers, entrepreneurs, and traders who are supposed to
earn money and spend it through h e l a l means, and soldiers and police
forces that are given the responsibility to protect the countryÕs Ôindivis-
ible wholenessÕ (ibid.).
Relevantly, a section in the sixth-grade textbook begins with a dis-
cussion of how one can attain happiness by believing in and exercising
the pillars of Islam. Then students are introduced to the concept of
happiness as something that is beyond material well-being: Ôfor exam-
ple, a poor person may look for happiness in material wealth because
he assumes his misery is a result of his material deficiency. This may be
partially true, too. If a poor person reached material relief and if his/her
material needs were met, he may be happy. Yet, this happiness even-
tually fades awayÕ (ibid.). This is followed by a discussion on the vice of
jealousy. Jealousy is described in terms of coveting the more prosper-
ous, the more successful, and the more beautiful. The basic moral is
that one has to try to imitate and learn from others instead of wrongly
craving for the their belongings. In a context of incrementally increas-
ing income inequalities, exacerbated by frequent economic and politi-
cal crises, this can be taken to be timely moral advice Ð the internaliza-
tion of which may be hoped to diminish chances of social uprising. If it
is possible to instruct children into thinking Ôone needs to work very
hard to become richÕ (ibid.), then it might also be possible to sustain
the idea that Ôanyone can make itÕ and that if you can not, it is your per-
sonal fault. 
The books also have something to say if you are one of the lucky
ones. Modest people are defined as those who Ôdo not descend to be-
coming spoiled because of their social position and prosperityÉ. God
does not like people who are arrogant and haughty. He does not like
people who make fun of those that are poor or without high social
rankÕ (ibid.). Thus the circuit is closed: the impoverished are not to
covet the riches of the affluent because jealousy is a major vice, while
the latter should be modest enough to respect the less lucky ones. 
In both cases, the roots of this inequality are not made the concern of
religion or social morality. Instead practices that allow inequality to
persist without the emergence of social crises or personal reservations
are encouraged: Ô[g]iving of alms is the bridge that connects the rich
and the poor with loveÕ (ibid.). The same thing is true for the way jus-
tice is conceptualized: Ô[i]n the implementation of rights and justice,
people should not be discriminated with respect to their religion, lan-
guage, m e z h e b, race, richness, or povertyÕ (Yõ l m a z et al. 1997Ð9). Thus
justice does not mean the eradication of wealth differentials but
ÔequalÕ treatment of people without reference to their level of material
well-being. 
C o n c l u s i o n
Universal religion classes in Turkey are a peculiar aspect of the al-
leged secular nature of the state. They have been offered in one form
or another for most of the republican history, and made obligatory
after the military coup in 1982. The study suggests that the generally
held opinion that secularism in Turkey can be more accurately defined
as state control of Islam is valid but can be further elaborated. One way
in which this can be done is by looking at how these books become ter-
rains for other ideologies. They are full of writings on secularism, na-
tionalism, militarism, and a capitalist notion of so-
cietal peace. The reproduction of these ideolo-
gies in connection with Islamic premises provides
them with a sanctity that may not be obtained so
easily otherwise. In other words, Turkish secular-
ism does not only mean state-exercised control
over the meaning of right religion. On the peda-
gogical level, it also operates as a divine legit-
imization for various facets of the official ideolo-
gy. Specifically by taking in the production of reli-
gious knowledge in its sphere, the educational
system is able to make use of a sacred sphere in
promoting nationalism, militarism, and corpo-
ratist capitalism. 
Fifth grade religious studies textbook.
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Practices related to gifted persons and
their gift, vrki, were hardly explored
within Soviet ethnography, and when
they were, they were considered Ôquack-
eryÕ in the context of ÔirrationalÕ practices
of Ôpopular medicineÕ as oppposed to
ÔrationalÕ uses of herbs and minerals.1
Moreover, during the Soviet period peo-
ple conducted their activities in secret
out of fear of being persecuted for prop-
agating superstitions and charlatanry.
The notion of v  r k i may be seen as proof of the endurance of Ôpopu-
lar IslamÕ in the post-Soviet era, but the ÔofficialÕ/ÕpopularÕ dichotomy
concerning Islam often appears to be meaningless, as is true in the
case of v  r k i. ÔGiftedÕ mullahs, for instance, exist; Islamic clergy is not
ÔgiftedÕ ex officio but it happens that some of them receive the ÔgiftÕ.
One mullah from Ashkhabad, who had a Ôvery strong giftÕ for rainmak-
ing, was well educated and fluent in Arabic. In another example an
alumni of an Islamic college in Saudi Arabia had the ÔgiftÕ of soothsay-
ing by use of pages from the Q u r ' a n. Adversely, a ÔgiftedÕ woman
showed me a picture of a mullah whom she was healing. Local tradi-
tion says that Mirmovsum  t - A g h a, the most famous seyyid in the Sovi-
et period, had the ability to heal.2 Nevertheless, many of those who are
highly educated in religious matters are sceptical and point to verses in
the Q u r ' a n and h a d i t h that condemn foretelling and divination. Espe-
cially the local Muslim intelligentsia is uneasy about such Ôsupersti-
tiousÕ practices.3
It is believed that a ÔgiftÕ is inherited and not to be learned. The ÔgiftÕ
may be strong or weak: an example of a weak ÔgiftÕ is the ability to re-
move a fear by applying burning pieces of cloth to the skin. Such a Ôre-
movalÕ of fear, called c h i d l a g, is transmitted from generation to gener-
ation by way of either the feminine or the masculine lineage (women
attend only women and men only men) and is regarded as an inheri-
tance of secret knowledge. No distinction between mental and physi-
cal disease as such is made; rather, one broad category of ÔinternalÕ dis-
eases may be healed by the gift. Nobody visits ÔgiftedÕ persons in the
case of toothaches or eye problems, which are considered ÔexternalÕ.
The ÔgiftÕ can only be received Ôfrom on highÕ, from holy persons Ð
very often S h i ' i imams, who are considered to be closer to God. The
concept of v  r k i parallels that of h  r m e t (ÔvenerationÕ, ÔrespectÕ), the re-
lationship connecting someone of low rank in the social hierarchy with
someone of high rank. H  r m e t manifests itself in a sacrifice to a saint or
traditional offering (n i z a r) to a seyyid but also in payments made to po-
licemen and other state officials as a token of respect to those situated
closer to the authorities. 
The function of broker taken up by those who are ÔgiftedÕ is rather
ambivalent. A ÔgiftedÕ person who has gained personal wealth is re-
garded with distrust, but this does not stop him/her from having many
clients. Professional foretellers and healers are credited when every-
thing they say proves correct, but there are also complaints about
tricksters. The prevalent view is nevertheless that the proper attitude is
to give a gift in order to show h  r m e t to some extent. 
Shamanism and other analogies
A number of concepts connected with the notion of the ÔgiftÕ suggest
a certain analogy to shamanism. It is believed that those who are Ôgift-
edÕ recognize one another. The place where someone obtained the
ÔgiftÕ has special significance and it is
called odzhag (which also means fire, a
house of a saint, and a part of wall cov-
ered by holy pictures). An odzhag is vis-
ited by ghosts that are afraid of people
but that show themselves to and talk
with the ÔgiftedÕ. It is believed that
there is no escape from the ÔgiftÕ and
that, at first, it generates suffering and
illness comparable to shamanistic ill-
ness and initiation dreams of ÔcalledÕ
shamans in the Turkic traditions.4 There are some ecstatic elements in
healing similar to practices of dervishes (m e r s i y y e - k h a n e) , who utter
laments for Imam HusseinÕs death and then fall into a trance, speaking
through crying and gesticulating emotionally. 
The world of the ÔgiftÕ and the ÔgiftedÕ fits well into post-Soviet syn-
cretism. In Baku, Russian Orthodox and Jewish foretellers ÔconsultÕ each
other: a Jewish woman may very well visit a ÔgiftedÕ Muslim girl for help
with marriage problems. Walls of houses of Muslims are covered not
only by pictures of the S h i ' i imams but also by Orthodox icons. On the
bookshelves the Q u r ' a n stands alongside the New Testament and
Russian occultist books. One female Muslim informant who had been
asked by Mary in a dream to visit the Orthodox church, stated that her
Ôluck is written down in Arabic letters but [her] cooking ability in Jewish
lettersÕ. The power of the ÔgiftÕ Ð I was told Ð Ôis Muslim, Christian, and
Jewish as wellÕ. It would be perhaps more appropriate to apply that
statement to the post-Soviet-era renaissance of occultism.5
Religious Practice
On the Apsheron Peninsula of Azerbaijan,
i n particular in the so-called Ôgreen beltÕ,
regarded by many as a stronghold of
traditional S h i ' i religiosity, including such
small towns as Nardaran and Mashtaga near
Baku, the concept of having the ÔgiftÕ (v  r k i)
o f healing and telling the future has remained
part of popular belief. V  r k i is obtained from
S h i ' i imams and other holy people
b y m e a n s o f d r e a m s .
Healing and
Foretelling Practices 
in Azerbaijan
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U p d a t e
Tay Ninh, a province located near the
Cambodian border, is home to seven
Cham Muslim villages. Their main
claim to fame is that they are consid-
ered the most backward of all Cham.
The Cham Student Programme (CSP)
was born in one of these villages after a
1995 family reunification visit by Mr
Abdulla Ysa. Learning that his nephew Sale had placed first in the
provinceÕs college entrance exams, but was planning to work in the
familyÕs field because the family was poor, an idea started to form.
Money was found, and Sale entered college a year later. In 2002, he
graduated from Ho Chi MinhÕs University of Social Sciences and Hu-
manities, having majored in English, Malay, and computer science.
Seeing the impact that this had on the other young people, a deci-
sion was made to provide scholarships to students from grades ten to
twelve, those who took college preparatory classes during the sum-
mer, and those who were admitted to college. For the 2000Ð2001 aca-
demic year, the CSP spent 360 USD to sponsor three secondary school
and 17 high school students. For the 2001Ð2002 academic year, the fig-
ure rose to 800 USD to support 48 secondary school and 16 high school
students. For the 2002Ð2003 academic year, 1440 USD was spent to
support 32 students from grades eight to nine, 23 students from
grades ten to twelve, one university student, two students taking col-
lege preparatory classes, and four students in community college.
As the programme becomes more popular and the students keep
asking their parents to let them pursue their education, the number of
students receiving scholarships continues to increase Ð with the full
support of local and provincial Vietnamese education officials.
G o a l s
The CSPÕs leader in Vietnam is Mr Cham Huong Mit, who has worked
closely with local and provincial officials. After receiving several Ôtempo-
raryÕ permissions to operate the programme, he secured official recogni-
tion for the programme on 22 May 2000, when the provincial govern-
mentÕs student programme issued a decree allowing and encouraging
the CSP to continue its activities. Recently, the CSP also received official
ÔpermanentÕ permission to operate from 2002 until 2005. Vietnamese of-
ficials have praised the CSP as being one of the best-run programmes in
the province. In addition, its activities are covered by local television sta-
tions and newspapers.
Having reached this level of acceptance, the CSPÕs top priority is to
encourage the students to become bilingual in Cham and Vietnamese.
Cham students are taught in their native language only until the fourth
grade, after which they are main-
streamed. As many find the transition
difficult, they drop out. Also, given that
Vietnam does not have compulsory ed-
ucation laws and that extra labour is
welcomed by the parents, many of
whom saw no value in a modern (as
opposed to an Islamic) education be-
fore the CSP appeared, attrition rates are high.
The Vietnamese government would like to see more Cham teachers
qualified to teach both Cham and Vietnamese to their students. The CSP
supports this goal, and also encourages students to major in English and
computer science so that
they can participate in Viet-
namÕs national development
plans.
The CSP seeks to bring the
Cham together by support-
ing local soccer teams so that
the students can get to know
each other. This is easier said
than done, however, as Cham
from different villages, not to
mention different provinces,
have a long history of not co-
operating with each other.
According to Mr Mit, this atti-
tude is now held only by a
small minority. In exchange
for this support, students are
to attend Islamic classes in
local mosques. As a result,
their patronage of local cof-
fee shops, pool halls, or just
hanging out has declined no-
ticeably. Most local Islamic
officials support the pro-
gramme, and local Islamic
teachers, both male and fe-
male, are being supported fi-
nancially by the CSP and the
Vietnamese government.
The Vietnamese government allows the Cham to acquire Islamic litera-
ture in Vietnamese. To meet the demand, a group of Cham Muslims in
California so far has translated the following books: Prayer Made Simple ;
The Beloved Prophet; The Holy Qur'an (1997, Vietnamese text only); Toward
Understanding Islam, Islam at the Crossroads; and 40 Hadith. In early 2001,
the Vietnamese government allowed the printing of 1,000 copies of a
Vietnamese-Arabic Qur'anin Hanoi and its distribution to Cham commu-
nities. Hopes are high that all CSP students will receive a solid grounding
in Islam.
P l a n s
The CSP is planning to expand into Dong Nai, a neighbouring province
that has only one Cham village. The students have made it clear that they
want to join the programme and further their education. When sufficient
funds become available, CSP officials hope to sponsor Cham students in
Tay Ninh and Dong Nai provinces all the way from grades one to twelve,
as well as those in college. Beneficiaries have agreed to direct some of
their earnings to the programme to support new students and so that the
programme can become self-supporting. Also in the works is a training
centre to teach students computer repair and sewing.
In the first issue of the ISIM Newsletter ( p g . 1 4 ) ,
Jay Willoughby reported on some recent
developments in the small and little-known
community of the Cham of Vietnam. Five years
later, he gives an update, in particular on
t h e progress in education as illustrated by
t h e Cham Student Programme.
The Cham Student
P r o g r a m m e
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The Cham Muslims of Vietnam are
descendents of Champa, an indigenous
Hinduized empire that ruled much of
southern Vietnam from 192 AD until
t h e 1490s. After the rise of Islam, Muslims
began stopping in Champa to acquire
i t s aloe-wood and other products for resale
in China. Archaeological remains show
t h e presence of a small Muslim community
during the mid-tenth century. For many
years, Islam spread only among the lite.
However, by the time of its demise, most
Cham were Muslim. Some scholars
attribute this to the ChamÕs desire to
maintain ties with the largely Muslim Malay
world to which they are related ethnically,
culturally, and linguistically.
A f t e r t h e sixteenth century, however,
t h i s contact was lost.
Local Vietnamese officials participate in a ceremony to honour
Tay NinhÕs Cham Muslim scholarship recipients at the b e g i n n i n g
of the 2002Ð2003 academic year.
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F e a t u r e s
was thrilled when she heard that I was too, and complained about her
compatriots, who were not: ÔYou are fasting!? This is wonderful, Julia, I
am glad you are! We must break the fast together some day. There are
not very many people who take this seriously, IÕm afraid, even though
we are a Muslim country. WeÕll talk later!Õ And off she went to another
appointment. I would have loved to discuss the issue further at that
point, but she, like so many others here, has an incredible workload
and receives only a small salary in return. 
Two male students of mine were also fasting Ð Bakyt, who shares a
flat with five others, who were all fasting, and Samat, who shares a flat
with three others, who were not. Samat told me about his experience
and expressed his surprise: ÔIÕm the
only one who is fasting in my flat; one
of my flatmates is Russian. Of course he
doesnÕt fast. But the other two are
Afghans, and I expected them to be
rather conservative, but they are not.
We are cooking together in the
evening, but in the morning for the
s u h u r meal, IÕm the only one who gets
u p ! Õ
There are a lot of street vendors in
Bishkek, selling anything from single
cigarettes to bread, filled pasties, bat-
teries, sweets, or dried apricots. They
are still there during Ramadan doing
business as usual and people are eat-
ing, smoking, and drinking. Consump-
tion during daytime did not seem to
decrease during that month, if I can
trust my own observations. Whereas in
Jordan, where I have been living for
two years, during Ramadan shops
would not open until late in the morn-
ing, get crowded in the afternoon, and literally nobody would be in the
streets after sunset, nothing Ð on the surface Ð seemed to distinguish
BishkekÕs street life during Ramadan from that during the rest of the
year. But this was Bishkek, and Bishkek is not the rest of the country.
I remember a conversation with another one of my colleagues,
Nazgul, a sociologist, who was not fasting. When I told her about my
suspicion (hope?) that in rural areas people would be fasting, she de-
nied this: ÔBelieve me, nobody is fasting here. My own family is living in
a village and none of them has ever done anything like this!Õ That was
three oÕclock in the afternoon and still a long way to go till sunset. A
third colleague joined us and offered us tea, which I refused. Nazgul ac-
cepted, but turned around to tell me: ÔThis is very embarrassing for me,
because I should be the one who is fasting, not you! I feel really bad
about it, but IÕve never fasted in my whole life, and I probably will never
do.Õ Most of the people I spoke to either admired people who fast or
were completely non-understanding, and had never really thought
about Ramadan. A friend of mine explained that the only time she ever
fasted was when she had been to the United States as an exchange stu-
dent: never before, and never after. Being a Muslim, as Bishkek proves,
indeed varies in terms of norms across the globe.
Ramadan in Kyrgyzstan
An EthnographerÕs Gaze on Fasting
ÕWho of you is fasting?Õ, I asked the thirteen students who took my
course ÔIntroduction to IslamÕ. One single hand at the back of the class-
room was raised. This course was part of an exchange programme that
sends European teachers to post-Soviet republics, and I had come to
KyrgyzstanÕs capital, Bishkek, in order to teach some courses in social
anthropology for one semester. This particular course was attended by
students of sociology, political science, and ethnology, who referred to
themselves as Muslims. And yet, their formal knowledge of Islam was
minimal. I suppose nobody can blame them for this, as they have
grown up in a society that has previously been declared ÔatheistÕ and is
nowadays considered to be secular. For me, as their teacher Ð from Eu-
rope and a Christian Ð realizing that I
knew a lot more about ÔtheirÕ religion
than they did was extremely awkward.
The strange feeling that accompanied
me throughout the teaching of this par-
ticular course (I did not experience it in
the other courses I was teaching) peaked
during the month of Ramadan, when
probably the majority of Muslims in the
world are fasting from dawn till dusk. My
previous experiences of living and trav-
elling in the Middle East1 seemed to
show that Ramadan plays a central role
in most MuslimsÕ lives, even if they do
not practise their religion otherwise.
This was not so in Kyrgyzstan. Although
a majority would identify themselves as
M u s l i m s2 when asked, fasting for most of
them did not seem to be an issue. So
there I stood in front of my class, expect-
ing similarities to my previous fasting
experiences, and had difficulties finding
just one who was fasting. Why was this
experience so disappointing for me? Could my ÔfaithÕ be ÔrestoredÕ by
finding others who took Ramadan seriously? These two questions
haunted me throughout the month of Ramadan and beyond, and
these questions I attempt to answer here.
I cannot speak for the whole of Kyrgyzstan in terms of fasting prac-
tices, let alone religious practices in general. In the six months I have
been here so far, I have only occasionally ventured outside Bishkek,
and most of my time is spent with people of a certain societal stratum
Ð the highly educated middle class. Very often these people have told
me about their families living outside Bishkek and even invite me, but
these contacts so far remain limited. After I had realized that hardly
anyone was fasting in my immediate environment, I came to the pre-
liminary conclusion that this could have been expected, because of the
exposure to high education, ÔwesternizedÕ norms and values, and pos-
sibly the remains of Soviet-style Ôscientific atheismÕ or at least secular
ideas in the capital. I tried to convince myself that in other parts of the
country people could potentially be fasting and
be faithful to their ÔMuslim heritageÕ that I expect-
ed to encounter. 
Thus, one of my students, whose family lives in
a rural area of Kyrgyzstan, had indeed told me
that whereas she herself does not fast, her family
does Ð everyone except the youngest children.
And then there was this colleague of mine Ð
Jyldyz, an ethnologist Ð who enthusiastically
helped me to get acquainted with Kyrgyz culture,
history, and traditions, who had taken me to her
family in a small village, and who was fasting. She
N o t e s
1 . There I started fasting for the first time Ð
n o t only as a good spiritual exercise, but
also as an expression of my solidarity with
those Muslims who live under extremely
harsh conditions.
2 . Of course, this does not apply to the
Russian, German, and other minorities that
are mainly Christian, and make up about
2 0 per cent of the entire population of
K y r g y z s t a n .
Julia Droeber is lecturer in social anthropology at the American University Central Asia
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ÕYou are fasting!? This is
wonderful, Julia, I am glad you
are! We must break the fast
together some day. There are not
very many people who take this
seriously, IÕm afraid, even though
we are a M u s l i m c o u n t r y . Õ
I n s t i t u t e s
How do modern Moroccans view a
forty-year-old king with the old Islamic
title of Commander of the Faithful,
who presents himself on occasion as a
young sportsman? What were the ex-
periences of Arabs in HitlerÕs concen-
tration camps? How does the internet
change patterns of authority and com-
munication in the Muslim world? And
what did it mean to live on the shores of the Indian Ocean, for example
in Zanzibar, where historically Africa met India and the Middle East?
Questions such as these are at the core of research projects at the
Berlin Centre for Modern Oriental Studies. The research fellows, most
of whom work on projects lasting two to three years, explore the histo-
ry, anthropology, economy, and present problems of African and Asian
societies with a special focus on Islamic societies and their interaction
with non-Islamic neighbours. In contrast to the dominant trend that
views these regions predominantly with regard to their importance (or
otherwise) to Europe, researchers at the Centre aim at understanding
the local perspectives. ÔThe WestÕ obviously does not disappear entire-
ly in such a perspective, but relations among and between regions of
Africa and Asia often dominate. 
It is therefore appropriate that the current research programme cen-
tres on the processes and consequences of translocal movements in
this wide area. Its historical perspective allows for historicizing the
flows of people and goods, as well as the processes by which the his-
torical actors cope with change. Thus, studying the Indian Ocean raises
questions similar to those which have been discussed with regard to
the Mediterranean and help, in very similar ways, to overcome the re-
gional divides that area studies and the creation of academic depart-
ments have tended to erect. One might even argue that the same
holds true for the study of other ÔnaturalÕ divides such as the Sahara. 
In order to avoid at least some of the problems of earlier generations,
the Centre tries to cooperate closely with colleagues from the areas
being studied. The Centre particularly invites younger colleagues from
these areas to apply within the framework of the research pro-
grammes. Furthermore, the Centre regularly hosts guests from the re-
gions both for longer research stays and for numerous workshops and
conferences organized by the different projects. It is our hope to fur-
ther intensify this type of cooperation with colleagues from the region
in future years.
The Centre for Modern Oriental Studies is uniquely placed for such
studies, because it is one of the few institutions combining regional ex-
pertise on different parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East with dif-
ferent disciplines. Created as an independent research institute to con-
tinue some of the research of the former East German Academy of Sci-
ences in a new framework and in close cooperation with academics
from the Western part of Germany, the institute has developed into a
lively institution that sees itself as a pioneer in promoting interdiscipli-
nary and transregional cooperation. Researchers work in groups,
which is in itself a novel experience for many in the humanities. 
Activities and services
As with any genuinely academic institution, the CentreÕs workshops
and publications are at the core of its scholarly output. The Centre
edits a monograph series that is currently being revised to become a
refereed series accepting manuscripts from outside the Centre. A sec-
ond series of working papers comprising bibliographical studies,
source editions, etc. is published in a printed edition but might be
turned into an internet publication. Both series feature books in Ger-
man and English on topics such as The Transformation of Asian and
African Societies under Colonialism (ed. Heidrich 1994), Responses to
Globalization in Asia and Africa ( e d s .
Fllberg-Stolberg, Heidrich, and Schne
1999), and Space on the Move ( e d s .
Deutsch and Reinwald 2002). The most
recent publication investigates the
role of Afro-Americans in the relations
between the US and Africa (Fllberg-
Stolberg 2003). The Orient, a bulletin
produced twice to three times annual-
ly and distributed for free, offers information about current activities of
the Centre. The CentreÕs website is now being developed into a space
for publication, in addition to providing information on the Centre and
links. It also hosts a valuable database that provides access to institu-
tions that boast know-how in the wider area of matters relating to
Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
The Centre runs a regular lecture series and organizes sessions to in-
form the public about Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Roundtable
talks provide the researchers with a more informal opportunity to
meet academic visitors or discuss work in progress. In addition, the
Centre organizes occasional public events either at its seat or at other
venues, often in cooperation with other institutions in Berlin. Many of
the CentreÕs research staff also teach Islamic and African Studies, an-
thropology, and other subjects at the Free University and Humboldt
University in Berlin.
Thanks to funding from the city, the Centre is housed in a mansion
built in the early twentieth century. Besides providing office space for
researchers and accommodation for academic visitors, the building
houses the CentreÕs library of some 50,000 volumes and 90 journals. It
comprises a number of valuable donations, in particular the library of
the founding director, Professor Fritz Steppat, with his large Arabic lan-
guage collection.
Funding and organization
The Centre is currently funded mainly by two institutions: the city of
Berlin provides the physical and institutional infrastructure, while the
German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) has
committed itself until 2007 to supporting the research programme.
Thus, the approximately 20 researchers at the Centre need to apply for
their projects jointly through the Centre. While this occurs in regular
cycles that are advertised, the Centre also supports individual re-
searchers in their applications to other funding organizations. The
CentreÕs Advisory Council, consisting of prominent academics in the
main subjects and regions represented at the Centre, plays an impor-
tant role in the development of the research profile. 
Future plans 
The Centre is currently undergoing a dynamic phase of develop-
ment. This is due to the fact that the position of director had been va-
cant for some years after the untimely death of Professor Haarmann in
June 1999. The Centre is seeking new ways of publicising its results and
communicating them to wider audiences. It also plans to intensify and
broaden its international cooperation, which, hitherto, has functioned
mainly on the basis of individual contacts. For example, the Centre is
hoping to build cooperation with young Turkish historians on the topic
of urban history in the framework of a joint project with the Freie Uni-
versitt and the Institute of Advance Studies, Berlin. The Centre hopes
to expand its historical breadth to include researchers working on top-
ics concerning periods as far back as the sixteenth century in order to
challenge the notion of modernity being brought to the Islamic world
in the nineteenth century. It would further like to widen its scope of re-
search to include Central Asia and Southeast Asia, the latter currently
being covered for the first time in the CentreÕs history.
The Berlin Centre for Modern Oriental Studies
(ZMO) was founded in 1996. ZMO is dedicated
to the historical, social, and cultural study of
the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.
A p a r t from conducting its own research
programmes the institute promotes
t h e development of research networks
o n national and international levels. 
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The Centre for Modern
Oriental Studies in Berlin
For further
information please
consult the CentreÕs
website: www.zmo.de
or send an e-mail:
z m o @ r z . h u - b e r l i n . d e
Ulrike Freitag is
director of the Centre
o f Modern Oriental
Studies and professor
of Islamic Studies at
t h e Free University
i nB e r l i n .
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Editors Pick
To Afghanistan and Back
A Graphic Travelogue
Ted Rall
New York: NBM, 2002
When bombs began raining on the
Taliban, Ted Rall hopped a plane to
the war zone. But the only cartoonist
to go to Afghanistan got more than he
bargained for: prisoners blowing
themselves up with grenades, anarchy
and Afghan porn, armed bandits
hunting journalists to rob and murder
them. At a time of unquestioning flag-
waving, Rall went with hard questions
and came back with some disturbing
a n s w e r s .
Sacred Spaces
Exploring Traditions of Shared Faith
i n India 
by Yoginder Sikand
New Delhi: Penguin, 2003
The politics of communal hatred in
recent times has brought under attack
the heterodoxy of our religious life.
This book explores popular religious
cults from various parts of the country
that defy the logic of communities as
neatly separated from and necessarily
opposed to each other. Travelling
from Kerala to war-torn Kashmir, and
from Punjab to Madhya Pradesh,
through twenty-five places of popular
pilgrimage Ð d a r g a hs, temples, and
shrines Ð Yoginder Sikand finds
followers from different communities
flocking together in common worship.
Multi-Level Discrimination of
Muslim Women in Europe
Jochen Blaschke (ed.)
Berlin: Edition Parabolis, 2000
This book investigates the experiences
of discrimination and the life histories
of Muslim women in different
European countries. Muslim women in
Europe are a most vulnerable social
group. They are visible, since most of
them wear a scarf or another symbol
of being a Muslim. They are territor-
ialized by their milieus and cultural
boundaries; they have needs arising
from their cultural difference in
comparison to an environment and
society which is dominated by
Christian heritage; and they
participate in immigrant-communities
or religious milieus in which women
have minor social status.
Law and Power in the Islamic World
by Sami Zubaida
London: I.B. Tauris, 2003 
Islamic Law and its application is a
central issue in contemporary Muslim
politics and culture. Starting from the
modern concerns, this book examines
the origins and evolution of the shariÕa
and the corpus of texts, concepts, and
practices in which it has been
enshrined. The central paradox in this
history is one of power: the shariÕa is
juristsÕ law, theoretically derived from
sacred sources, yet dependent for its
institution and application on rulers
with their own agendas and priorities.
Transcending Borders
Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam in
Southeast Asia
by De Jonge, Huub & Nico Kaptein
( E d i t o r s )
Leiden: KITLV, 2002
Arab immigrants to Southeast Asia
have long exerted a quiet but
profound influence on the economic,
political, social, and Dreligious
developments in the region. The 10
essays in this volume discuss the
interrelationships within the various
Arab communities, as well as between
these communities and society at
large, from the perspective of various
disciplines: history, sociology,
anthropology, and Islamology.
I S I M  P U B L I C A T I O N S
The following ISIM publications are available in hard copy.
Please use the order form on the ISIM website.
Publications in the ISIM Papers Series include:
Ð Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East (ISIM Papers 1)
by James Piscatori
Ð Thinking about Secularism and Law in Egypt (ISIM Papers 2)
by Talal Asad
Ð S h a r ' i a, State, and Social Norms in France and Indonesia (ISIM Papers 3)
by John R. Bowen
Ð ÔTraditionalistÕ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (ISIM Papers 4) 
by Barbara D. Metcalf
Special ISIM Publications include:
Ð Muslim JuristsÕ Quest for the Normative Basis of S h a r ' i a
(ISIM Inaugural Lecture) 
by Muhammad Khalid Masud
Ð New Voices of Islam
by Farish A. Noor (Interviews with Muslim Intellectuals)
The following publications are forthcoming:
Ð Muslims, Minorities, and Modernity: The Restructuring of Heterodoxy in
t h e Middle East and Southeast Asia (ISIM Chair Inaugural Lecture)
by Martin van Bruinessen
Ð A Naqshbandi Tlmaque 
by Sü e r i f Mardin (ISIM Papers 5)
A r t s
Personal Quest for
Happiness in Islam
t Transformation No. 1, acrylic on canvas
s A s h o u r a d, oil on canvas
t Hirz One (Amulet One), acrylic
a n d mixed media on w o o d
The exhibition The Path of Beauty and
Happiness will be on display at the
Wereldmuseum Rotterdam until Sep-
tember 2004. This exhibition offers an
overview of the ideas and forms of life
of the Islamic mystics, and displays the
present day and the past in beautifully
executed works of art, ritual objects,
photographs, poetry, and mystical
music. Peepholes have been made in
the exhibition for children, behind
which special objects can be seen. The
ÔTheater de EvenaarÕ picks up on the ex-
hibition with related lectures, work-
shops, concerts, special thematic
evenings, and literary salons.
For more information:
Wereldmuseum Rotterdam
Willemskade 25,
3016 DM Rotterdam
The Netherlands
Tel: + 31 (0)10-270 71 72
w w w . w e r e l d m u s e u m . n l
Theater De Evenaar
Tel: + 31 (0)10-270 71 90
Islamic mysticism has had a great influence on art and
culture. Modern-day artists also draw inspiration from it.
Exciting examples of this can be seen at the Wereld-
museum Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
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